

ब्रह्मसूत्रा ज्योतिर्मय

SANTINIKETAN
VISWA BHARATI
LIBRARY

325.3

S40

COMPARATIVE COLONIAL POLICY

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE AMERICAN COLONIAL POLICY.

BEING THE PATNA UNIVERSITY READERSHIP LECTURES, 1925.

BY

V. SHIVA RAM,

M.A., PH.D. (Harvard) F.R.HIST.S.

HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, LUCKNOW UNIVERSITY,
SOMETIME RESEARCH EXHIBITIONER, EMMAUS COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE,
BOWDOIN PRIZEMAN AND PARKER TRAVELLING FELLOW, HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
AND FORMERLY SENIOR LECTURER IN HISTORY, CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY.

WITH A FOREWORD BY

THE RIGHT HON. LORD OLIVIER P.C., K.C.M.G.

LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO., LTD.

6 OLD COURT HOUSE STREET, CALCUTTA

53 NICOL ROAD, BOMBAY

167 MOUNT ROAD, MADRAS

LONDON, NEW YORK AND TORONTO

1926

PRINTED BY THE
GANGES PRINTING CO., LTD.
CALCUTTA.

Dedicated

THE MANDATES COMMISSION OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

With the hope that by their timely and statesman-like policy they may be able to avert the conflict of colour and the disasters of a possible world-war between European and non-European races and thus contribute to permanent world peace.

PREFACE.

In the spring of 1925, the Patna University invited me to deliver a series of lectures on Comparative Colonial Policy with special reference to the American Colonial Policy. The present work is the outcome of those lectures, though they have not been revised for publication since they were originally delivered in lecture form. It is nearly a quarter of a century since the late Professor Paul S. Reinsch first published his pioneer works on Colonial Government and Colonial Administration. No other work has been published in English since that time dealing with the Colonial Policies of England, France, Holland and the United States of America from a comparative point of view, and it is to supply this long-felt need that the present work has been undertaken. No one is more conscious of the defects of the book than I am, and limitations of time and space have prevented a fuller treatment of the subject. The absence of specialist libraries in India, like the library of the Royal Colonial Institute of England, has been a severe handicap and the book could not be revised in such a manner as one could have wished. A work of this nature, covering so broad and controversial a field, is open at every point to charges of partisanship, but I have tried throughout to keep an open mind. Copious footnotes and references have been deemed unnecessary as an exhaustive and detailed bibliography is given in an appendix. The

first six lectures give in outline a brief account of the Colonial Policies, of Portugal, Spain, Holland, France and England, and the last six deal with the Colonial Policy and administration of the United States of America and the Mandate principle.

It is not customary to think of the United States of America as a Colonial Power. Nevertheless, her whole history is the history of successful colonisation, first of contiguous temperate regions, and since 1900, even of non-contiguous areas in the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea, chiefly on the theory that trade follows the flag. Though the United States of America was the last of the great Powers to enter the colonial field, yet its experience, especially in the Philippines during the last 25 years, is valuable in showing how a democratic republic based on the principle of the "consent of the governed" puts into operations those basic principles in the governance of its alien dependencies. American Policy in the Philippines has a far reaching effect on the colonial policies of other great Powers holding colonies in Asia. It is for this reason that an attempt has been made in this book to study the colonial policy of the United States of America in somewhat greater detail. To sum up that policy in the words of an American statesman, "no dependency has made such a rapid and all round progress in so short a time as did the Philippines under the American regime." Another writer asserts "Philippine independence will light a new lamp in Asia." Expectant Asia, which houses and feeds one half of the human race, is watching to see whether America will put into operation her

twin-principles of "the consent of the governed" and "self-determination." The nations of Asia all demand self-determination. Egypt has regained her independence. Korean nationalism has reasserted itself. Representative institutions are being tried successfully in Java, the Philippines and India, resulting in the demand for responsible Government based on the principle of self-determination. •

The relations of the so-called backward and advanced races of mankind in the 20th century is the greatest problem of the age and upon the successful solution of this problem, the permanent peace of the world depends. Every educated man, woman and child can contribute to the solution of this problem by creating and maintaining the right kind of atmosphere. A new social conscience has to be developed whereby the same public morality will govern the relations of the peoples of Asia and Europe, which determines the conduct and morality of private individuals of Europe among themselves.

The Mandate Commission of the League of Nations is endeavouring to establish a new principle of 'trusteeship' in the development of tropical regions under European control. Never before in human history has the consciousness of the interdependence and solidarity of the various parts of the world been realised as it is to-day. The ideas of 'trusteeship' implied in the mandate principle cannot therefore but react sooner or later on the older colonial powers in the governance of dependencies like India, Java and Korea. The extension and application of the idea of 'trusteeship' to the governance of these older

dependencies will no doubt solve to some extent the problem of racial relationships. It will thus help the establishment of a permanent and enduring world peace and a composite civilisation,—a civilisation to which all nations and races of the world can contribute their own quota. The dawn of such a day is already discerned by the best minds of both Europe and Asia, and whoever contributes to this ideal whether by precept or practice is doing a real service to humanity.

My best thanks are due to the Right Hon. Lord Olivier for his kind interest in the work, and to my colleagues Messrs. V. K. Nandan Menon and D. S. Dubey of the Lucknow University, for their kind help in proof reading and verification. I have also to thank Mr. L. L. Sundara Ram for help with the Index.

V. SHIVA RAM.

“ Nalanda,”

Lucknow,

June 5th, 1926.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

	PAGE.
MOTIVES OF COLONISATION	1-27
1. Pressure of Population	3
2. The Missionary Motive	6
3. The Desire for Exploration and Adventure	10
4. The Commercial Motive	12
5. Means of Communication as an impetus to Imperialism	21

CHAPTER II.

THE COLONIAL POLICY OF PORTUGAL, SPAIN AND HOLLAND	28-53
1. Portugal	28
2. Spain	34
3. Holland	40

CHAPTER III.

THE FRENCH COLONIAL POLICY	45-73
1. First Phase of French Colonial Activity	54
2. Struggle between England and France for Empire	56
3. Expansion of the French Empire in the XIXth Century	58
4. Government and Administration of the French Colonies	64
5. Political and Economic Value of the French Colonies	70

CONTENTS

CHAPTER IV.

	PAGE
EXPANSION OF BRITISH EMPIRE, 1600-1815 - - -	74-96
1. Introductory - - - - -	74 ⁿ
2. Expansion by Plantations, Settlement, Trade and Conquest - - - - -	77
3. English Revolution and Colonial Policy - - -	82
4. Effects of the French Revolutionary war on colonial policy - - - - -	85
5. Expansion in the Near-East - - - - -	90

CHAPTER V.

BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY 1815-1878 - - - -	97-114
1. Development of the Empire in the Pacific and Africa - - - - -	97
2. The influence of the <i>Laissez Faire</i> and the Manchester School - - - - -	101
3. Canadian Rebellion: its causes and results -	108
4. British Policy in India - - - - -	112

CHAPTER VI.

BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY 1878-1919 - - - -	115-140
1. Consolidation of British power in the Near East, 1878-1885 - - - - -	120
2. Egypt - - - - -	124
3. British Imperial Problems - - - - -	130

CHAPTER VII.

ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM OF THE UNITED STATES - -	141-169
1. Revival of European Colonial expansion and the partition of Africa - - - - -	142
2. American Policy in the Hawaii and the Pacific -	154
3. American Policy in the Carribean Sea - - -	156
4. The Constitutional Basis of Expansion - - -	167

CONTENTS

xi

CHAPTER VIII.

	PAGE.
AMERICAN POLICY IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS	170-192
1. Historical	170
2. Local Self-government	175
3. Resident Commissioners to the United States	190

CHAPTER IX.

HOME RULE IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS	193-218
1. The Jones Act of 1916	193
2. The Governor-General	195
3. The Philippine Legislature	203
4. The Administration of Justice	209
5. The Financial condition of the Philippine Islands	212

CHAPTER X.

PUBLIC EDUCATION, HEALTH AND SANITATION	219-233
1. Moral and material development of the Philippine Islands	219
2. The Library Movement	228
3. The Philippine Health Service	231

CHAPTER XI.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROGRESS IN THE PHILIPPINES	234-252
1. The Development of Agriculture and Industries	234
2. Recent Political Developments	242
3. The Independence Movement	248

CHAPTER XII.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE MANDATE SYSTEM	253-278
1. The Control of the Tropics and the origin of the Mandates	253
2. Mandatories and Mandated Territories	264
3. The League of Nations and the Backward Peoples	270

FOREWORD.

Professor Ram's survey of the history of colonisation and his analyses of colonial policy will be read with interest and, I may say, with pleasure, on account of the mass of information which they contain and the lucid and skilful manner in which that material is handled. But this book has the additional interest and value of being an examination and criticism of European colonisation by a distinguished scholar who is himself a native of one of the countries which have been the subject of the Imperialising process. That process naturally presents itself to such an observer in a somewhat different aspect from that in which it is habitually displayed by publicists writing from the metropolitan point of view. Neither the motives nor the effects of the process may appear to such an intelligent critic quite so admirable in all respects as they may to the imperial writer. With regard to the contents of this book, I myself consider that the criticisms are on the whole sound, but at the same time I think that some of them—as is only natural, show some failures of appreciation both of the facts and of the merits of the proceedings described.

The reason is that British Imperial relations (to speak of these only) have arisen out of and are still

actuated by three or four different strains of policy and intention and that generalisations which are accurate or fair with regard to parts of those relations or particular territories are inapplicable and unfair in regard to others. To make in each case the necessary discrimination or reservation would, in such a book as this be practically impossible.

Such partial irrelevancies or unfairnesses however, as might, in my opinion be pointed out, I neither propose nor desire to enlarge upon. Those criticisms which should induce European colonising peoples to reflect upon the aspect which their operations present to subject peoples are stated and documented in these pages irrefutably enough to stimulate recognition of the very important fact that the whole balance of Imperialist relations is now entering a new phase throughout the world.

The salient thesis of these pages is that the dominant present purpose of Colonial Imperialism, as distinct from merely commercial intercourse, is exploitation by capitalistic enterprise, and the most important circumstance which has come into action during the current century is that African and Asiatic peoples have begun very generally to criticise the balance of values arising from capitalistic exploitation, not only on the grounds on which that balance is criticised in European countries, where the capitalist and wage earning classes are at any rate members of one nationality and sharers in a common civilisation, but also in relation to the destructive effect of the intrusive contact of alien systems on their own racial genius and civilisation.

This is especially the case in India, the seat of a very ancient and characteristic civilisation which is even to-day in certain respects manifestly of a higher quality than the common civilisation of the conquering European peoples, although in certain other respects manifestly less progressive and less efficient for purposes of survival. But the same is the case even in Africa, in which the disadvantages of destroying native institutions and customs, as offensive to Christian civilisation, is being more and more resented, not only as it always has been by the natives themselves on the simplest and most direct personal grounds, but now also on critical grounds by those natives who have had the advantage of European education and who are able to join with Professor Ram and unprejudiced European ethnologists and sociologists in detached analyses of the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the social and human inheritance of different races. In this connection it is extremely significant that the policy which in South Africa, half a century ago, was associated with the name of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, is now apparently on the way to become the official and deliberate policy of the principal South African Governments. Sir Theophilus Shepstone, the son of a Christian missionary in Natal, conducted an uphill but in the outcome practically victorious fight against the theory of Liberal colonisers and Christian missionaries that the Zulu should be transmogrified into the character and social habits of an ordinary British artisan or agricultural worker. The institution of polygamy with its attendant economic basis, the institution of tribal

ownership of land and tribal administration, were preserved by this policy and made part of the law of the Colony. Lands were reserved for the natives, from which European proprietorship and exploitation were as far as possible excluded. The Union Government of South Africa and the Government of Southern Rhodesia have now arrived at the point of accepting a policy which confesses that the only possible means of preserving the vitality and allowing scope for the growth of the best characteristics of native societies in South Africa and for enabling Europeans and Africans to live together in the same continent without increasing hostility, is for such segregation to be as far as possible established or re-established, and for the development of the domestic and social civilisation of the natives to be allowed to proceed upon its own lines without legislative interference with any but the most disastrous customs. It may be appropriate in this connection to quote the words of the recent Report of the Southern Rhodesia Land Commission :—They say :

“ The evidence leaves no room for doubt as to the wishes of all classes of the inhabitants affected, and we have no hesitation in saying that an overwhelming majority of those who understand the question are in favour of the existing law (enabling natives and Europeans to own land anywhere) being amended, and of the establishment of separate areas in which the two races, black and white respectively, should be permitted to acquire interests in land. Missionaries,

farmers and town-dwellers, the officials of the native department, the natives in the out-districts and reserves, in so far as they can grasp the subject, and the more advanced natives, are generally speaking all of one mind in this respect."

And the following has a further relevance to what I have referred to as the new attitude of subject peoples towards colonising imperialism :—

"In the world generally the relations between the white and coloured races tend to become more and more embittered; and of those who have given the subject most thought, many fear that wars of extermination between the races will take place in the future, unless effort is made to secure a better understanding between them"....."On that account, and especially where the two races are living in the same country, it becomes all the more necessary to remove as far as possible all causes of friction."

It must be disconcerting to the most self confident Imperialists to read such an extremely pessimistic testimony as this, to the effects of British Imperialism in South Africa, under the auspices of a chartered company, the London shop front of which was specially dressed with aristocratic and philanthropic Directors as a guarantee to the British public that its activities would be unexceptionable. The Chairman of the Commission from whose Report I have quoted was a distinguished Colonial servant of long experience as a judge in Africa, and another

member was one who had himself been, for years, the British South Africa Chartered Company's Land Agent.

Professor Ram devotes a considerable section of his book to a very thorough examination and survey of what is perhaps the most interesting and important experiment in modern imperialism, namely, the history of the relation of the Government of the United States to the Philippine Islands. This will be matter with which many readers have been hitherto unfamiliar, and they will appreciate the thoroughness with which the topic is handled. The Government of the United States had always disclaimed being a colonising power. When it annexed the Philippine Islands it did so in the guise of a liberator of an oppressed people from the effete domination of Spain. It proclaimed its own entire disinterestedness and its intention after a short period of tutelage in democratic institutions to establish complete self-government in the Islands. The experiment may well be regarded as a crucial one, having regard to the character, nationality and numbers of the population. The history is not yet complete. It breaks off somewhat abruptly. In 1921 President Harding declared that the progress of the Filipinos in all directions had been unequalled by any other people under similar conditions and within the same period of time. Yet in 1923 the Filipinos were petitioning for the removal of their Governor-General on the ground that he had set at nought all understandings the Filipino people had had with the American Government and had ignored

the assurance given them by the late President, whilst President Coolidge was expressing his unqualified support of the Governor and his full confidence in his policy, good intentions, fairness and sincerity. The autonomy of the Philippines still hangs fire.

The American declaration that the flag of the United States which was raised in the Philippines after the Spanish War, was an emblem of liberty and not of slavery, a symbol of humanity and civilisation and not of selfishness and exploitation, expressed the same aspirations as were embodied in President Wilson's "Fourteen Points" and in the idea which underlay the establishment of the League of Nations as a controlling authority for colonial policy in territories which it was not considered (on whatever grounds) advisable to leave entirely autonomous. And Professor Ram does not overrate the importance of the idea embodied in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League with regard to the future of the relations between the colonising powers and the communities and territories which they have colonised or may desire in the future to bring within the sphere of European intercourse. The ideas embodied in that Article are sound and vital and furnish the only basis of hope for happy future relations between these diverse communities. The machinery of the League of Nations as at present established provides a scaffolding, a machinery and a theory which are quite capable of being used for the purpose in view, namely preventing the exploitation of weaker races and of ensuring a fair access for all countries of the world

to the resources of its various regions. But the idea and the theory are very far indeed from being yet in efficient working order. They were provided in good faith, but no nation or government which has accepted a mandate can be credited with having exercised that mandate in accordance with the intentions of the Article. Unless the League of Nations is to fail and to dissolve, it must be made stronger and act more strongly. At the present time the Mandatés Commission and its sub-committees are still working on progressive lines, both in regard to the question of slavery and in regard to the treatment of native races; but their work is very uphill and stubbornly distrusted by nationalist, and capitalist interests and it still remains to be seen whether that obstruction will not succeed in defeating the purpose of the Mandate system, so lucidly and sympathetically set forth by Professor Ram in his closing chapter.

OLIVIER.

CHAPTER I.

MOTIVES OF COLONISATION.

“ Colonisation is the activity which decides the future of the human race.”

A colony is an outlying possession of a national state, the administration of which is carried on under a system distinct from, but sub-ordinate to, the government of the national territory. In other words, a colony may be defined as a political dependency, settled or prospectively to be, settled, to some degree, by the citizens of its dominant state, or it may be peopled principally by another race (as in India, Java, Korea, etc), but in every case the government of the colony must acknowledge some form of allegiance to the mother country.

The technical use of the word colony includes all settlements under the control of the British Colonial Office. There are two kinds of colonies—settlement and investment colonies. The former are situated in the temperate region or moderate zone in which the original population has been largely or entirely displaced by emigrants from the mother country, who settle in the new region and engage in agriculture and the other arts of industrial life, as in Canada, Australia, etc. Exploitation or investment colonies, on the other hand, are found in the tropics, where small numbers of Europeans undertake the development and management of natural resources. They are roughly of four kinds, viz., the military or strategic stations like Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Malta and

Singapore required for military reasons; the commercial like the Straits Settlements, Indo-China and Tunis, acquired for commercial reasons. In the original colonisation of India, of Africa, and of Java commercial enterprise was a primary motive. This is especially true of the original colonial activity of the Dutch, the Portuguese and the English. The third class of colonies is the agricultural or plantation colonies in which the citizens of the mother country settle as proprietors or managers of large plantations. The islands of Java, Ceylon, West Indies and the colonies of tropical Africa are examples of this class. In these colonies capital is supplied by white men and labour by the native races. The fourth class consists of industrial colonies in which the natives are sufficiently civilised to supply both labour and capital. Egypt and India represent the industrial type of colonies.

In the industrial colonies the soil is already completely occupied by the native agricultural population, where, therefore, the utilisation of forests and mines, the building of railways, the establishment of manufactures are undertaken by the dominant country. The natives of the colony supply both labour and capital for these enterprises, though they are worked under the supervision and control of the colonising power. In this type of colony, the colonising power is merely the entrepreneur, directing the use of raw materials, labour and capital furnished by the colony. The industrial type of colony is the latest development, due to the super-abundant energies and means of the capitalistic civilisation of Europe, and also due to the undeveloped natural resources and industrial opportunities, which they offer. Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine and the Philippine Islands,

(in addition to India and Egypt), are some of the important colonies that belong to this group. It is with this type of colonies that we are here concerned. The self-governing colonies such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand, the military and naval stations, the agricultural colonies such as the West Indies, etc., do not concern us here, as their problems are different from those of the investment colonies. We shall, therefore, study the problems of land, labour, capital and government in detail of the colonies belonging to the fourth class, though a passing reference will have to be made to the history and problems of the other type of colonies.

Before taking up a detailed study of the problems of colonial government, it behoves us to examine briefly the motives that led to the foundation of the Great Empires since the age of discovery. The migrations of peoples, due either to pressure of population or other causes, seems to be one of the earliest causes of colonisation.

The movement of population is not only due to over-population in the mother country, and the failure of the land to support its population, but also to various other causes such as religious discord and oppression as in the case of the Puritans to New England, the Huguenots to South Africa and Canada, and also dissatisfaction with their institutional and economic surroundings as is the case with the Irish. In general mere over-population produces only stolidity and weakness, and the impulse to venture into new lands must be given by some other conditions or incentive, such as political oppression or religious bigotry and intolerance. In some cases population movements have been started by force or by the offer of unusual inducements. The penal settlements in Siberia and

Australia and originally in Virginia are some of the examples of the use of force by the government, as a first step in the development of new regions. The settlement of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland by discharged soldiers and sailors, the scientific scheme of emigration started by Gibbon Wakefield, as also the methods of Richelieu in 1627, when the Company of New France was granted a charter only upon condition that it would induce 4,000 colonists to settle in America, were all fostered by special inducements. Colbert employed both force and inducements when founding the French settlement colonies of Quebec, Louisiana and the West Indies. Most of the colonists thus enlisted by force or concessions came from the dependent and lower classes. They were as a rule hired out to colonial planters as indentured servants for a period of three years, as was the case early in Virginia also. Women were generally supplied from the orphanages of Paris, and of the large provincial towns. The Dutch likewise, relieved the scarcity of women in their South African colonies by the importation of orphan girls from Amsterdam.

The pressure of population is also another potent factor that leads to the establishment of settlement colonies. The population of the world has increased between 1820 and 1920 from 800 millions to 1750 millions of people, or nearly doubled itself. At the same rate of increase, the population in 2001 is likely to be over 3000 millions. This tremendous increase of population seems to bear out the theory of Malthus that population tends to increase more rapidly than the means of subsistence. The problem of providing for surplus population became pressing only in the 19th century with the rapid increase of population after the Industrial Revolution. The population of Ger-

many for instance, increased from 41,058,792 in 1871 to 64,925,993 in 1910, a gain of almost 24 millions. The appalling growth of the slum sections in most European cities and the large number of unemployed, bear testimony to the fact that Europe cannot support all her population. To prove conclusively that Europe was burdened with a surplus of population, one need only to point out the fact that in the second half of the last century about nine millions of persons emigrated from the British Isles, that during the 19th century more than six millions of Germans became emigrants. To ardent nationalists it seemed a pity that these emigrants should be lost to the nation by settling in some foreign country, like the United States, abandoning their native language, and surrendering their allegiance to "the old country." To remedy this state of affairs, they argued that each nation should provide itself with colonies, into which its surplus population might overflow, exactly as some of the super-abundant population of Great Britain had overflowed to Canada and Australia. Some patriots went so far as to declare that a vigorous nation with a high birth rate had a moral right to conquer new territory for its rapidly enlarging population; hence imperialism, and the conquest of new colonies were considered by them to be justifiable, if not morally necessary.

Although the "surplus population" argument still carries great weight with the public, it has not worked very well. In spite of the fact that Germany had acquired a million square miles of colonial territory, in 1913, out of a total of 25,843 German emigrants, 19,124 sought homes in the United States, 5,537 in Canada, 359 in Australia and 140 in Brazil. In that year, more Germans were living in the British colony

of Canada than in all the German over-sea dominions. Clearly the German colonies had failed to attract German emigrants. Perhaps Germany had been particularly unfortunate in acquiring only tropical colonies unfit for European habitation. But even Great Britain with all her colonies in every climatic zone still sent to the United States in the year 1913 more than 88,000 emigrants, and within 25 years after 1870 almost three millions of citizens of the United Kingdom settled in the United States rather than in the British Colonies.

The importance of the missionary movement in stimulating imperialism can hardly be exaggerated. The Spanish, Portuguese and, later on, the French (in the patent granted by Louis XIV to the French Company of the West in 1664) were all animated by missionary zeal and the spread of Christianity. In all parts of the world the missionary has preceded the merchants and the magistrate, often preparing the way for them and making their operations easy and possible. During the last 200 years, fifty-four missionary societies have been established in Great Britain alone, most of which are still active in foreign and colonial fields. Through the work of the missionaries alone, the British Empire obtained its first foot-hold in many of its most important colonies, such as Australia, Fiji, South and Central Africa (David Livingstone), Sierra-Leone, Burma and Guiana. In all these regions missionary stations were established long before regular trade communications or political control came into existence.

Missionary motives were at least in part responsible for the commercial revolution. Columbus indeed, regarded himself as a missionary. The colonial expansion of Europe was accompanied, and to a consi-

derable extent promoted, by the expansion of Roman Catholic missions, which were efficiently organised under the central control of the papal congregation of the Propaganda, organised by Pope Gregory XV in 1622. The Jesuits, and the Dominican and Franciscan friars, preaching, baptizing, teaching and if need be, dying for the faith, converted most of the natives of Latin America, christianised the Philippines and established important Christian communities in India, China, Japan, Africa and Polynesia. Until the 19th century, the various Protestant missions took comparatively little interest in the extension of Christianity.

The French established their political dominion in Cochin-China in 1862, when their missionaries (who went there as early as 1741 under Pigneau de Behme) were murdered in a popular uprising by the natives. In the West African colonies which were acquired through the forward movement begun by General Faidherbe in the fifties of the last century, the missionaries, as the leader of the movement himself testifies, were a most powerful aid in the expansion of French influence. L. Henrique in his "Les Colonies Francais, Vol. IV," says "Missionary work was the cause that led to the establishment of French protectorates in Oceania." The French have claimed and exercised the privilege, since the time of the Crusades, of protecting the Roman Catholic missions and Christians residing in the Levant and in the Orient, though the separation of State and Church took place in 1905, in France. The French have been able to exercise tremendous political power in the Levant by means of this protectorate over the Christian missions in that region. Both the Italians and the Germans have protested against the use of this power by the French.

The method of utilising missionary work for political purposes has been nowhere employed with less reserve than in China. As is well known, Germany obtained her first foot-hold in Kia-chou in consequence of the murder of two German missionaries. In the course of the negotiations which followed this incident, the German Government obtained the lease of the harbour and bay of Kia-chou and adjacent territories and it also obtained extensive mining and railway privileges in the rich province of Shantung. The first raising of the flag of Germany on the soil of Africa grew out of the need of protecting the Rhenish missionaries in Namaqualand (German South West Africa). In Southern China, the French in a similar manner and with equal boldness, secured a mortgage on the country and its resources. As compensation for the murder of a missionary, they obtained mining rights in six governmental districts of Sze-chuan together with other valuable privileges. In the famous case of Pere-Berthelot, they avenged a like outrage by claiming the right to construct a railway within the two provinces of Kwang-so and Kwang-tung. These concessions caused the British in their turn to obtain Wei-Hei-Wei, and Russia to get a lease of Port Arthur from China. Due to these political rivalries for colonial expansion, the Germans and French in Africa do not welcome the English and American missions. French writers are unanimous in their indignation at the political activities of the English missions in Madagascar, before the annexation of the island to France had been accomplished and while there was still a chance for the establishment of British influence. It is also the American missionaries that won Hawaii for the American Government as against the British

and other nations. In more backward regions where a state of barbarism or savagery exists, the way for the achievement of direct political control over the native peoples is often effectually prepared by the missionary influence. This has been true especially of the islands of Oceania and of many regions in Africa, where the missionaries obtained an ascendancy over the native populations which could easily be turned into control exercised by political officials and magistrates. In countries having a high civilization like India and China, the missionary influence is not great. But they help their nation to get a foothold in the country, through the right of protection which may be eventually exercised as against the native government or to defeat the claims of other foreign nations. Moreover, the missions are used as a further line of defence against the growth of Moslem ascendancy in Central Africa, where Islam and Christianity are waging war; and in this struggle the missionaries are made to subserve political purposes. One important reason why missions and missionaries are looked upon with suspicion and distrust by the Asian and African peoples is the close connection of missions with imperialism, which destroys the confidence of the natives.

• Many earnest Christians, who might otherwise have disapproved of colonial expansion, become enthusiastic when they consider that the propagation of the faith might be promoted by annexing the territory in question. In Africa and in the islands of the South Sea, time and again, an enterprising missionary explorer led the way first for merchants and then for soldiers. The Church Missionary Society of England paid the British Africa Company £15,000 when the company was about to abandon its unprofitable territory in the region of Lake Victoria Nyanza in 1887 to

hold the territory another year, in the hope—which was fulfilled in 1893—that the British Government might then be induced to assume responsibility for the country. While missionaries have done much to further the work of imperialism, it is doubtful whether imperialism has furthered the work of the missionaries. While the missionary was preaching the Christian precepts of charity, unselfishness, purity and temperance, stern government officials were practising ruthless severity, avaricious commercial corporations were enriching themselves by forcing the natives into virtual slavery, licentious soldiers were giving free rein to their vicious passions, and European liquor agents were supplying the natives with cheap gin. The barbarous methods pursued by European rubber merchants in compelling the negroes of Central Africa and Congo Free State to collect rubber for commercial purposes, were calculated to inspire bitter hatred rather than grateful respect for Christian civilization.

The spirit of adventure and the desire for geographical exploration which animated men like Columbus, Cortez, Raleigh, Drake, Stanley, Livingstone, and Nachtigal is also responsible for the founding of new colonies. The achievements of Rajah Brooke, Cecil Rhodes, Dr. Peters, Lord Cromer, Sir George Taubman Goldie, and Sir Bartle Frere are the result of the same spirit of individual enterprise, exploration and adventure. Younger sons of the nobility everywhere take a keen interest and part in this work of exploration and the founding of new colonies by the right of prescription. This has been satirically called the "out-door relief for the nobility." The French explorers of Northern Africa together with the missionaries prepared the way for a sweeping political occupation. The scientific work of exploration is often the first

step in the establishment of a political dominion in the newly explored region. German travellers from Humboldt and Ritter down to Wissman and Dr. Gerhard Rohlfs have prepared the German people for their entry into colonial politics. Joubert says in his *Pensées* "Propose a conquest to the Spanish, enterprise to the English, discovery to the German, profit to the Dutch and dashing success to the French."

Explorers like La Salle, De Soto, Pizarro and Cortez were all animated by the thirst for gold though partly actuated by political ambitions. Sir Stamford Raffles, Sir Andrew Clarke, the men who gave England a footing in the Far East, Sir George Goldie and Cecil Rhodes, the builders of the British Empire in Africa, all belong to the adventurous type of colony-builders and are much after the fashion of the old buccaneers who founded the French and English power in the West Indies. Military men like Rajah Brooke (who by single-handed effort created for himself a Kingdom in the island of Borneo, through successful services to the Sultan) and Sir William Sandeman who extended the Indian North-West Frontier by gradual and peaceful methods, are other examples of this class of people. Faidherbe, the Count of Brazza and other French officers (who, combining the explorer's longing with the enthusiasm for national expansion) pushed out the French frontier farther and farther, until it included the greater part of Northern Africa. Morocco as well as Algeria are consecrated to the French by the daring and the sacrifice of many a long list of explorers and soldiers who have given their lives in these regions to the glory and advancement of France. Their successes were claimed by their home government, but the responsibility for their failures would have been solely theirs. The Russian

military men have also acquired northern Manchuria (now known as the Amur Province) and Central Asia by conquest of the Turkomans. It will be seen thus, that adventure-some individuals act as outposts to prepare the way for a steady current of trade communication; finally when interests of sufficient magnitude have been established, the state appears as a protecting power. This had been the normal progress of national expansion; but of late, particularly during the last two decades, this older method has been reversed and under the policy of staking out claims for posterity, State action in all its crudeness and inflexibility has taken the place of individual enterprise.

The desire for the establishment of commercial relations has been the most predominant motive in the colonising activities of the European nations. The present movement of colonial expansion, more particularly in the latter half of the 19th and early in the 20th century, is connected with the search for new markets and a storehouse for raw materials. The early Spanish colonial leaders had but little desire to establish *bona fide* commerce; it was rather their effort to acquire in the shortest possible time the gold and other precious products of the American mines. Although a certain kind of commerce grew out of this exploitation, it was not allowed to develop naturally and remained a narrow monopoly of the Crown. Portuguese colonial enterprise was far more commercial in character, partly because the Portuguese took more readily to sea-faring than did the Spaniards, partly on account of the special opportunities afforded by the regions in which the Portuguese colonised. Their relations were chiefly with the Orient, the many valuable products of which naturally led to a diversified commerce.

Holland had already developed a complete commercial system and a European carrying trade before she entered upon the acquisition of territorial possessions. When the power of the Portuguese waned, and the Dutch had become their successors, they treated their opportunities in as narrow a commercial spirit as that of the Carthagians. They looked upon their colonies simply as a basis for profitable trade, and their lack of a true perspective and of effective political action lost them Ceylon and the Cape of Good Hope. In their commercial methods they did not, however, employ 'the monopoly system' but that of the chartered company composed of private stock-holders. In this manner they were enabled to engage the accumulated wealth of their country in the work of colonisation. But in the exclusiveness of monopolistic privileges, they, too, went as far as legislation could go. The French, during the early period of modern colonisation, showed great aptitude for commercial enterprise. Had it not been for the weakening of France by the expulsion of the Huguenots, and for the hopeless corruption of the royal government which left no strength for, and no interest in, the enterprises of the great colonisers, France would have fought a much stronger battle for supremacy in colonial affairs. It is not the French Revolution alone that is the result of the old régime in France, but the loss of her colonial empire—a world empire—is the direct consequence of her misrule.

The English profited by the experiences of other nations, the Portuguese, the Dutch and the French. The greater part of the British Empire was acquired with the assistance of merchant adventurers. They set in motion the stream of colonisation which

flowed into North America, they organised the East India Company that gave England the control of India. India, of all colonial dependencies, is the best instance of a possession acquired through the sole initiative of commerce. The scope and character of colonial commerce in the early period was entirely unlike that of the present. The purpose which animated the European merchants was not so much to discover or create a market for manufactured goods, as to obtain the valuable produce of the rich regions beyond the seas. To-day, on the other hand, the primary object is to search for markets, and the chief purpose of commercial expansion has come to be the desire to dispose of the surplus products of European industry. The emphasis has shifted from what could be obtained of the natives to what can be sold to them. The commercial policy of the 17th and 18th centuries did not aim so much to encourage the development of the colonies in order that they might become better purchasers, as to make sure that all the produce of the colonies should be shipped to the mother country, if the latter could profitably employ it. This is what is known as the Mercantile System. It was found that the American colonies, after their independence, continued to purchase British goods in even constantly increasing quantities.

The assurance of commercial gain and of exclusive commercial privileges seemed to most men of that period the only true basis for national expenditure on colonies. The Navigation Acts, as well as the French Colonial Pact (the granting of exclusive privileges to the mother country in the colonial markets with favourable treatment of colonial imports) testify to the prevalence of this belief on the part of Europe

In the middle of the nineteenth century, the sentiment of free trade grew so strong that these restrictive systems were abolished, and there followed an era of apathy towards the colonies. Commercial gain and exclusive monopoly having disappeared, they saw no further reason why a state should desire colonial possessions. The policy of France still adheres to the old mercantile view of commerce. When the total value of colonial trade is compared with the entire commerce of the world, it seems comparatively insignificant. During the decade between 1887 and 1897, a period of great colonial activity with the French, the proportion of the colonial to the total trade of France increased by only 3·5 per cent. In 1913, Canada purchased only 20 per cent of her total imports from the United Kingdom, whereas Argentina, which is not a colony of Great Britain at all, obtained more than 30 per cent of her imports from the United Kingdom. France enjoyed less than a third of the total trade of her colony of Indo-China. The trade of Canada was more valuable to Germany than that of all the German colonies. It will no doubt be pointed out that in the case of a few colonies like India and the Dutch East Indies, the trade is largely in the hands of the mother country. But these exceptions do not prove the rule. For example, the total trade of Germany with German South West Africa in 1913 amounted to only 28,600,000 marks. It is difficult to understand how the profit on this trade would make up the deficit of 12,140,000 marks which Germany had to pay for the government of the colony. Colonial trade, moreover, was a very small item in the total foreign trade of this country. Thus Germany in 1913 exported to France alone, almost 14 times as much as to all the German colonies put

together. From such figures, the inference is plain that as far as commercial privileges are concerned many colonies are of little or no advantage to the mother country. In other words, the industrial and commercial prosperity of a nation could hardly be said to depend essentially upon the number of its colonies. The real economic reason for imperialism is the opportunity for gain which colonial enterprises offer to individuals in the mother country, such as investments in the colonial mines, rubber forests, plantations and railways, etc., which yield interest at anything from 5 to 50 per cent. When, however, we look at commerce from the point of view of the colonies themselves, and determine the share in colonial trade which falls to the mother country, we find that it constitutes a very considerable part of the totals. Thus for instance, 83.7 per cent of the trade of Algeria, 57.9 per cent of that of Tunis are with France, while 70 per cent of the trade of South West Africa was with Germany. Great Britain enjoys 52 per cent. of the trade of British Guiana, 62 per cent. of Natal, 44 per cent. of Canada, 69.5 per cent. of Australia and 53 per cent. of India. It will be seen therefore, that there is some truth in the adage that trade follows the flag. Political control must certainly give the mother country some advantage in colonial trade, as may be seen from the fact that the *per capita* consumption of British goods in all the British colonies in 1900 was a little over £3, while for the non-British countries it was about 16 shillings. From the point of view of the colonies, trade relations with the mother country are of great importance, as they embrace on the average over half the entire trade of the colonies. This is due to the adequate facilities for trade, such as banks and

other financial institutions, frequent and regular communications, community of language and of laws.

The only manner in which political control can be made synonymous with commercial monopoly is through the use of an exclusive system of high tariffs *i.e.*, the policy of commercial exclusiveness. But the policy of commercial exclusiveness neither pays the colonies nor the mother country as may be seen from the experience of Spain, Portugal, France, Prussia and the United States of America.

With the principle of the Closed Door established, powers inevitably strive to obtain political control of new territories and war is often the outcome, as was the case in the Great World War in 1914. Ordinarily the closed door means discriminatory tariff policy and the withholding of concessions from foreigners. So far as the tariffs are concerned, the Closed Door is observed to-day in the colonies of France, Japan, the United States of America, Spain, Portugal and Italy. The United States of America also, like the European colonial nations, adopted a restrictive policy in its commercial relations with its extra-continental territories and dependencies. The Continental customs system has been extended to Hawaii, preferential duties are granted to American commodities imported into Porto Rico, the Philippines and Cuba, and the products of these islands are favoured when entering the United States. When Congress in 1912 passed a law concerning the fiscal status of the Panama Canal, in anticipation of its approaching competition, it exempted from tolls the American ships engaged in coastal trade. England protested against a measure she deemed contrary to the Hay-Pauncefote treaty.

One of the clearest illustrations of the connection

between imperialism and tariff protection, was afforded in 1898 when Canada, having previously adopted a high protective tariff, announced that henceforth the duties on imports from Great Britain would be a third less than those on imports from other countries. The French Tariff Act of 1892 imposed import duties on foreign goods imported into French colonies, while French goods were to be admitted free. These instances are sufficient to indicate the manner in which the possession of colonies might be advantageous to the trade and industry of a nation. India has been the most profitable market for British goods for over a century and a half, and it has presented the richest return to England of all the great undeveloped markets of the world both as a consumer of British goods and as a supplier of raw materials like hides, oil seeds, etc. Even within the British Empire—chief defender in the past of this economic faith—the Closed Door exists in the Dominions in the form of Imperial Preference and in twenty six crown colonies. The only exponents of the colonial Open Door are the little countries of Belgium and the Netherlands.

The League of Nations has taken a definite stand against the present world wide tendency towards monopoly. With the exception of the mandates in the Pacific and South West Africa—class C Mandates—it has imposed the Open Door régime on all the territories taken from Germany and Turkey as a result of the last war. In the past, a number of international treaties were signed bearing an application of the open door principle in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, but the terminology employed has been too vague to make those treaties effective. The League has defined explicitly what it means by the Open Door. Any foreigner, whose Government is a member of

the League, may enter and reside in a mandated territory, acquire property and pursue a profession or trade upon exactly the same basis as a subject of the mandatory Power. She has "complete economic, commercial and industrial equality" whether in taxation or commerce. There can be no discrimination in granting concessions, except for essential public works, while monopolistic concessions are rigorously forbidden. The United States has protested against the policy of Great Britain in Mesopotamia with reference to the petroleum question, on the basis of the clause in the terms of the mandates given to Great Britain in Mesopotamia by the League of Nations. In certain of the Mandated Areas like the former German East Africa, and Tanganyika, the mandatory Powers have enacted legislation discriminating between their own nationals and the people of British India, though they both belong to the British Empire, thus violating both the spirit and the letter of this safeguard of the League of Nations. And yet India cannot appeal to the League against this violation of the Mandatory Power.

The League has gone further than any previous international accord, not excepting the Open Door treaty signed at the Washington Conference, in defining what is meant by this policy and in giving life to a principle previously more honoured in the breach than in the observance, except in the case of class C Mandates. The British phosphate monopoly in Nauru Island, and the tariff preference granted to the British products in Samoa, are examples of the Closed Door policy in the mandated areas of the "C" class. The principle of the Closed Door here is a bad example, but no nation may go to war over this trade, because it is too small. It amounts

only to about £4 millions a year. The policy of the Closed Door is also pursued by Great Britain in palm oil in her West African possessions, such as Nigeria, Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, etc. In view of the world wide approval of the Closed Door policy, the League's success in imposing the Open Door, at least in the important mandates of "A" and "B" type, is commendable and noteworthy. The application of this principle to the Class "C" Mandates also is highly desirable, as the most potent cause of friction will be removed and war may be avoided on this issue.

The total volume of colonial trade is insignificant compared with the entire commerce of the world. The policy of British Imperial Preference therefore will injure both the mother country and the colonies, in so far as the trade of the colonies and the mother country with foreign countries will be retarded, and possibly even retaliation may take place. The experience of Russia and France does not warrant the adoption of the policy of Imperial Preference by the British Empire. It would seem that a policy of this nature must be inherently so weak that it can not permanently maintain itself against the true interests of both the colony and the mother country. Political control fosters national trade relations with the colonies in one respect, i.e., the exercise of the financial powers of the government and the execution of great public works in the colony, such as roads, mines, railways, canals, harbours and public buildings. While these activities are primarily industrial, they also involve the purchase of vast amounts of material. This is usually bought from the mother country, as even the British self-governing colonies and India have in this manner made very large purchases in the mother country.

The great object of competition among modern nations being trade, only that country can successfully compete in this struggle which is provided with the means of communication to the most important markets. Taking the history of British imperial expansion, the one consideration of assuring safe routes to India has been the most potent factor in British foreign policy during the last century. In the first place, the Cape of Good Hope was taken from the Dutch in order to make sure of this important station on the sea road to India. Then in the sixties came the building of the Suez Canal. Step by step the British acquired control of this waterway and as an accessory to it, the country of Egypt. If we glance at the map, we see that Great Britain has a whole series of possessions that derive their value entirely or chiefly from the fact that they are situated on the Suez Canal route. These possessions are the Kuria Muria islands, Socotra, Aden, Perim, the Somali Coast, and Ceylon in the Indian ocean; and Cyprus, Malta and Gibraltar in the Mediterranean. So successful have the British been in securing for themselves the points of access to the Canal, that the latter has practically become a British waterway. With great political genius they have forged a strong chain which binds India to England. Some authorities even declare that the one reason why England entered upon the Boer War was that Great Britain could not afford to lose her South African possessions, because of the importance of the Cape as a station on the alternative route to India. The friendship between England and Turkey in the 19th century is in no small measure due to the anxiety of the British to acquire Egypt and Cyprus from Turkey.

The Ruanda-Urunda frontier, which was fixed in

1921 between Belgium and Great Britain, drawing a boundary line between their mandates in former German East Africa, decided to give the British the right of way for the Cape-to-Cairo railroad, originally planned by Cecil Rhodes. As a result of this division, however, the tribes of the native kingdom of Ruanda were cut in two, which brought about great hardship and suffering. Missionaries drew the attention of the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations to this frontier at the 1922 meeting, and asked that the boundary be modified. After inquiring into the question, the Commission placed the matter before the League Council, as a result of which Belgium and England agreed to change the frontier. This action might never have been taken, but for the salutary influence of the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, which has or ought to have the sole desire to advance the interests of the natives themselves. Russian political history points to the same policy *i.e.*, the obtaining of ice-free ports as an access to the sea. Germany pursued the same policy by the acquisition of the Marshall and Caroline groups and Samoa. The occupation of Kia-chou by the Germans was due to their urgent need of a depot of commerce and of a naval station. In the Far East, Singapore and Hong Kong, towns of small territorial importance and yet rich and influential commercial centres, attest to the value of favourably situated depots of trade.

In the United States of America, the entire course of national expansion has been influenced by this same logic of communications. Louisiana was acquired because it gave the United States control of the mouth of the Mississippi, the main outlet at that time for the trade of the old West and North West. Then the Pacific beckoned, and the chief outcome of

the War of 1847 was the possession of its coast. The more complete control of the Isthmian canal route has been the prime motive for the acquisition of Porto Rico, and the Danish West Indies. Porto Rico is important because it became a central point for the distribution of merchandise and produce between North America, South America, Europe and Asia. American communication with Asia has been rendered secure through the acquisition of Hawaii, Midway Island, and Manilla. While much was expected of Manilla when it was said that it would soon equal Singapore and Hongkong as an Asian trade centre, its location is nevertheless favourable enough to make it a valuable entrepot. The increased speed of the means of communications, i.e., Railways, Steamships, Aeroplanes, Wireless telegraphy, has made most powerfully for the permanence of colonial relations. Before 1850, colonies were so distant, both in space and in time, that any lasting connection between them and the mother country seemed problematic.

The 19th century was the great era of national home industry. The policy of Free Trade was adopted by England during this period as an article of faith, as it enabled England to obtain an ample supply of cheap raw material and food and tended to keep open the markets of the world for her products. The beginning of the 20th century was heralded by an era of economic imperialism. England had accumulated an abundance of capital and it was found that opportunities for exceedingly profitable investment existed in other parts of the world. Moreover, the British manufactured products were excluded from certain foreign countries and even from British Colonies and India by hostile tariffs. Therefore British capital entered those countries, established manufactures there, and

obtained liberal returns on account of the very restrictions that had been directed against the commerce of England. In the construction of railways, the exploitation of mines and forests, and the establishment of large plantations, British capital was used freely both in the British colonies and in foreign countries like Mexico, Central and South America, Africa, China, Russia, the United States of America and even in Germany and France. As a result, England is now primarily a creditor and landlord nation, and a great part of the industrial and banking mechanism of the world is controlled from London. The colonies are becoming more and more industrialized, as is the case with India also; expensive and complicated machinery, for the preparation of coffee for the market and for large central sugar factories, take the place of the former simple and primitive methods of agricultural production. Moreover, manufactures of various kinds are being established to provide for the growing wants of the local population. Thus we have arrived at an era of industrial colonisation as opposed to the old commercial or political colonisation. This is the real secret of the strength and scope of the present movement for the assertion of political dominion over new regions—often disguised under the name of mandates as in Mesopotamia and Syria, which possesses rich oil fields. India may have home rule with practically an independent parliament, she may even manage her foreign policy, but as long as her whole financial system depends on British capital, she remains in the true sense of the word, a colony or dependency of Great Britain.

Capital seeks the protection of its own national government in colonial enterprises for various reasons. The matter of an official language and of a

system of laws with which the capitalist is familiar, is a great convenience to him. Moreover, favourable administrative action is much more readily obtained in cases where the officials belong to the same nation as the colonists; of still greater importance is the fact that a capitalist may obtain from his own government public contracts, grants of land and the concessions of privileges which a foreigner has little reason to expect. Such advantages constitute a definite basis of financial credit. For these reasons, there is a tendency for capital to become national in its methods and applications. Formerly most foreign investments were made in state securities, leaving the foreign government to which the funds were lent to construct the improvements itself or to make contracts therefor with foreign industrialists. At present the direct investment of capital in works of exploitation and improvement is much more common, as was the case with Germany in the construction of railways in Turkey and Asia Minor, which were financed by German banks and constructed by German engineers. By this process, the economic life of the so-called undeveloped and backward regions is made to conform to advanced standards. The usefulness of the western industrial machinery, and the improvements thereby produced in the comforts of life, are recognised by even the backward peoples; while in philosophical and religious matters, they may consider themselves superior, and while commerce may touch them only on the boundaries, industrial enterprise goes to the very heart of their countries, and brings before them the visible achievements of western civilization. Thus the superiority of the western nations in matters of industry and in practical affairs is often

recognised by them. English education both in India and England has the effect of anglicising young Indians and making them intellectually sterile.

The evils of capitalistic colonisation cannot be over-estimated. The interests of concentrated capital are often pursued with absolute unscrupulousness and with total disregard of the rights of the native populations—as in the rubber industry in Congo, sugar in Fiji and Mauritius, mines in South Africa, etc. The capitalist is not unfrequently ready to play the game of politics, even to the extent of embroiling nations in murderous warfare, if only the success of great financial or industrial operations is thereby promoted. One of the causes of the South African War may be said to have been the protection of the industrial and financial policy of great corporations. In the internal affairs of a colony, the shrewd and selfish activity of organized capital is often so pernicious that it becomes one of the chief concerns of the colonial government to prevent the utter exploitation of the natives. The manner in which concessions have been abused in Indo-China and other French possessions in Africa, is an example of how far this may be carried. When the natives in certain parts of Indo-China had fled for safety during the war, their lands were freely granted to French concessionnaires as the English did in Kenya and Southern Rhodesia. Far from introducing improved methods of agriculture, or enriching the soil, they simply took possession and superimposed themselves as a landlord class upon the natives, when the latter returned to till their ancestral lands. Once in control of land rich in

rubber or oil, a power is tempted not only to shut the door on all out-siders, but also to confiscate the native lands giving it to their own nationals as Japan did in Korea, France in Algeria, England in South Africa, (Kenya, Southern Rhodesia, etc.) and other colonial Powers. It is to prevent this unjust exploitation that the Mandates Commission on land tenures of the League of Nations has held that the native land must be held in trust for the natives themselves. The Council of the League of Nations also decided in April 1923, that the nationality of the people of mandated territories shall in every case, be distinct from the people of the governing power. If this territory had been annexed after the manner of a dependency or a protectorate, the highly valuable public lands of these regions would have been transferred to the annexing power, as was previously the case prior to the establishment of the mandate principle. Thus the harmful policy of the French in Algeria, or the British in Southern Rhodesia cannot be perpetuated in the new mandated areas, as the League provides that no land shall be transferred from natives to non-natives without governmental consent, subject of course to the supervision of the League.

CHAPTER II.

THE COLONIAL POLICY OF PORTUGAL, SPAIN AND HOLLAND.

Portugal.

At the end of the 14th century, according to Stephens, Portugal formed a political and social entity more conscious of nationality than almost any other state of Europe. Expeditions were led against the Moors of North Africa, and the idea of external dominion was, in true crusading fashion, commingled with the desire to extend the outposts of Christendom. The strength of the rising state was augmented also by the skilful use of foreign relations. John I, the founder of the house of Ariz and the consolidator of the realm, by his union with Philippa of Lancaster (1387), laid the foundation of an international relationship and sympathy which has often reacted to the advantage of the less powerful nation. The cementation of this alliance, through the more palpable and enduring bonds of trade, went on with few interruptions. The King of Portugal (Henry the Navigator) attracted Genoese shipbuilders to Portugal and employed many Italians, Germans, French and English as sailors and officers in the Navy. With the discovery of the Cape route Portugal takes her place as the successor of Venice in the Empire of Commerce. The great era of explorations was made possible by the improvements in navigation worked out during the 15th century. The astonishing discoveries of new worlds (by Diaz, De Gama, Cabral, and of adventurers in the service of Spain, Columbus,

Balboa, Vespricco and greatest of them all Magellan) placed for a time the destinies of the outer world in the hands of Spain and Portugal, and the first period of European imperialism is the period of Iberian monopoly extending to 1588. A papal award in 1493 confirmed the division of the non-European world between the two Powers.

After the fateful geographical discoveries of the 15th century, the Portuguese initiated slave trade, the Dutch enlarged, and the English carried to its culmination the practice of forcibly capturing and exporting for sale African men, women, and children. It has been estimated that from the 16th to the 19th century, 15,000,000 Negroes were poured into America. On an average, the importation of one slave meant the death of five others in raids or on the high seas. Nearly 90,000,000 Negroes were thus done to death or reduced to a living death. The Portuguese were the first people to initiate, organize, and develop this unholy slave trade. The Mohammadans also carried on a similar slave trade. They were responsible for the death or slavery of another 90 millions of blacks. All the slaves thus captured were converted, at least nominally, to Christianity or Islam.

The abolition of slavery in the 19th century was due partly to philanthropy, but mainly to its unsuitability to modern mechanic industrialism, its inevitable tendency to degrade free human labour and the resulting revolt of assertive labour against it, and last, but not least, the constant menace of actual and potential servile insurrection. These factors contributed powerfully to the success of the anti-slavery campaign. The Negro in Central and South America had been admitted to intermarriage with the native Indian who in

his turn, had begun to assimilate the Portuguese and Spanish colonists. The free intermixture of the three stocks has automatically solved the race problem and produced a new race, which after generations of chaotic internecine warfare, is emerging into peaceful prosperity and contributing its quota to world culture. In the West Indies the Negro slaves had to wage a series of desperate armed conflicts to emancipate themselves from bondage and to win civil rights and to found the free Negro State of Hayti.

✓ Spanish and Portuguese sea-farers crossed the seas and conquered the world. The Dutch and the English followed suit. All these conquests, however, had as their purpose in the acquisition of territory only the gathering of riches. The Europe of those days was so thinly populated that there was no necessity for emigration. Wherever there was a chance to obtain metallic treasure found in the hands of the natives, it was simply demanded; in those cases where neither gold, silver, nor precious stones were procurable, but even when products of native growth, such as coffee, sugar, tea, spices, or other tropical products were grown, the existence of the native population was tolerated as a necessary evil.

The monopoly of the trade in the Portuguese as well as the Spanish Empire was reserved to the Crown, and no charter companies helped to build up the dominion and extend the trade of Portugal in the East. In their desire to seize and retain the whole traffic of the negroes within their Empire, the Portuguese fell into the error which had misled their predecessors. They believed that force of arms was necessary to effect the ends of trade. The Portuguese power in the East was never more than a commercial dominion. The Portuguese also proclaimed Lisbon

the sole European port to which their ships might resort and at which they might discharge their cargoes. The transportation of the wealth of the Indies to the capital city was the only thing required of their mariners. They brought back the riches to Lisbon only and left it to the Dutch to distribute them throughout European countries. This was the policy of the home government in the administration of their dependencies. The administration of the Indies was entrusted to a viceroy, stationed at Goa, invested with supreme authority, both civil and military, but appointed for three years only, lest by a longer term he might become too powerful, and consequently, insubordinate to the crown. The result was that almost always these governors, regardless of means and methods, improved their limited opportunity to amass wealth; and petty functionaries, no less than chief executives, devoted their period of service to their personal aggrandizement. Portuguese ships and traders paid as taxes, port dues, and customs collected in the Indies, immense sums, which went directly into the coffers of the viceroys and their subalterns, the metropolis receiving a mere fraction of the revenues. The participation of officials in trade was the capstone of demoralisation. From the highest to the lowest, the representatives of the Government were unscrupulous and as a result, the eastern colonial edifice of Portugal collapsed. The profitable nature of the monopoly trade may be seen from the fact that the freight of De Gama's ships covered the expenses of his voyage sixty times over. The three-fold policy of the Portuguese was "commerce, conquest and conversion." This latter is due to the old crusading spirit, developed by the Portuguese and the Spanish, chiefly for the conversion of the Moslems.

The king and his ministers regarded the officers whom they sent out with jealousy and suspicion, and were served in turn by a set of men, who kept the authorities at home in the dark as to the true condition of their dependencies, who did not administer justice to the people, but only inquired what profit their predecessors derived from their administration, that they might obtain more. That is why Portugal, which at the close of the 18th century controlled Brazil, East and West Africa, and the Orient, and in 1860 was still in control of much of that territory, is now represented only by colonies upon the East and West coast of Africa. The Portuguese could not maintain through cool and rational means of administration what they had gained by dash and the impetus of enthusiasm. In the West, the Portuguese settlement in Brazil was a genuine colony, or branch of the Portuguese nation, because here there were no earlier civilised people to be dominated. But both in East and West, the activities of the Portuguese were from the first subjected to an over-rigid control by the home government. Portugal was the first to plunge into a task far beyond her power of numbers or grade of discipline. She spent her strength before the race was really begun. Her foreign dominions weakened rather than strengthened the home country. She had fallen into a more or less dependent relation with the nation which was able to seize the dominant place in the modern world movements of trade and colonisation—the British. Amidst these failures, however, Brazil stands forth as a success due largely to uncontrolled and natural development.

In 1580, Portugal and her Empire fell under the dominion of Spain and under all the reactionary influences of the government of Philip II. By the time

this heavy yoke was shaken off in the middle of the 17th century, Portugal came under the influence and tutelage of England and had to play a second fiddle to English interests. Portuguese dominions thus fell into decay. To-day nothing of the Portuguese Empire remains, save "spheres of influence" on the Western and Eastern coasts of Africa, and two or three ports on the coast of India, as the Azores islands are considered an integral part of Portugal. The Portuguese colonial possessions in Africa, however, are important not only because of their size and potential wealth, but also because of their geographical distribution. The Portuguese colonies in Africa cover nearly 800,000 square miles, and have a population of more than 8 millions. The islands of the Cape Verde group are on the route from Europe to South America and command the coastal passage around Africa. Angola and Portuguese East Africa are her most important possessions on the continent of Africa. They are highly valuable for raw materials, food stuffs and other undeveloped resources. Portugal has not been able to keep pace with the other colonial powers in the development of either Asiatic or African colonies, and, as she is not a maritime power, they have no strategic value for her. She has retained her colonies only because for the past two hundred years she has never been in antagonism with British policy nor allied to one of Britain's enemies.

Before the World war the Portuguese colonies loomed large in world politics, because Great Britain and France, especially the former, feared that Germany planned to annex them, either by seizure or by purchase. Angola and East Africa became neighbours of Germany between 1884 and 1889 and it was feared that some pretext would be invented to

seize them when Great Britain was fighting the Boers. What worried Britain most was the thought of having Germany in possession of the islands on the trade routes. Consequently at the beginning of the Boer War the British Government sounded Germany as to her intention, and indicated its willingness to agree upon an eventual division of the Portuguese colonies, should Portugal at any time feel the necessity of disposing them. These pourparlers were resumed in 1913, and the British were willing to consent to the continental expansion of Germany in Africa, provided they could acquire the islands. The War put an end to the plan of joint purchase. Portugal, being one of the allies in the late war, retained all her colonies. She was not, however, given any mandate, not only because she is a small Power but also presumably because of her bad record in the treatment of the native races of Africa, particularly in Portuguese East Africa where even now slavery is tolerated in some form or other and cruelty is practised.

Spain.

In passing from the colonial enterprises of the Portuguese to those of the Spanish, strong contrasts due to racial differences in the two peoples are conspicuously absent. Religious unity and political coherence were forced upon Spain and Portugal both by the western crusades against the Moslem invader. Both Spain and Portugal were led by enthusiasm for King and church into enterprises which placed too severe a strain upon their material resources. The Dutch and the English at a later time profited by their errors. A display of individual initiative was as little to be expected in Spain as in Portugal. This fact and the concentration and exaltation of the

royal power, led naturally in one case as in the other to the concentration of new enterprises in the hands of the sovereigns. In 1500 Spain was really strong not only in her religious and political unity but also in her economic organisation.

The relation of Spain to America soon reduced itself to the simple old terms, conquest and conversion, herein recalling the Portuguese attitude towards India and Africa. There was no spice trade in America, though gold was early discovered, the conquests were far more thorough-going, the subject peoples being upon a much lower stage of culture, there was no competing religion of a high order as in the East and for a long time no European intruders. The Spanish Empire is the result of rapid conquest in a single generation, and not of gradually growing commercial settlements like the British or the Dutch. It is impossible to exaggerate the heroic valour and daring of Cortez, Pizarro, Hernand  de Soto, Orellana and the rest of the conquistadores who carved out in a single generation the vast Spanish Empire in Central and South America; but it is equally impossible to exaggerate their cruelty to the native races, partly due to the fierce tradition of crusading warfare against the infidel, and partly due to their greed. The Spanish dominion in Central and South America was of a different character from that of the Portuguese in the East. When once they had realised that it was not a new route to Asia, but a new world that Columbus had discovered for them, the Spaniards sought no longer mainly for the riches to be derived from the traffic, but for the precious metals which they discovered in immense abundance in Mexico and Peru. The Spanish Government regarded the precious metals as the chief products of these lands and

wished to maintain close control over them, by developing their mines even to the neglect of industries and the development of their natural resources, lest these industries might compete with the labour of the mines.

The Crown always upheld the maxim that it was the right of the parent state to draw all possible benefit and advantage to itself from the colonies, irrespective of the interests of the latter. From this point of view, the trade and commerce of Spain with the colonies was made a monopoly in the hands of an organisation known as the *Casa de Contratacion* which controlled absolutely the trade between Spain and the colonies. Commerce with the colonies was subjected to a duty of $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. which was afterwards increased to 12 per cent. The home government forbade the colonists to raise any products that could be raised at home, and the universal principle was adopted that whatever colonial industry interfered with the home industry, was to be destroyed directly by law, or taxed out of existence.

The policy of the Spanish Government did not succeed in preventing an intermixture of the races because the Spanish themselves came from a sub-tropical country and the Mexicans and Peruvians were allowed to intermarry with the Spanish, thus creating a mixed class called the Creoles. Central and South America thus came to be peopled by a hybrid race speaking Spanish. The Portuguese settlement in Goa is another instance of the creation of a mixed race, which is half Indian and half European. The Goanese are of course more intelligent and cultured than the hybrid races of Central and South America.

The state of society in the colonies was oligarchical in character, the pure Spanish families were few in number though possessed of great wealth either

from their agricultural possessions or from successful mining operations. Creoles congregated in cities due to the system of restrictions under which they lived and the bulk of the population of these cities was made up of the mixed classes—those which grew up from the intermarriage of Spaniards with Indians and of both with the negroes, who in the course of time were imported into the continent. The Indians, where sufficiently numerous, tilled the soil or worked the mines.

The political treatment of the Spanish colonies was based upon two principles—centralization and lack of self-government due to persistent suspicion and mistrust shown towards the colonists. The system of governing by viceroys, captains-general, and councils with their various relations to each other, has been truly described as a complicated contrivance to render every part of the government a check on every other. The best governors found it impossible to carry into effect any scheme for the amelioration of society, the worst found it easy enough to enrich themselves and aggrandize their favourites.

The state of the church was perhaps the worst feature of all, in the condition of these colonies. The church owned large landed estates in perpetuity,—in some cases as much as 88 per cent. of the real property of the colony. The clergy, both religious and secular, were notoriously lazy, and corrupt to a degree unknown in the mother country. The inquisition with all its appurtenances was transferred across the Atlantic. The monasteries covered 75 per cent. of the total area of the land, while the number of monks was immense. Education was for the most part sedulously discouraged. In short, the causes of the failure of the Spanish colonial Empire may be sum-

summarized as follows : centralized administration, utter lack of self-government, corrupt officials, avaricious greed for quick returns at the sacrifice of future prospects, a restrictive commercial system, trade monopoly, erroneous economic doctrines, the admission of the church to an exaggerated share in the public affairs, and a general wastefulness of resources, accompanied by enormous taxation. Viewed from the point of view of Spain, the colonies were mere territories to be used, and robbed, as a matter of convenience; the rights and privileges of whose inhabitants the home government was in no way bound to respect. It is noteworthy, however, that Spain never developed the mercantile system in extenso, never for example so far as did England.

The conquest of Portugal and her Empire by Phillip II in 1580 turned Spain into the foremost colonial power of the world, and it was inevitable that this world-dominion should be challenged by the other European countries which surrounded the Atlantic. The challenge was taken up by three nations, the English, the French and the Dutch, all the more readily because the very existence of all three and the religion of two of them were threatened by the apparently overwhelming strength of Spain in Europe. As in so many later instances, the European conflict inevitably extended itself to the non-European world. The defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1587 by England brought to an end the era of Iberian monopoly in colonial expansion. From 1587 onwards Spain sank to the position of a second rate power, supporting France in her rivalry with England. During the first quarter of the 19th century, Spain lost nearly all her American colonies, which declared their independence during and after the

revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, supported by the attitude of England and the United States. The efforts of the Holy Alliance to restore Spanish Power in America were opposed both by England and the United States with its Monroe doctrine. At the end of the 19th century, Spain, like Portugal, retained only a small part of its vast colonial empire. The Spanish-American War in 1899 gave the final death-blow to the remnants of the Spanish Empire, Spain losing Cuba, the Philippines, Guam and Porto Rico. Her over-seas possessions, after the treaty of Paris in 1900 were reduced to three small colonies of slight value and no importance on the West African coast; a strip of Guinea coast and five islands in the Gulf of Guinea and the Riff coast of Morocco opposite Gibraltar. The Canary islands are considered by the Spaniards as an integral part of Spain, just as the Portuguese consider the Azores and Madeira. The Spanish colony in Morocco is of international importance. Because of geographical proximity, Spain has been interested in Morocco since the middle ages, and at one time or another she established claims both on the Atlantic and on the Mediterranean. These claims were not acknowledged by the natives except when force was applied, and they became the source of international disputes when France began to extend her protectorate over Morocco. After Great Britain and Germany had withdrawn their opposition to the French penetration of Morocco, Spain was compelled to come to terms with France. By the treaty of Madrid, signed on Nov. 22, 1912, France accepted the right of Spain to exercise her influence in a clearly defined Spanish Zone along the Mediterranean for about 200 miles, with a hinterland averaging sixty miles. The district of Tangier was neutralized,

but the Spanish zone extended along the hinterland of Tangier to the Atlantic, thus cutting off Tangier from communication with Fez and the rest of Morocco. A large portion of the Spanish Zone, called the Riff, has never been pacified and the Spaniards have been besieged in their ports. Successful defiance of Spanish authority and the resultant anarchy have greatly annoyed and retarded the French in their efforts to make Morocco a French protectorate. As long as the Spanish remain in possession of the northern tip of Morocco, the development of Tangier is blocked, and the French administrative control suffers. Relations between Spain and France on the Moroccan question have been strained for the past decade. France has refused in 1922 to renew her tariff convention with Spain. Since the world war, France has attempted to get the Spanish out of Morocco. In 1921 and again in 1924 the Spanish were badly beaten by the natives in the Riff. In fact, this disaster to Spanish arms is the worst blow to European prestige in Africa since the Italians were routed by the Abyssinians at Adowa 25 years before. But the Spaniards do not want to part with their last important over-seas possession—a remnant and souvenir of her once colossal colonial empire.

Holland.

It is in proportion primarily to the degree of its political homogeneity and unity and to the strength of its economic organisation that a state is likely to succeed or fail in the colonial field. The Low Countries, with the rest of Western Europe, were awakened by the Crusades to the value of trade and a desire for gain and adventure, though they suffered with the rest the loss of population and extinction of labour forces

in connection with the Crusades. The Netherlands succeeded to the trade and commerce of Venice and Spain and they pursued it with a fervour, skill and success unequalled before in the history of Europe. In 1609 the Dutch wrung their independence from Spain, and in 1648 became the Republic of the United Netherlands recognised by Europe. The republican institutions of Dutch colonial enterprise differed from those of the Portuguese and Spanish, inasmuch as the predominant factor in this movement is no longer royal initiative and support, but individual and above all corporate activity.

The second period of European Imperialism was filled with the rivalries of the three nations, which had in different degrees contributed to the breakdown of Spanish monopoly, the Dutch, the French and the English. The long era of their rivalry extended from 1588 to 1763. During the first portion of this period *i.e.*, 1588 to 1660, the era of experiment and settlement, the leadership fell to the Dutch. The Dutch, who made a far more systematic and more immediately profitable use of the opportunity than either the French or the British, regarded the whole enterprise as a great national commercial venture.

The first two voyages to the East in 1596 and 1598 were organised by private merchant adventurers with the tacit consent of the state. Java in the East was selected as their objective. The Eastern trade was very lucrative and the voyage home was covered in the then short time of fifteen months. The cargoes included, as most important constituents, 6,000,000 pounds of pepper, 250,000 lbs. of cloves, 20,000 lbs. of nutmegs, 200 lbs. of mace and 100 lbs. of long peppers. The merchants admitted to have made easily "two pennick on one."

" The trade was conducted by the powerful trading corporations, the company of the East Indies and the company of the West Indies; but though directed by the merchants of Amsterdam, these were genuinely national enterprises; their shareholders were drawn from every province and every class.

The company of the East Indies was the richer and the more powerful of the two, because the trade at the Far East was, beyond comparison, the most lucrative in the world.

On March 29th 1602, the Dutch East India Company was chartered and for many decades the history of the commerce and colonisation of the Dutch is the history of this chartered corporation and of its offshoot, the West India Company. It is not probable that the Dutch charter borrowed anything from that of the English East India Company formulated two years before. Movements in England towards establishing a company may have exercised some general influence in the Netherlands, but any alignment of the two organisations has the value of a comparative study of the simultaneous reactions of similarly minded peoples upon similar conditions, rather than that of an exercise in the detection of mutual borrowings.

By the charter, the company was given an absolute monopoly in East India trade for 21 years; within the area of its monopoly, moreover, the company was granted practical sovereignty, power to make treaties with native rulers in the name of the States-General, build strongholds, appoint governors and military and judicial functionaries; in short to take all measures called for in the interest of trade, and required for the maintenance of order, government and justice. Unlike the monopolies that went before, that of the Dutch was to be enforced only as regards a portion of

the seas and not against the world, nor against the adherents of another religion, nor against any special foreign nation. In theory the States-General was supposed to exercise a thorough control over the affairs of the company, though in practice the control over the affairs was only nominal. The company proceeded upon the regular mercantile programme of making treaties and founding factories on an extensive scale. The need for centralization in the East Indies was felt early, to prevent a lack of unity and purpose. Pieter Both was, therefore, appointed Governor-General who began his rule in 1610; the office thus created was almost that of a monarch. The Governor-General was expected to follow the orders of the "Seventeen" at home, and there was attached to him, as a sort of check, a council (Raad Van Indie) of five men, later (1617) increased to nine. The Seventeen were too far away to dictate more than general policies. Only five of the members of the Raad were stationed at Batavia, the other four being governors of districts outside Java and so too far away to do much. And the governor had his own ways of evading their control. At first he was to confer with the Raad when there was no special instruction from the Seventeen; later he was merely its president with a casting vote. But as head of the fleet and army, he far surpassed his advisers in importance; and he could easily get the upper hand by reference to secret advices of the Seventeen, or on the pretext of awaiting instructions. One of the first duties that fell to the Governor-General was the crushing of all competition within the areas of spice-production. Accordingly the Dutch captured Malacca in 1641 and were thereafter masters of the Archipelago, driving out the Portuguese, Spanish, French and British. The Dutch carried out

a thoroughly exclusive policy; when once masters of the situation their trade principles were as follows:—"For us the greatest possible freedom, for our competitors the greatest possible obstruction here and elsewhere. To this end our trade legislation and trade policy were directed" (Van Rees II 53-63). The nature of the profitable spice-trade may be gathered from some of the examples taken at random. The Dutch bought nutmegs at a stiver and a half per pound in the Indies, and sold them in Holland and Zeeland for three guilders and a quarter, making in some cases up to five thousand per cent. profit. The cloves also of Amboina and Ternate yielded heavy profit. The sole object of the Dutch was commercial gain, conceived to be derivable first and foremost, and to the exclusion of all else, from the spice trade.

Commercial control brought in its turn territorial sovereignty over Java and many of the neighbouring islands, and this sovereignty was exercised by the Directors of the company primarily with a view to trade interest. It was a closely guarded commercial monopoly. It was this concentration upon purely commercial aims which also prevented the Dutch from making any use of temperate regions like the Cape of Good Hope and other regions like Australia and New Zealand, which were opened up by the enterprise of the Dutch explorers. These countries were left unpeopled, largely because they promised no immediate trade profits. Even their colony in America, *i.e.*, New Netherlands, with its capital at New Amsterdam (later New York) was founded and controlled by the company of the West Indies, not primarily as an outlet for Dutch emigration, but as a trading station for collecting the furs and other products of the North American continent. The key-note of Dutch colo-

nisation may be said to be primarily trade, and in the interests of trade, settlement and colonisation were sacrificed, though they discovered Australia, New Zealand and Tasmania and established themselves at the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon and New York.

They established good coaling stations on the route to the East by planting a settlement at Mauritius and another at the Cape of Good Hope. After two centuries of monopoly, as injurious to their real interests as it was contrary to justice, they have abandoned it; at least the errors of their former methods are manifest. Private capital and personal energy are now allowed full play. Not a single company, but rather the entire nation has a part of its wealth. Even at the present day, Holland enjoys three-fourths of the entire trade of the Dutch East Indies, until lately by a tariff, which is now being slowly relaxed.

The Napoleonic wars ended disastrously for Holland. Her forced alliance with France gave the British an excuse to seize the Cape of Good Hope, to penalise Holland by detaching Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo from Surinam in South America and to legalise the capture of the foreign settlements in Ceylon by the Madras Presidency. An expedition was also sent against Java by the English East India Company under the leadership of Sir Stamford Raffles, and Java was captured by him. The Convention of London, signed on August 13, 1814 and recognised in the treaty of Vienna, took from Holland all her colonies except the East Indies, the island of Curacoa in the West Indies, and part of Surinam in South America. This agreement has often been criticized by British writers, who believe that the restoration of the Dutch East Indies was a sad and inexplicable blunder.

But the advantage to Great Britain of giving back the East Indies may not have been apparent at the time. In more than one international crisis, the fear of losing her colonies has acted as a deterrent to anti-British tendencies of the Dutch Foreign policy. Holland, in spite of its natural sympathies with the Boers, had to be guarded in its sentiments at the time of the Boer War. In the world war, joining forces with Germany would have proved as great a risk to Holland, as taking sides against Germany; and in the East Indies the Dutch were far less pro-German than in Holland. The influence of Great Britain's sea power was felt by Holland as by Italy, Portugal and Greece. The fear of Japanese aggression also forces Holland to remain on friendly terms with Great Britain and France.

In extent and population the Dutch East Indies are by far the most important island group of colonies in Asia—in fact in the entire world. They are nearly seven times as large and seven times as populous as the Philippine group, which lies north of them. With the exception of the northern side of Borneo, which is British, and the eastern end of Timor which is Portuguese, the Dutch are in undisputed possession of all the islands between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean from the strait of Malacca to New Guinea. Except Java, none of the islands has been completely pacified or administratively organised. While Java has only one-fifth of the area of the East Indies, her population is three-quarters of the total. There are four cities in Java of more than 100,000, and railways extend throughout the island.

Holland has no autonomous colonies as England has, with a responsible government and parliament. According to the Dutch constitution of 1848,

the King had the right of exclusive administration of the colonial possessions. At present, the law requires a budget of the colonies to be presented to the Dutch Parliament. The administration of the colonial possessions is exercised in the King's name by the minister of the colonies, and a detailed annual report is presented to the States-General on the situation in the colonies. The government in the Indies is vested in one man, the Governor-General, a functionary of the King and responsible to him for the proper discharge of his office. He is the commander of the land and sea forces of the Dutch Indies. He exercises supreme control over the different branches of the general administration. He issues ordinances on all matters not regulated by royal decree, declares war, makes peace, and concludes treaties with the native princes, and appoints civil and military employees. One of his most important duties is supposed to be the protection of the natives. He watches that no cession of land violates their rights and issues rules and regulations relating to the government cultures, fixes the kind and extent of the forced labour, and sees to the proper execution of all ordinances pertaining to this matter. He has the power of disciplining all foreigners who disturb the public order. Under him there is an Indian Council consisting of a Vice-President and four members; meeting under his chairmanship, but this is merely a consultative body whose opinion he takes, without being bound to follow it. At the head of the civil administration are five officials who hold the modest title of directors and are subject to the order and supreme control of the Governor, who is, in the empire of the Indies, almost the King himself in the absolute sense of the term. The machinery of the local

administration reveals the ingenious skill by which a very small number of functionaries rule the densest population of the world. The island is divided into 22 provinces, at the head of which are European officials who are as powerful in their province as the Governor-General is in the Colony at large, and who are aided by assistants who in turn have their subordinates in the persons of the *contrôleurs*, who see to the proper observation of the regulations relating to the natives, visiting periodically the villages of their districts, listening to complaints, overseeing the plantations and forming the link which connects the native administration to the European administration. The mechanism of government consists partly in concealing the true motors of the machine, under the net work of pure display by leaving to the native princes the illusion of power and veiling the action of the European rulers. Each territory or political division governed by a resident or governor comprises one or more residencies; and alongside of each resident or European governor, there are one or more regents; and while the resident is always a European, the regent, on the other hand, is always a native functionary belonging to the highest families of the country and frequently of princely birth. The natives are subject to the regent, their natural chief; and the resident or European Governor of the section, although the real holder of power, does nothing except through the medium of the regent. This is what is known as the indirect system of government as opposed to the direct system of administration carried on by the British and the French in their dependencies. Judging by experience and results, the Dutch system of indirect government seems to be more successful than the

direct methods of dealing with the natives, whose prejudices, susceptibilities, etc., the rulers are not expected to understand and sympathise with.

The Dutch Government in Java established the so-called " Culture System " in 1832, by which each occupant of the land, all of which was held to be practically the property of the government, was required to plant a certain proportion in coffee, sugar or such other articles as the officials might direct, and to sell it at a fixed price to the government, which in turn resold it in the markets of the world at a large profit. Under this system the government selected certain villages as suitable, in which at least one-fifth of the area should be sown with the crop prescribed. If the crop was one, such as sugar, requiring manufacture on the spot, a director was posted to the village or group of villages to whom the villagers were bound to deliver all the raw product as cut, receiving a fixed price for the same. The director, who had received large advances from the Government to enable him to set up the necessary machinery was bound on his part, to deliver a certain quantity of the manufactured article to the government. The advocates of the system point out that the revenue was raised in 25 years under this scheme from £2 millions to £9½ millions annually; imports jumped from £2 millions to £5 millions and exports from £2 millions to £8 millions.

The general principles of the culture-system were these:—All land belonged to the Government, and was given out for cultivation on the condition that of the total produce 4/15ths should be paid to the government. A class of Europeans known as contractors were encouraged by the Government by the offer of a bonus to build factories and storehouses for

the gathering and handling of the crops chiefly sugar, coffee and spices. Behind this system lay the corvee or liability of the country to render a certain amount of free service to the government in each year (for construction of roads, harbour works, etc.) The amount of such service varied from 50 to 75 days a year. By utilizing this forced labour the Dutch covered the island with public roads.

The culture-system was very profitable to the government, and although under it the Javanese population increased, and the interior of the island was developed, it is the most unjust and inhuman system as far as the native is concerned, because it laid down what he should produce and the methods by which he should dispose of his product, methods which were so adjusted as to become extremely profitable to the government, which created and enforced the system. It was vigorously attacked in 1868 by a former officer of the Dutch Government, who had spent 17 years in official life in Java. In a powerful novel entitled "Max Havillan" he points out certain features of the injustice of the system to the natives as follows:—"The native is by nature a husbandman. The cultivation of rice is in Java what the vine is in the Rhine Provinces and in the South of France. But there came foreigners from the West, who made themselves masters of the country. They wished to profit by the fertility of the soil and ordered the native to devote a part of his time and labour to the cultivation of those things which should yield higher prices in the markets of Europe. To persuade the lower orders to do so, they had only to follow a very simple policy. The Javanese obeys his chief; to win the chiefs, it was only necessary to give them a part of their gains and success was

complete. To be convinced of the success of that policy, we need only consider the immediate quantity of Javanese products sold in Holland, and we shall also be convinced of its injustice, for if anybody should ask if the husbandman gets a reward in proportion to that quantity, then I must give a negative answer. The government compels him to cultivate certain products upon his grounds; it punishes him if he sells to any purchaser but itself and fixes the price actually paid. The expenses of transport to Europe through a privileged trading company are high, the moneys paid to the chiefs for their encouragement increases the prime cost, and because the entire trade must create profit, that profit cannot be got in any other way than by paying the Javanese just enough to keep him from starving. This book created a sensation in Holland and in Europe, and, as a result, from 1871 onwards the rigours of the system relaxed, and the system was abolished in recent years. Now taxes have been substituted for the *corvée* and the land has been thrown open to private enterprise.

During the past few years, the island which formerly yielded a handsome annual profit to Holland, has had to face a yearly deficit averaging about one million pounds. This is due in part at least to the Chinese War. The culture-system has finally been abandoned as a result of the growing sense of humanitarianism and philanthropy. The condition of the agricultural classes of Java now compares very favourably with that of the same classes in India, and this has been attributed by writers to the fact that under the Dutch system there exist no landlords and middlemen to increase the rental of land. It is remarkable how Holland has not merely preserved but extended its dominion. Holland without

its colonies would be an insignificant, feeble member in the 'family of nations. With them, its power is much more substantial and far-reaching than many of the larger empires.

In 1913 a commission on the defence of the West Indies declared that it was necessary for Holland to build a fleet to protect the colonies, and the creation of a new navy was already under consideration when the great world war was declared. In view of the precarious position of her possessions in the East Indies, which Holland cannot hope to defend by her own means, no country was more interested in the formation of a League of Nations to guarantee the present colonial status than Holland. The dominion of Holland in the East is dependent upon world peace and a strict prohibition by international agreement of the sale of arms to natives. In 1920 and 1921 the United States engaged in an acrimonious correspondence with Holland over the question of discrimination against Americans in affording opportunities for the development of the mineral oil resources of the East Indies. But until weak nations like Holland feel that their possessions are secure by international agreements, and not by the grace of one or more Great Powers, favours will be granted—at least in self-defence—to the nations by whose good-will they are allowed to hold colonies.

The Dutch, by their exercise of prudence, judgment and enlightenment during the past few years, have moulded their policy to meet new conditions prevailing in the countries over which they rule. The Portuguese and Spanish lost their empires by their inability to adjust themselves, and their policy to constantly changing conditions. The Dutch, by their moderation have been able to maintain their sovereignty, while by their sagacity they have in

many respects improved their position. Even at the sacrifice of profits, abuses in the colony have been corrected and the reforms which were introduced lately, were not too late, to save their sovereignty. In 1917 a "Volksraad" or Legislative Council was installed to discuss the budget, and to advise the government on matters of general importance as a first step towards the development of self-government in the Colony. The Council includes Europeans, Javanese and other Orientals such as the Chinese and Arabs. Some of the members are appointed by the government, some are elected by the local Councils, and the Chairman is appointed by the Crown. These reforms may be compared to the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909 in India, and like the people of India the Javanese are not satisfied with them and are demanding further constitutional reforms which cannot be postponed much longer with a progressive India on one side and a democratic Philippines on the other.

CHAPTER III.

THE FRENCH COLONIAL POLICY.

After the world war, as before, France held second place to Great Britain in the extent, population distribution and importance of her colonial possessions. These two powers had been the principal beneficiaries of the treaties of Versailles and Sèvres. Japan had a small share in the division of the German colonies, but France received Morocco, Kamerun, Togoland, and Syria, extending and consolidating her dominion in West and Central Africa and North Africa and giving her a foothold in the Near East.

No nation or people give more careful study to the theory of colonisation or to the methods of advancing colonial prosperity than the French. The public officials, the educational institutions, the economists and the Press follow with great care and discuss in much detail the condition of their colonies, and the lessons to be drawn from present conditions and experiences of the past. The French have in many respects always been eminently suited for colonising. They have never been found wanting in enterprise, in fighting qualities, or power of adapting themselves to new peoples and new countries. Their leaders showed a definite policy in dealing with the native races; they treated them with humanity and consideration. They organised them and gave them cohesion; they formed alliances and counter-alliances and trained the natives of Asia and Africa in European methods of warfare and administration.

The first phase of French colonial activity during the 16th and 17th centuries relied almost wholly upon government assistance and although both Henry IV and Richelieu were anxious to give what help they could, internal dissensions were of such frequent occurrence in France during this period, that no systematic or continuous governmental aid was available. Hence, the French East India Company was all but extinct when Colbert took it in hand in 1664; it was never able to compete with its Dutch or even its English rival. The colonisation in the West and the establishment of the settlements in Acadia on the coast, though full of romance and heroism, was full of difficulties during the first fifty years, due to the severity of the climate, the barrenness of the soil, smallness of the number of settlers, etc. From the first, despite their small number and their difficulties, these settlers showed a daring in exploration, (*e.g.* Champlain) which was only equalled by the Spaniards, and to which there is no parallel in the records of the English colonies. From the outset, poverty, paucity of numbers, gallantry and missionary zeal formed marked features of the French North American colonies.

A despotic central power, a feudal organisation, and entire dependence upon the will of the King of France, and upon his support form a strong contrast with the conditions in English self-governing colonies (further down South) in New England.

France became the greatest of the European States under Louis XIV, and his great finance minister Colbert. Under their direction, France resolved to win for herself supremacy in trade and colonisation, and this was to be done under the control and direction of the central government. The French East

India Company was revived under government direction and began for the first time to be a serious competitor for Indian trade. An attempt was made to conquer Madagascar as a useful base for Eastern enterprises. The sugar industry in the French West Indian Islands was scientifically encouraged and developed, though the full results of this work were not apparent until the next century. France began to take an active share in the West African trade in slaves and other commodities. In Canada a new era of prosperity began; the population was rapidly increased by the dispatch of carefully selected parties of emigrants, and the French activity in missionary work and in exploration became bolder than ever. During this period also New Orleans was founded in 1717 and the organisation of the colony of Louisiana took place. The whole of the French colonial activity during this period depended upon the support and direction of the government, and when Colbert died in 1683, and soon afterwards all the resources of France were strained by the pressure of the great European Wars, the rapid development which Colbert's zeal had brought about was checked for a generation.

In the two great wars between England and Louis XIV (1688—1713), though the questions at issue were primarily European, the conflict inevitably spread to the colonial field, and as a result France was forced to cede in 1713 the province of Acadia (Nova Scotia), the vast basin of Hudson Bay and the island of Newfoundland to which the fishermen of both nations had resorted, though the English had always claimed it. The main conflict between France and England for colonial supremacy was however fought out during the half century following the peace of Utrecht (1713—1763). As a result of the seven years' War, France

lost to the English both India and Canada, her two richest possessions in the East and the West. By 1763, as a result of England's control of the seas, her superior organisation and the consistent policy of her home government, England had destroyed the power of its chief rival (France) both in the East and the West. In 1763 the French had lost almost the whole of the empire which they had toilsomely built up during a century and a half. The French revolutionary wars brought further changes. Nothing was left of the first colonial empire, save a few West India Islands. The allies of France in the Napoleonic wars, Holland and Spain also lost their colonies to England who by her control of the seas captured the colonies of her enemies. In 1815 France had fewer colonies than even Holland, Spain and Portugal.

From 1815 to 1870 with the notable exception of Algeria, the French made little effort to rebuild their colonial empire. Algeria was conquered between 1830 and 1847. The most important colonial achievement of Napoleon III was the foundation laid for the creation of Indo-China by intervention in Cochin-China in 1861 and in Cambodia in 1862. From the time of Mohemet Ali, the French had an advantage over other Powers in Egypt. They conceived and financed the building of the Suez Canal, but allowed it to pass out of their hands. They co-operated with Great Britain in fighting China, but got no tangible gain like Hongkong. After the Franco-Prussian war, Bismarck encouraged the French to devote their efforts to the creation of a new colonial empire, and especially to extend their influence along the Mediterranean coast of Africa. From 1871 to 1914 colonial ambition played a dominant role in the internal and international policy of France. Through

her colonial expansion, France became the ally of her hereditary enemy, Great Britain. She built up a standing army of Africans and Asians to compensate for her stationary population.

The period from 1871 to 1900 brought the empire-building instinct of the French into play in five distinct fields; North Africa, West and Central Africa, Madagascar, the Far East and Oceania. The French attempted to make Algeria an integral part of France. European settlers and Jews were granted French citizenship; emigrants from Alsace and Lorraine were given every encouragement to settle there. A law enacted in 1873 evicted thousands of native proprietors from their lands. Then followed the suppression of the Moslem system of dispensing justice through Kazis and the extension of the new French Municipal Law. To bring and keep colonists, partial exemption from military service and taxation was offered, and likewise the lands of dispossessed natives were given. This policy of the government was maintained until 1898. It was unpopular with the natives and it failed to attract the desired colonists from France. The reforms, that have brought prosperity and contentment to Algeria, were not put into effect, and administrative control was not extended to the Sahara hinterland until the end of the 19th century.

The conquest of Algeria was not opposed by the other powers. But when France expanded eastward into Tunisia and westward into Morocco, she came into conflict with Italy, Spain, Great Britain and Germany. When the French conquered Algeria they looked upon the occupation of Tunisia as a logical sequel. After the Crimean War, Turkey renewed her claim to sovereignty over Tunisia. The British

loaned money to the Bey, built the ports, railroads, waterworks, warehouses, etc., and owing to the proximity of Malta, a British protectorate was talked about. The Italians also competed with the French and the British for the possession of Tunisia. From 1860 to 1880, tens of thousands of Italian colonists went to Tunisia. In 1880 they bought the railroad from the British. But in 1878 at the Congress of Berlin, unknown to Italy, Salisbury with the consent of Bismarck, assured France, that there would be no opposition to her intervention in Tunisia. The French invaded the country from Algeria in 1881, occupied Tunisia and forced the Bey to sign a treaty putting himself under French protection. After two years of fighting the French were in full control. Great Britain, followed by other powers (except Italy) accepted the *fait accompli* of the protectorate. Owing to the mutual jealousies of the Powers (France, Spain, and Great Britain) to see one another ensconced in Morocco and especially owing to the determination of Great Britain, after the British seized Gibraltar, to brook no rival in the Straits, Morocco remained a semi-independent state till the beginning of the 20th century. In 1880 a conference of the powers at Madrid agreed upon the policy of "no special favours" for any one power in the matter of foreign protégés and from this time forth, their representatives watched one another with a jealous eye.

In 1900 France and Italy signed a secret agreement not to interfere with each other in efforts to extend exclusive economic and later political control over Tripoli and Morocco and the way was opened to France in 1904, when a similar agreement concerning Morocco and Egypt was signed by France and Great

Britain. The French originally planned to take all of North Africa but in order to have Morocco they had to buy off Italy and Great Britain. The evolution of French foreign and colonial policy since 1900, culminating in the treaty of Versailles at the end of a successful war, has tended principally to the creation of a consolidated North African Empire. The abandonment of Egypt and the Sudan by the French to Great Britain, meant renouncing the dream of a French belt across Africa. Morocco was needed to make Algeria secure, and then, when France expanded across the Sahara desert, it was realized that the African Empire of French dreams would be practicable, strategically, politically and economically only if France controlled Morocco. The protectorate of 1912 received international sanction in the Treaty of Versailles.

France looks upon her North African Empire as an extension of France and a reservoir of soldiers, foodstuffs and raw materials. As her North African colonies are developed and become more essential to the well-being of France, French statesmen see the vital importance of naval control in the western part of the Mediterranean, though her North African Empire can be reached by land and aeroplanes. Italy is wholly a Mediterranean power and if she cannot control the Mediterranean herself, she prefers to see Great Britain and France offset each other. Great Britain regards the Mediterranean as an essential link between the mother country, India and Australia, and ever since the Suez canal was cut her foreign policy has aimed at control of this sea.

The British delegates at the Washington Conference argued that overseas possessions necessitated a large navy. This argument provoked discussion in

Paris concerning the relation between France and her scattered colonies. The French Pacific Islands are taken care of by the Four Power Treaty, signed during the Washington Conference. But the rest of her scattered possessions in Asia, Africa and West Indies, for the most part remnants of France's ancient colonial empire, are not near to one another and demand protection. France has no control of the seas and bound herself at the Washington Conference to the ratio of 1.75 to 5 in relation to Great Britain. France is, therefore, likely to demand the extension of the principle of guarantee, confined to the Pacific islands in the Four Power Treaty, to possessions throughout the world. Pushed to its logical conclusion, the compelling of a guarantee with the fixing of a ratio in naval and military strength means the adoption by the Great Powers of a more specific mutual guarantee of the world-wide *status quo* than that implied in article X of the League of Nations Covenant.

The ambition of France in West and Central Africa was to build up an empire from the Atlantic to the Nile, and from the Mediterranean to the Congo. Germany's two colonies in West Africa were given to France in 1919, and the British consented to changes in the boundaries of Nigeria. The acquisition of Togoland in 1919 gave the French complete control from the Atlantic to the Nile, and the elimination of Germany in equatorial Africa in 1919 gave France a clear sweep of territory from the Congo to the Mediterranean, just as the peace treaty of 1919 gave the British a clear sweep from the Cape to Cairo, which formed the objective of the British as early as Cecil Rhodes. In 1890 the French and British governments mutually agreed to give each other a free hand

in Zanzibar and in Madagascar. In 1896, the queen of Madagascar was exiled to Algeria, and Madagascar was proclaimed a French colony. It took four years more for the French to establish complete authority.

In the South Eastern corner of Asia, Anam, Cambodia, Tongking, and Cochin China were, up to the middle of the 19th century, independent states, with a long history behind them. The Cambodians and Anamese had successively been masters of the whole country and had been under the suzerainty of China and Siam, their powerful neighbours. They had also received and expelled the Portuguese and the Dutch. During the Second Empire, through French missionaries, France intervened in these countries, due to the constant wars and the need for protection of their missionaries. In 1858, a Franco-Spanish fleet captured the port of Tourane and the French seized Saigon. Opposed by the Anamese, war followed with their country and in 1862 Anam concluded a treaty with France and Spain recognising the cession of the three provinces of Cochin China to France, promised security to French and Spanish missionaries, and agreed to pay an indemnity to the two powers. In 1863 Cambodia accepted the protectorate of France and in 1867 the other three provinces of Cochin China, left to Anam by the treaty in 1862, were annexed. French Indo-China thus includes Cochin China, Tongking, Anam and Cambodia, with an area of 263,000 square miles, or considerably more than that of France, with a population of over 25,000,000.

In 1862 Siam and France signed a treaty at Paris by which the Siamese recognised the French protectorate of Cambodia in return for the two provinces nearest Siam. By the annexation of Cambodia

France became a neighbour of Siam; on the other side of Siam, Great Britain became her neighbour by the annexation of Burma. It was only the jealousy and rivalry of France and Great Britain that prevented the partition and annexation of Siam. In their respective encroachments upon the sovereignty of China and Siam, Great Britain and France had reached a common frontier, which threatened friction. Differences of opinion were, however, settled by the Anglo-French agreement of 1904.

The Franco-British agreement of 1904 enabled France to take more territory from Siam both in 1904 and in 1907, being unopposed by any other Power. France has developed a rich colonial empire in Indo-China, and she maintains there a high export and import tariff and thus controls the bulk of the trade with the colony.

The only danger that could menace Indo-China is Japanese aggression. France cannot hope to defend Indo-China, as Holland cannot hope to defend Java, against Japan. But fortunately for France and Holland, Great Britain holds Hongkong and Singapore, and the United States the Philippines, which are also strategically at the mercy of Japan.

In regard to their forms of government, the French tropical colonies may be divided into two classes—those in which the government is carried out to some extent by the passage of laws, and those in which all matters are settled by the simple decree of the governor. To the first class belong Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Reunion; to the second class belong all the other French tropical colonies. In the first class of colonies the principal rights of the subjects are as follows:—the regulation of contracts, matters relat-

ing to wills, legacies and succession, the institution of juries, criminal procedure, mayors, municipal deputies and councillors and the organisation of the local Councils-general. In regard to all other matters of importance all the French tropical colonies are on the same basis of legislation—that is, government by decrees issued by the governor or the minister of the colonies.

The administration of the French Colonies, excepting Algeria which is regarded as a 'department' of France and Tunis and Morocco which are attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is directed or controlled by the Ministry of the Colonies, which was organised as a separate department in 1894. Most of the Colonies enjoy some measure of self-government and have elective Legislative Councils to assist the Governor. The older Colonies have also direct representation in the French Parliament, while most of the recently acquired Colonies are represented on the *Conseil Supérieur des Colonies*. This Council consists of the senators and deputies of old Colonies, delegates from other Colonies, and officials and other persons appointed on account of their special knowledge or qualifications.

The governor of a French colony has very wide powers. He is commander of the local land forces and of such vessels of war as may be attached to his station, as well as of the local militia. In his administrative capacity he has absolute authority to regulate nearly all the internal affairs of his colony; and he is above the law, for he cannot be brought before local courts for any cause whatever.

The governor is to some extent guided by the advice of two bodies—the privy council, which is a nominated body consisting of official and non-official

members; and the general council, which is made up of councillors elected by the votes of all male persons over 25 years of age who have resided for more than one year in the colony. Generally speaking, these bodies merely advise, but in regard to a few matters, such as the fixing of the tariff, the regulation of transfers of property and mortgages, the governor is bound to follow the advice thus given him. Such, in brief, is the constitution of the French tropical colonies; but in addition to the privy council and general council, some of the colonies have local councils and Councils *d'arrondissements*. The exact delimitation of the functions of these various bodies would involve an amount of detail which would be out of place in a volume intended merely as an introduction to the study of colonial policy.

The principal officers under the governor in the French colonies are the director of the interior, the military commandant, the chief of the health department, the permanent inspector of finances, the attorney-general, and the judges of the superior Courts. As compared with the British or the Dutch, the French have always suffered from poor material in civilian colonial administrators. The French army has furnished splendid men to the colonies, but the general run of officials has been and still is decidedly second rate, though they study most carefully the habits, characteristics, and the temperament of *les indigènes*. Social and economic conditions in France militate against recruiting high grade men for service abroad. The upper classes do not have younger sons to find posts for, and life and opportunities at home are sufficiently attractive to prevent the type of man that enters the British colonial service from seeking a career in the French colonies.

The same handicap prevents the French in finding good business men to cast in their fortunes with the colonies. There is a livelihood for all capable men in France, better than they could earn abroad.

Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Pondicherry send representatives to the French Parliament, usually one senator and two deputies. It must be said, however, that these colonies do not derive any advantage from this arrangement, as the natives of the colonies are rarely returned as deputies or senators. The voting takes place by the so-called separate list system, and hence the few Frenchmen in the colony have nearly as much voice, if not more, as the natives themselves.

The system thus described above results in a rigid government control over some of the French colonies particularly Madagascar and Indo-China. In others, owing to the weakness of the French officials and the fear inspired by the aggressive attitude of the natives, the ignorant masses are practically in power. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu says in his work *De la Colonisation chez les Peuples Modernes* "As regards politics, we have introduced French liberty into our colonies; we give them civil governors, we admit their representatives in our Parliament..... All these reforms are excellent in themselves. It is unfortunately to be feared that they will, in practice, result in abuses and that unless the mother country is very watchful, those free powers which she has granted to her colonies will become powers of oppression." Generally speaking, it may be said that in the French colonial possessions very little regard has been shown for the interests of the native people, though the French warned by British experience in India have introduced technical

and industrial in addition to literary education in Morocco and Algeria. In these two colonies they have avoided the danger of creating a number of highly educated but unoccupied persons who breed discontent. They try, like the Dutch in Java, to adjust the numbers in the higher schools to the places or occupations that the students may have to fill. In other respects, imbued with the spirit of Roman Jurisprudence, which lies at the basis of all institutions of the mother country, they have transferred to their colonial possessions the whole administrative and judicial machinery of the mother country, without asking themselves whether the natives, for whose benefit they profess to work, would not find in this machinery simply tools of oppression and exploitation. For example, the French have introduced in Cochin-China and Senegal (where the native population is altogether distinct from the European race by custom, religion, etc.) an organisation which seems to have been constructed in such a way as to crush the natives and reduce them to a condition befitting to the taste of their rulers. Much the same thing may be said of some aspects of British rule in India, though to a lesser extent, as the natives of India are more cultured and civilized than the natives of any other dependency. The colonial councils of Senegal and Cochin-China, with a preponderance of European members, have considerable power as regards the assessment of fiscal charges and expenditures, (as was the case in pre-Montford days in India,) and thus act as an organisation for the exploitation of the natives. Mr. J. L. de Lanessan, a former Governor-General of French Indo-China, and an ex-Minister of the Marine in his work *Principes de Colonisation* says as follows :—" For what else are the introduction of

our codes, our administration, our lawyers and our men of affairs but another means of turning over the natives to the exploitation of Europeans? I believe that to make these colonies prosperous and to acquire the sympathy and confidence of the people, we ought to strive to protect them against the proclivities on the part of Europeans of exploiting them. Our laws and codes ought to be introduced as little as possible, and each colony ought to have the right to adopt for itself a system of legislation adapted to the particular necessities of the country and to benefit of the natives." In spite of these drawbacks, the French, more than the English or the Dutch, have to a remarkable degree shown a capacity to live the life of the subject races, and acquire personal ascendancy over them by their methods of adaptation and assimilation.

The French conquer new territories and they govern them as dependencies, but they do not colonise in the proper sense of the term, by sending out French emigrants even to temperate regions like their North African Empire *i.e.*, the Mediterranean lands like Algiers, Morocco and Tunis suitable for European colonisation. Algiers is but a few hours' sail from the south of France, and Tunis not much farther. Here is the field in which one might look for a prosperous French peasantry under climatic conditions but slightly different from those prevailing in Provence or Gascony. Yet to-day it is not the Frenchmen but the Italian, the Spaniard and the Jew who furnish the bulk of European settlers there, though there are French cafés in the towns and French officials in their uniforms are seen everywhere. The French are proverbially reluctant to leave their country even as tourists. It is true that France has no excess population, and climatic condi-

derations might probably keep emigrants from northern and central France from choosing the northern coast of Africa for colonisation, though the Italians flock to Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco in large numbers. From the colonial point of view, therefore, Spain and Italy are the countries directly benefited by the Mediterranean, countries rather than France. The Frenchman is a brave soldier, and his fellow-citizens have a passion for detailed administration. When they govern, they govern too much. It would seem therefore, that freedom from paternalism is the crying need of the French colonial system, as it is even in France. Nevertheless, France has introduced substantial changes in the government of her colonies since 1919. She has done away with the old consultative conference in Tunis in favour of a more representative Grand Council. She has admitted native Algerians to French citizenship, subject to certain qualifications, and has abolished discriminatory taxes. Constitutional re-organisation has also been taking place in French Cochinchina, Senegal and Equatorial Africa, and the mandate of Syria has been given a federal constitution recently. In spite of this concession, the French are finding the occupation of Syria expensive, dangerous and fruitless. It makes them offend the susceptibilities of the Mohammedans, which they can ill afford to do. The Syrians irrespective of creed have resented the mutilation of their country by the exclusion of Palestine. The Moslems, who form the majority, are not content to be French subjects, when in the adjacent Hedjaz the Arabs are independent and in the adjacent Iraq they enjoy autonomy. The Syrians do not want the French. Even the French realise that Syria would always be a drain on France and the French

possession precarious, as France has no bases in neighbouring territories as the British have for controlling Mesopotamia and Palestine.

The Latin races do not share the Anglo-Saxon prejudices against the coloured peoples. The Anglo-Saxons regard even Asians as coloured people. To the French, the Tunisians, Algerians, Berbers, Moroccans, Malagasy, Hindus and Indo-Chinese are not in any essential different from the white people. Only the natives of West and equatorial Africa are blacks, and the French, while agreeing that these people are different from the Europeans, none the less receive them socially and treat them more or less on equal terms.

One of the most important values of the colonies from the French point of view is the use of the colonies as military reservoirs. In their eyes, Africans and Asians are a military asset, and can be used in Europe in time of peace as well as in time of war to offset the discrepancy in population between the French and the Germans. Dupleix as early as 1750 discovered that the Asians, when drilled and disciplined on the European system, make as good soldiers as Europeans. He was the first European to discover the military value of Asian races and his European rivals (the English) quickly made use of it and were benefited by his genius.

General Mangen as early as 1910, in his book *La Force Noire* (The Black power), advocated the military training of the African natives for the use of France in her continental wars. This practice of using the African colonies as military reservoirs of the mother country is now part of the permanent military policy of France. Throughout the world war, France used her African troops in Europe on all the

fronts, though the allies accused Germany of training black armies in Africa for this purpose. Even after the declaration of peace, France employed black troops as an army of occupation in the Ruhr, Rhine and other parts of Germany which evoked great bitterness in Germany and aroused protests from all the European powers.

The French Government in January, 1922, increased the colonial quota from 200,000 to 300,000 troops, about fifty per cent. of the total mobilized strength of the French army. Conscription is in force in the colonies, as in France, but with this difference that the native levies especially in West and Central Africa are being organised and developed with the idea of making them infantry divisions to be used by France in Europe and the Near East, while French conscripts are not ordered on foreign service except in time of War.

Should such a practice become universal, the rivalry of Europe and America for the control of raw man-power in Africa will itself be productive of international disputes, not to mention the effect it will have upon the natives. For this reason article XXII of the League of Nations insisted that in mandated territories natives must not be given military training except for local police purposes and for defence of the territory in which they live. The principle applies to all the African and Pacific mandates except French Togo and Cameroons, where France has insisted on the right to train natives in order to 'repel an attack or for the defence of the territory outside of that subject to the mandate.'

France interprets the expression "the defence of territory" to mean the defence of French territory anywhere in the world.

“ The effect of military training on the natives themselves is remarkable. If by conscription the natives of Africa are trained to fight and are in possession of weapons, France and the other Powers with colonies in Africa may find, in course of time, that their subjects cannot any longer be exploited with impunity. They will demand self-government and the use of their labour and their national wealth for the benefit of their own country. This is already happening in the older French colonies, *i.e.*, in Algeria and in Tunisia.

Much has been written since the world war of the great wealth of the French colonies and of the economic advantages France will enjoy from their development. The value of the North African empire, for foodstuffs as well as for soldiers, was amply demonstrated during the late war. And in the decade before the war the increase in the prosperity of the colonies had been marvellous. The difficulties that confront France in the economic development of her colonial possessions are the lack of administrators and colonists and the maintenance of high protective tariffs for the benefit of the mother country. The French still think that colonies exist primarily for the benefit of France; hence heavy import and export duties imposed on the rest of the world are omitted in favour of French merchants, and French shipping is everywhere given preference. Under these conditions French colonies have not prospered as much as they would have, if they were allowed to trade on equal terms with the whole world and avail themselves of the world's shipping. The French themselves realize that exploitation and monopoly cannot continue indefinitely. Subject people will demand the right to trade on equal terms with other nations than

France. The British have been so far ahead of other nations in the organisation of their commerce, in their control of carrying trade, and their control of trade routes, that they could afford to let other nations do business with their colonies on equal terms. Only in recent years have there been preferential tariffs within the British Empire and these have not been onerous. The other nations, if they find that France is not using and developing the resources of her colonies, will demand the open door; whether they will get it or not depends upon future developments.

CHAPTER IV.

EXPANSION OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

1600—1815.

In 1914 approximately one-fourth of the world's habitable area, and a fourth of the human race were embraced by the British Empire. Larger than any other state in the world, nine times the size of the German Empire, and considerably more than three times the size of the United States, by its very vastness, with its perplexing social, political, and economic problems, the British Empire merits a closer study by the students of imperialism and colonial problems. Its closest rival, the Russian Empire boasted in 1914 only three-quarters the area and three-tenths the population of the British Empire. The size of the British Empire becomes even more impressive when compared with the smallness of the mother country. In area the United Kingdom constitutes less than one-hundredth part of the Empire, in population about one-tenth. Shorn of its colonies, Great Britain would have been a comparatively small state with less than three-fourths the population of Germany and far less important than either Germany, France, Russia, or the United States. Indeed the entire white population of English speaking people in the Empire, number no more than sixty millions, three-fourths of whom live in the British Isles. From the remaining fifteen millions of white inhabitants, there must be deducted 1,800,000 Canadians of French origin who normally speak French, 500,000 Canadians

of other nationalities, 700,000 South Africans of Dutch and German extraction. • It appears, then, that there were hardly more than twelve millions of really British settlers in all the British Colonies. The comparatively small size of the British nation proves that the colossal empire was not produced by the normal increase of the English speaking people. For every one of the British colonists, there are more than thirty natives subject to British rule. Four-fifths of the entire population of the British Empire (or 315 millions of Indians) live • in India alone, and forty millions of blacks, six millions of Arabs, six millions of Malays, one million Chinese, one million Polynesians, and 100,000 Red Indians, overwhelmingly • outnumber the sixty millions of white inhabitants of the Empire. The British Empire is, therefore, a heterogeneous collection of people of every race, representing every phase of culture from cannibalism to the absolute *ahimsa* or non-violence creed of Mahatma Gandhi, inhabiting lands of the most diverse climates, professing five great * and innumerable lesser religions, and inhabiting important territories in five of the world's six continents. † By its very nature such an empire must be a highly complex and inharmonious organisation, the more so, since its constituent parts were added one by one, some by conquest, some by mere occupation, and some by settlement. The expansion of the Empire was guided by no consistent policy, unless the shifting of policies itself be considered a policy.

* Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, Mohammedanism, and Jainism.

† South America is the only continent in which the Empire is not well represented.

It has been truly said that the Empire was built up in a fit of absent-mindedness. The Empire may be roughly divided into three types :—(1) The mother country and the self-governing dominions, (2) The crown colonies, possessing few or no rights of self-government, the Chartered Companies and the protectorates and the mandates, and (3) the Indian Empire. The Indian Empire is the greatest of all British possessions viewed from the historical, economical, and political point of view. Although less than half the size of Canada, India is justly entitled to rank first, because it contains forty times the population of Canada, because four-fifths of the entire population of the Empire live in India, because Indian trade with the United Kingdom, worth more than one hundred and fifty millions of pounds a year, far exceeds that of any other colony, * because more Englishmen are employed in the civil and military administration of India than of any other colony, and because more Englishmen are benefited by their connection with India than with any other country. For every square mile of territory in the United Kingdom, India can show fifteen, and as the British Isles have only forty-five million inhabitants as against India's three hundred and fifteen millions, every man, woman and child in the United Kingdom may be said to possess seven subjects in India. North and South America put together have only half as many people as India.

The acquisition of this tremendous empire by a handful of British merchant-adventurers would have

* In 1913 the total commerce excluding the shipments of treasure between India and Ceylon and U. K. amounted to one hundred and thirty millions of pounds. No other colony or country in the world purchased so large an amount of British merchandise as India.

been absolutely impossible but for two facts.* In the first place India was divided geographically, racially, religiously and politically, and in the second place India was not organized in western methods of warfare, *i.e.*, the lack of discipline, lack of deadly fire-arms and the marvellous machines coupled with the lack of any systematic training in western sciences. In addition to these grave defects, India was not benefited by the progress of science and civilization after the era of the industrial revolution. Up till this time India could compare herself favourably with the advanced European countries, either in the development of arts, letters, philosophy, and science or in methods of administration.

We shall now briefly sketch the growth of the British Empire both in India and elsewhere, and consider what forces and causes contributed to the growth of this marvellous empire and enabled Great Britain to come out triumphant in the race for Empire among the various European nations that struggled for colonial possessions, since the age of discovery in the fifteenth century.

The first period of European Imperialism was the era of Iberian Monopoly and supremacy; and it lasted till the defeat of Spain in the Great Armada in 1587 by the English. The second period of European Imperialism, from 1588—1763, was filled with the rivalries of the three nations which had in different degrees contributed to the break-down of the Spanish monopoly, the Dutch, the French and the English. The long era of their rivalry extended from 1588 to 1763, and it can be divided into three sections. The first of these extended from 1588 to about 1660, and may be called the period of experiment and settlement, and during its course the leadership fell to the Dutch.

The idea of plantation in undeveloped tracts was first adopted in Ireland in the reign of Mary Tudor and more fully in the reign of Elizabeth; Sir Walter Raleigh, who had gained experience in Ireland, was the chief advocate of expansion through plantations in America. He led his first expedition to Virginia in 1585, though his half-brother Sir Humphrey Gilbert, who published his "Discourse on Plantations" in 1575, attempted to make a settlement in Newfoundland in 1583. The first expansion movements, in undeveloped tracts and islands by plantations in America and the West Indies, and in the populous and productive countries in Asia by trade, were extended by chartered companies. The English government granted charters for plantation purposes to the Virginia Company in 1606 and 1609 (settlement of Bermudas 1609, 1612, 1620,) and to the Massachusetts Bay Company in 1629. Grants of lands were also given to individuals and Royal favourites in America and West Indies for 'plantation purposes, notably of Nova Scotia to Sir William Alexander in 1621, of Barbadoes to the Earl of Marlborough in 1624, of the Carribean Islands to the Earl of Carlisle in 1627 and of Maryland to Lord Baltimore in 1632. Francis Bacon's essay on "Plantations", published in 1625, sets forth the clearest statement of the science of planting as it was understood in the Seventeenth Century.

The second period extended from 1660 to 1713, and may be called the period of systematic colonial policy and of growing rivalry between France and England; during this period France held the leadership by reason of her superior organisation and advantages. During this period the chief work of

expansion was carried on by chartered trading companies. Merchants were accustomed to associate for trade purposes and to work like the mediaeval guilds on the basis of monopolies. The Russian or Muscovy Company was founded in 1554 by the Charter of Mary Tudor to trade with Russia. The Turkey or Levant Company was founded in 1581 by a charter from Elizabeth, and the English Levant Company was extended into an association to trade overland with India in 1593. Finally the London East India Company, which brought India into the British Empire, was formed on 31st December 1600 to trade with India by way of the Cape of Good Hope. The embassy of Sir Thomas Roe was sent to India in 1615 by this company through royal favour. The weak condition of the English navy and the political weakness of England checked both expansion by settlement and expansion by trade up to the Civil War. A new era was opened, however, by the direct intervention of the English government for the protection and extension of English interests beyond the seas, when Sir Harry Vane passed the first Navigation Act in 1651, which marks the mercantile view of trade and plantations. The second Navigation Act was passed by Charles II in 1660 to strengthen the English mercantile marine and English trade and to promote the expansion of colonies. Expansion by war was also undertaken when the conquest of Jamaica was effected in 1655 by Penn and Venables, and the annexation of New York was made in 1667 from the Dutch. At the same time new companies and settlements were founded, such as the Royal African Company in 1663 for carrying on the slave trade, the Hudson Bay Company in 1670 (to trade in furs,) which brought Canada into the British Empire. Carolina was

founded in 1673, and John Locke, the philosopher, gave a constitution for the government of the new plantation. The 'settlement of Pennsylvania by William Penn took place in 1681 under a charter from the Crown. Bombay was leased to the London East India Company in 1667 through the influence of Sir Josiah Child who, in his 'Discourse on Trade' published in 1668, undertook the popularisation and exposition of the Mercantile System. All the charters were given by the Crown; and since the Crown, and not the Crown and Parliament, exercised this prerogative, the control of plantations and trade fell to the Privy Council, and a commission of the Privy Council was appointed in 1634 for making laws and orders for the Government of English colonies. After the restoration, Clarendon created the Council of Trade and the Council of Plantations in 1660, and the two councils were united as a Council of Trade and Plantations in 1672 with John Locke as its Secretary. The Council was, however, abolished in 1677 and its duties were given to the Privy Council. These Councils were only consultative, administrative authority being vested in the Secretaries of State. In practice the English settlers in the seventeenth century enjoyed a considerable degree of self-government and their right to legislate for themselves was admitted by the English Government. This right was also at first given to the factory at Madras and later withdrawn.

The third period from 1713 to 1763 was dominated by the intense rivalry of France and England, decadent Spain joining in the conflict on the side of France, while the declining power of the Dutch was on the whole ranged on the side of England; and it ended with the complete ascendancy of England,

supreme at once in Canada and India. During this period the expansion of the Empire was primarily by means of conquest. Lively interest was taken in expansion by settlement, expansion by trade and expansion by conquest after the revolution of 1688. The influence of the merchant class in Parliament in the reigns of William III and Anne became supreme. As a result, continual peace and alliance with the Dutch were maintained, which prevented the rivalry of the Dutch with the English merchants in Asia. Marked attention was paid to trade privileges in the Treaties of Utrecht in 1713. The Assiento with Spain was concluded. Gibraltar and Nova Scotia were annexed as a result of the War of the Spanish Succession. Halifax and Nova Scotia were colonised by English discharged soldiers and sailors in 1749, (after the conclusion of the war of Austrian Succession,) which is the first instance of deliberate expansion by settlement undertaken by the English Government. The expansion by conquest was undertaken by William Pitt (afterwards Earl of Chatham) by the regeneration of the Navy, the dispatch of Royal troops to India, and the recognition of the genius of Wolfe and Clive, who won for the English Canada and India respectively during the campaigns of the Seven Years War. Pitt refused to take Bengal under the direct government of the Crown. The Treaty of Paris in 1763 gave the British, Canada, St. Vincent, Grenada, Dominica Tobago and other West India Islands, in addition to their supremacy in India over the French. During the Seven Years' War, an expedition was sent from Madras by the East India Company against Manilla, which was partially successful. The Treaty of Paris in 1763, however, restored the Philippine Islands to Spain.

During the Seven Years' War the American colonists helped the mother country by sending expeditions against the French in Louisburg and in other ways. The treaty of Paris left the way open for the American revolution as the American colonists no longer feared French aggression in Canada, neither did they desire or require the protection of England in the New World.

The effects of the English revolution of 1688 on Colonial Administration were three fold. It resulted first in the establishment of the control of Parliament over the executive, which meant Parliamentary interference in colonial affairs and the disappearance of the direct authority of the Crown in the Colonies. The Secretary of State for the Colonies was no longer to be merely the agent of the Crown, but was to be a leading member of the party which controlled the majority in Parliament. Secondly, the Americans were influenced by the ideas of Locke and the philosophers of the Revolution, and wanted no interference in their domestic affairs either from the Crown or Parliament. The establishment of the Board of Trade and Plantations in 1696, which carried on the correspondence with the colonies and advised on colonial matters, irritated the Americans when this Board pursued a policy of interference. Increased attention was paid to Asiatic and American affairs in England after the Treaty of Paris. The Secretaryship of State was instituted for the American colonies in 1768, and the secretary was not to be bound by the decision of the Board of Trade and Plantations. Lord North's Regulating Act was passed in 1773 by which the English government directly interfered in the government of India for the first time. In 1774 the Quebec Act

was passed, recognizing the rights and laws of the French Canadians, which permanently secured their loyalty to the British Crown.

The third and most important effect of the English revolution on colonial matters was the increasing influence of the Mercantile Theory in the relations of England with her colonies and dependencies. Close supervision and control of trade, and in the case of India, of monopoly of trade, were maintained. This is also true with regard to Ireland. Though self-government and the benefit of English Law were granted to American colonies, trade interference and the evil effects of the mercantile system, adopted by the mother country, alienated the sympathies of the American colonies and resulted in constant friction and irritation. The colonial legislatures in America enjoyed full legislative autonomy, but the Governors appointed by the Crown came into conflict with the legislatures and the problem of an irremovable executive and an elected legislature gave rise to constant deadlocks and causes of friction, * which were bound to end either in the granting of full autonomy or separation. The two limitations upon the self-government of the American colonies were as follows:—The executive and judicial officers who carried out the laws were not elected by them, but appointed by the Crown in England. The colonies were not responsible for the administration of their own laws. Secondly, the regulations by which their foreign trade was governed were determined, not by themselves but by the British Parliament. They were not responsible for the control of their own traffic with the outside world.

* Excepting in Rhode Island and Connecticut where the power of electing governors was conferred on the people.

The old colonial system or the mercantile commercial policy was perhaps more responsible for the American revolution than even the political cause,—the right of the British Parliament to tax the colonists. According to the old colonial system, which was in force till the loss of the American colonies in 1782, the mother country used to be responsible for the defence of all the scattered settlements, which in their weakness were exposed to attack from many sides; in return she expected to be put in possession of definite trade advantages. Hence the Navigation Act of 1660 provided not only that inter-imperial trade should be carried in English or Colonial vessels, but that certain 'enumerated articles', including some of the most important colonial products, should be sent only to England, so that English merchants should have the profits of selling them to other countries, and the English Government the proceeds of duties upon them. Another Act provided that imports to the colonies should only come from or through England. In other words, England was to be the commercial entrepot of the whole empire, and the regulation of imperial trade as a whole was to belong to the English Government and Parliament. To the English Government also belonged the conduct of the relations of the Empire as a whole with other powers. This commercial system was not, however, purely one-sided. If the colonies were to send their chief products only to England, they were at the same time to have a monopoly or marked advantage in English markets. Differential duties were levied in England on competing products of other countries and their colonies. This policy was something like the modern policy of imperial preference. It aimed at turning the empire into an economic unit of which England

was to have been the chief beneficiary.. The old colonial system of England was not different from the contemporary colonial policies of France and Spain or Holland, except that self-governing institutions were granted to the English colonies which were denied by France and Spain. The restrictions on colonial trade, together, with the prohibition of industries likely to compete with those of the mother country, irritated the colonies and encouraged smuggling trade between the New England Colonies and the French West Indies, in defiance of the Navigation Acts and other mercantile laws passed by England. The rigorous enforcement of these laws, together with the insistence of the right of Parliament to tax the colonists, brought about the American Revolution.

The American Revolution marks the first retrogression in the history of the British Empire. The success of the American Revolution disgusted English statesmen and the English people regarding problems of Colonial administration. By Burke's Act of 1782 the abolition of the Board of Trade and Plantations and of the Secretaryship of State for the American Department was effected. Questions with regard to the remaining possessions were left to the Secretary of State for the Northern Department alone until 1786, and after that date until 1794 conjointly with a committee of the Privy Council on Trade and Plantations until the establishment of the Secretaryship of State for War and the Colonies in 1794 with Henry Dundas as the Secretary. The committee of Trade and Plantations was finally abolished in 1801.

While the American controversy was proceeding, one of the greatest of British navigators, Captain Cook, was busy exploring the Pacific and ac-

quiring Australia and New Zealand for the British, though these regions were discovered by the Dutch a century earlier. The loss of the American colonies had deprived Britain of her chief dumping ground for convicts. In 1788, six years after the recognition of American Independence, England established the convict settlement of Botany Bay in Australia. This penal settlement of Botany Bay is the starting point in the colonisation of Australia and New Zealand. The United Loyalists from America crossed the border after 1783, and settled down in Ontario and Nova Scotia and started the new colony of New Brunswick. The advent of the loyalists into Canada, a hitherto purely French province, raised the very difficult problem of racial relationship. No attempt was made to anglicise the French settlers; on the contrary the Quebec Act of 1774 granted to the French the maintenance of the Roman Catholic religion and of French Civil Law, which ensured the loyalty of the French Canadians. By the Quebec Act of 1791, the purely French region of Ontario or Upper Canada, and both the provinces as well as the coastal settlements, were endowed with self-governing institutions of the familiar pattern, representative government with an elected assembly controlling legislation and taxation,* a nominated governor and a council directing the executive. The Act of 1791 is important as indicating a new departure in Colonial policy, conferring self-governing institutions on alien non-British European elements in the Empire; though there was the absence of any recognition of alien races, to self-governing institutions, whether they be the inhabitants of India or of Africa.

* While the Act of 1774 provided for only a nominated council.

The Regulating Act of 1773 failed in its operation and the trading exploitation of the East India Company led to worse results than those of the forcibly imposed political dominion; and the only solution lay in the wise adaptation of western methods of government to eastern conditions; and the first step was taken by the passage of Pitt's India Act establishing the Board of Control in 1784, substituting the responsibility of Parliament and of the English Nation to some extent for the irresponsibility and selfish interests of the East India Company in the governance of India.

As a result of the growth of the humanitarian movement in England, the impeachment of Clive and of Warren Hastings took place (1786-1793), and an Anti-slavery Society was founded in 1789, together with the settlement of Sierra Leone for freed slaves in 1787. During the Napoleonic wars the humanitarian spirit continued to grow, until the abolition of the negro slave trade was effected in 1807 with the trial of Colonel Picton (1806) for the torture of Louisa Calderon. Wilberforce succeeded in inserting at the time of the renewal of the Charter of 1813 of the East India Company, clauses allowing missionaries to preach in India, and establishing the Bishopric of Calcutta in 1813.

During the long war between England and the French Republic, involving France, Holland, and Spain, the control of the sea by England, as in the case of the Seven Years War and the wars of the Spanish Succession, enabled England to capture nearly all the colonial possessions of the French, the Dutch and the Spanish. As the control of war and the colonies went together, the newly captured possessions were generally administered by military officers.

The French Revolutionary wars brought about vast changes in the colonial map of the world. The principal changes were with reference to Africa and South America. As a result of the participation of Holland in the war on the side of France, the Dutch colony at the Cape of Good Hope was occupied by England in 1798, restored for a brief period in 1801, re-occupied in 1806, and finally annexed under the treaty settlement of 1815. The Cape was, in fact, the most important acquisition secured to England by that treaty, though she paid a sum of two million pounds to Holland as a compensation for this settlement. England secured the Cape mainly because of its value as a coaling station on the way to India, but it imposed upon her an imperial problem of a very difficult kind. As in Canada, she had to deal here with an alien race of European origin, and this racial problem was accentuated by the further problem of dealing with a preponderant and growing negro population.

A second result of the French revolutionary wars was, that when Napoleon made himself master of Spain in 1808, the Spanish colonies in Central and South America ceased to be governed from the mother country, and having tasted the sweets of independence, and still more the advantages of unrestricted trade, could never again be brought into subordination. Between 1815 and 1825 all the Spanish colonies in South America declared their independence of the old country. By 1825 nothing was left of the vast Spanish Empire save the Canaries, Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippine Islands; nothing was left of the Portuguese Empire save a few decaying posts on the coasts of Africa and India; nothing was left of the Dutch Empire save Java and

its dependencies restored by England in 1815; nothing was left of the French Empire save a few West India Islands; and what had been the British American colonies were now the United States of America, a great power declaring to Europe, through the Monroe doctrine, that she would resist any attempt of the European powers to restore the old régime in South America.

As a result of the Napoleonic Wars, England acquired vast colonial dependencies in all the continents. In Asia she acquired Ceylon from the Dutch in 1795, took Java in 1808 and restored it in 1815 in return for the valuable cession to the British of the Cape Colony in Africa. In addition to the Cape Colony, which became the starting point of the British Empire in Africa, England acquired Mauritius (now a prosperous sugar colony,) and the Seychelles from France in 1810, though she restored the island of Reunion to France in 1815.

In America and the West Indies, England acquired British Guiana from the Dutch in 1796, St. Lucia and Tobago from the French in 1794, and Trinidad from Spain in 1797, though she restored Martinique and Guadeloupe to France in 1815. In Europe she acquired the valuable and highly strategic island of Malta as a military and naval station to be added as a link in the line of communications with Gibraltar, acquired in 1713. During the same period, the Indian Empire was founded and consolidated by the policy of Hastings and Wellesley.

The first empire that England lost through the American Revolution was more than made up by the new acquisitions she obtained through exploration and the control of the sea and by the terms

of the Treaty of Paris in 1815. The second Empire that she won between 1785 and 1815, a period of less than thirty years, was different in character from the old. It was an empire of continents or sub-continents—Canada, Australia, India, South Africa—not to speak of innumerable scattered islands, trading posts, naval and military stations dotted over all the seas of the world, which had either survived from an earlier period, or had been acquired in order that they might serve as naval bases. It was spread round the whole globe; it included almost every variety of soil, product and climate; it was inhabited by peoples of the most varying types. It presented an infinite variety of political and racial problems. The gains made between 1785 and 1815, a space of thirty years, are astonishing and remarkable, and the loss of the thirteen American Colonies was but a trifling matter compared with the new acquisitions; though the American colonies were entirely different in character from the new Empire, in as much as they were an offshoot of the mother country.

The development of the British Empire up to 1815 was due to her geographical position, her advance by a hundred years in political unification over her rivals, her policy of non-intervention in European affairs, except when the balance of power in Europe made one or other power threaten England's trade or sea-power, her control and supremacy of the seas, and a lucky start in colonial enterprises all over the world. In addition, there are other causes, material and moral, for her supremacy in colonial expansion. The British had coal at tide water. Their brains and energy were responsible for the adaptation of steam power to industry and transportation. Just as in political matters they were a cen-

tury ahead of other leading European Powers, so also in industrial and commercial methods they took advantage of the new inventions earlier than any other Power. They were good sailors and established firmly their supremacy of the seas in 1815. But, most important of all, they were willing to expatriate themselves, not only to fight and die for their country, but to settle and develop the overseas territories to which they took title, unlike the cases of the French, Dutch, or Spanish who went there only as soldiers, statesmen or adventurers and returned to their mother country. The social organisation of England, and her system of primogeniture had enabled her younger sons to turn their thoughts permanently to territories situated in the temperate zones such as Canada, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand. Their treatment of the native races too was fairer during this period when compared with that of other powers.

Of the leading Powers at the Congress of Vienna, Great Britain alone attached importance to questions outside Europe. The Holy Alliance of Russia, Prussia and Austria did not appeal to her. In Europe Great Britain's interests led her to play a negative role in international diplomacy from the Congress of Vienna to the Congress of Berlin. Among themselves the Powers could do as they pleased. The veto of Great Britain was heard in international councils only when questions of over-seas policy arose; for example, British statesmanship opposed the scheme of the Holy Alliance to help Spain to win back her American Colonies in 1822-23. With Russia and France, the only other powers that showed marked colonial activity, Great Britain came

into occasional diplomatic conflict, and from Denmark and Holland titles of ownership were acquired on the West African Coast.

From 1815 to 1878 the growth of the British Empire was rapid, though in other parts excepting India, Burma and China it was not a period of conquest. Wars were fought only to protect claims already staked out and in the process of development, and to prevent other Powers from menacing the British imperial trade routes by land or sea, which are the means of protecting and facilitating communications with colonies. British colonial activity must be treated from the dual point of view, of creating and stimulating overseas markets and the carrying trade, and of protecting the markets and the merchant marine. For themselves first, and then for the colonies peopled by the overflow of population from England and Scotland, the British sought security and prosperity. In buttressing the British Empire and gaining control of trade routes to all parts of the world, they took what they wanted, or thought they needed, in Asia and Africa, and opposed by diplomatic pressure and by force the expansion of every other European Power, where they felt that expansion would jeopardize their plans for strengthening and adding to the empire. The dominant considerations were India and the trade routes from England to India, from England to the other colonies, and from the other colonies to India. India could be made secure only by control of the land and sea approaches to the Indian peninsula. The settlements after the downfall of Napoleon had given Great Britain, Malta and the Ionian Islands in the Mediterranean, the Cape of Good Hope, the Seychelles, Mauritius and Ceylon. The Ionian Islands

were ceded to Greece in 1863, but Cyprus was occupied in 1878. Owing to the changed conditions through the piercing of the Isthmus of Suez in 1869, Cyprus had become a vantage point of importance. But Disraeli had already taken another step to control the new route to India by purchasing the Khedive Ismail's shares in the Suez Canal Company in 1875.

In the regions between Egypt and India, the British had been working with admirable foresight and energy for half a century before the Suez Canal was cut. Control of the Red Sea was secured by the occupation of Aden in 1839, and in the following year the East India Company pre-empted the opposite African coast by binding the native chiefs to a promise not to enter into treaty relations with other Powers. To neutralize other European influences the British were led to declare war against Abyssinia in 1868. The king was killed and his heir taken captive to England where he died. In 1873, the Sultan of Zanzibar made a treaty with the British and in 1877, London recognised Egyptian jurisdiction over Somaliland, provided that no territories of Egypt be ceded on any pretext whatever to a foreign power.

The occupation of Aden was preceded and followed by diplomatic activity, made possible through the co-operation of the Navy around the Arabian peninsula. The first treaty of peace with the Arab chiefs of the Persian Gulf was made in 1820. It was reaffirmed in 1853 and in 1861; despite the violent protests of Turkey, the Sheik of Bahrein put himself under British protection. In 1854 the Sultan of Muscat ceded the Kuria Muria Islands and in 1876 the Sultan of Kishim gave Sokotra to the British. In all agreements with the Red Sea and Persian Gulf chiefs there was the same clause, namely, that no

treaties, concessions, or negotiations be entered into with any European Power other than Great Britain without the consent of the Government of India. The extension of the British Power in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea and even in Egypt was undertaken partly from the revenues and resources (military and naval) of the Government of India under the direction of the Foreign Office in Downing Street.

When Napoleon III was at the height of his power in 1862, Great Britain agreed with France to respect the independence of Muscat and Zanzibar. But eleven years later in 1873, the Sultan of Muscat accepted a British subsidy and Zanzibar eventually came under British protection. The Government of India was virtually master of the Persian Gulf, and had extended its influence along the Arabian Sea coast of Persia before the Russo-Turkish War of 1877. The effort to shut Russia off, from the Indian Ocean and from the countries contiguous to India, required two serious wars with Afghanistan in 1839-42 and 1878-80, a war with Persia in 1856-57, the extension of British control to the North Western Frontier, and the establishment of a protectorate over Baluchistan. In the campaign of 1839 against Afghanistan, the British felt that it was necessary to protect the flank of their expedition by seizing Kalat. A treaty was, therefore, signed with the Khan of Kalat in 1840 and renewed in 1854 and 1876. The first was simply a defensive treaty, the second an offensive and defensive alliance with a subsidy for the Khan, and the third allowed the British the right of intervention and gave them the north eastern corner of Baluchistan, where Quetta became a strong fortress, linked with Karachi by rail, serving to watch the future relations between Afghans and Russians.

On the eastern side of India, the British began to extend their influence in 1824 by invading Burma, which was finally annexed after the capture of Rangoon in 1852. The leasing of the island of Singapore from the Sultan of Johore in 1824 was a master-stroke of far-sightedness. When Hong Kong was added sixteen years later in 1840 as a result of the First Opium War with China, the British had laid the foundation of unrivalled naval and mercantile supremacy from England to the Far East, both by the Mediterranean and by the Cape of Good Hope routes. The various Sultanates between the end of the Malay peninsula and Burma were gradually incorporated in the British Empire by treaties with the Malay sovereigns and Siam. Along the sea route, the Andaman Islands were annexed in 1858, Labuan was occupied despite the protest of Spain and Holland in 1847, and a foothold was obtained in the northern tip of Borneo in 1878 by a treaty between the Labuan Trading Company and the Sultan of Sulu. All the territory between Cainta and Hong Kong, incorporated in the British Empire, has been acquired mostly through the efforts of the Government of India and its revenues and resources, as distinct from the revenues of the Home Government, and yet, the advantages accruing from these territories are reaped mainly by the inhabitants of the home country, and Indians are not admitted even in this territory on equal terms with the British.

On the Northern side of India the British secured the right to maintain a resident in Nepal by the treaty of Segowlee in 1815 and the right of recruiting Ghurkas for the Indian Army in return for a cash payment of 10 lakhs of Rupees a year. In 1864 eleven provinces of Bhutan were annexed to Bengal and in the follow-

ing year the Bhutan government accepted a subsidy from Simla. It has been under virtual British control ever since. Attempts were made to open up trade between India and Tibet in 1872-73, but as Tibet belonged nominally to China, an agreement was made at Chefoo in 1876 between China and Great Britain for exploration of this country in which the British greatly feared the penetration of Russian influence. Tibetan fanaticism prevented British and Russians alike from exploration and propaganda. The remoteness of the country made conquest by arms impracticable, though recently postal and telegraphic communication has been established between India and Tibet.

CHAPTER V.

BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY 1815—1878.

The development of Australia and New Zealand, the founding of British Columbia, the increasing importance of Hongkong and Singapore, and especially the invention of marine telegraph communication caused the British to realize, during the seventies, the advisability of the extension of their sovereignty over islands in the Pacific. The Convention of London in 1814 had left the East Indies to the Dutch, and the Philippines had not been taken from Spain. British exploration, notably the voyage of Captain Cook, did much to make the Pacific Islands known to Europe. The first actual British possession in the Pacific was Pitcairn island annexed in 1838. A naval captain hoisted the British flag over the Hawaiian Islands in 1843, but this act was disavowed by London. A foothold was secured on the south coast of New Guinea, owing to its proximity to Australia in 1846, and the earlier settlers of New Zealand gathered in the islands in their immediate neighbourhood. Until the era of cables, however, nobody was much concerned about the more remote Pacific archipelagoes, whose exploration would bring little profit.

The first important step in the extension of the British Empire to Oceania was the annexation of the Fiji islands in 1874. France, which had just begun active empire-building in Indo-China, had been picking up Pacific islands since 1840. The French were well established in New Caledonia and the South

Sea Islands. In the year following the British coup in Fiji, the British and French began to colonise—or rather to pay attention to their missionary work—in the New Hebrides. John Paton, a Scotch missionary, proposed to make the New Hebrides British in 1877. But the French protested. On the other hand, the British were able to take advantage of this claim and others that they were willing to forego, to secure international assent to the annexation of Union, Ellice, Gilbert, Southern Solomon, and other groups over which they had discovery and trading claims that had never been pressed. The agreement of 1877 established the British Empire on a wide and firm basis in the mid-Pacific.

In the earlier days, before the interior of Africa was explored by Livingstone (1859) and before the great value of African raw materials became apparent, the British did little to extend the colonies which they had acquired on the way to the Cape of Good Hope. But their activities along the West African coast, in connection with the suppression of the slave trade, laid a valuable foundation for the future. Sierra Leone was made a Crown colony in 1808, and the transfers of territory at the end of the Napoleonic wars led to new frontiers for Gambia and the founding of Bathurst in 1816. The French withdrew from Gambia finally in 1857, but without a definite determination of frontier. In the meantime France was developing the Senegal settlements that had been returned to her in 1815. In 1831 British explorers and merchants began to discover the potentialities of the Niger Valley. The Gold Coast forts were taken over by the Crown in 1843, Danish rights were acquired in 1850 and Dutch rights in 1871. This led to the Ashanti War in 1873-74 when the king was

compelled to acknowledge Great Britain's supremacy on the Coast. Lagos Island was seized in 1861, and the United Africa Company was founded in 1879, with the object of developing British Trade at the expense of less united rivals. It was just in time to get ahead of the Germans and French, both of whom were backed by their governments.

The African Lakes Corporation was founded in 1878 after the explorations of Livingstone and Stanley in Lake Nyassa (1859) and the Uganda (in 1875). At the same time Baker and Gordon, in the employ of the Egyptian Khedive, Ismail, explored, fought for, and established administrative control over the Sudan. In America the three colonies, taken from Holland in 1815 on the South American coast south of Venezuela, were organised into British Guiana. A seventeenth century settlement of British log-cutters on the west coast of Central America became British Honduras and was put under the Governor of Jamaica in 1862, and was finally made a Crown colony in 1870. These two coast strips are the only footholds of Great Britain in Central and South America.

Now turning our attention to the development of temperate or settlement colonies, the two chief questions, with regard to them, concerned the transportation of convicts and the regulation of emigration. The pressure of economic distress, that followed the Napoleonic wars coupled with the extraordinarily rapid increase of population in England, led to wholesale emigration. In the first quarter of the nineteenth century a very severe penal code, which inflicted the penalty of death, commonly converted into transportation, for an incredible number of offences, gave an impetus to the emigration movement. The

convict settlement of Botany Bay, established in 1788 after the loss of the American colonies, continued to grow as a result of an accession of new convicts. Free settlers did not come to Australia till 1816, and a contest between convicts and free settlers began to take place. As a result of this contest, the convict settlement of Van Dieman's land or Tasmania was formed in 1825. The end of the convict system was brought about by Sydney Smith and Archbishop Whatley. The great wave of humanitarian movement continued to grow, and the abolition of slave trade in 1806 was followed by an agitation for the emancipation of Negro slaves throughout the British Empire. As a result of this agitation slavery was abolished in 1833, when the British Parliament declared slavery illegal and voted twenty million pounds to purchase the freedom of the slaves from their masters. This was the first sign of an enlightened attitude towards the backward races, hitherto mercilessly exploited by all the imperialist Powers. The principle of the protection of the backward races was now definitely adopted by the British Government, mainly due to the influence of the missionary organisations known as the power of 'Exeter Hall.' There have been in the history of modern British imperialism sporadic instances of injustice like the forced labour of Kanakas in the Pacific, the indentured contract cooly system of Indians, the policy of land alienation in Kenya and South Rhodesia, but no organised policy of exploitation and extermination of the native races.

The emancipation of slaves led to grave labour difficulties in the West Indies, whose prosperity was seriously impaired, and in South Africa, where it

brought about acute friction with the slave-owning Boer-farmers. The abolition of slavery led to a shortage of labour throughout the tropical colonies of Great Britain, and the indentured contract cooly system was organised by Great Britain and thousands of Indians and Chinese were sent to Trinidad, British Guiana, Jamaica, Mauritius, Fiji, Natal, Ceylon and the Federated Malay States under this system which is the modern substitute for slavery. This is the origin of the present serious Indian questions in South Africa. The evils of the indentured system led to its abolition in the case of most of the colonies except Ceylon and the Malay States. The labour problem in the Empire is as serious as ever, due to the inability or unwillingness of the white races to work in tropical colonies. As a result of the same humanitarian movement, Sati was abolished in India, and the trade with India and Asia was thrown open to all merchants by the final abolition of the commercial monopoly of the East India Company in 1833.

A new body of definite theory as to the functions which colonies ought to play was ably discussed by Edward Gibbon Wakefield in his book, "A View of the Art of Colonisation" (1847). The main object of colonisation, according to this school of thinkers was the systematic and scientific draining off of the surplus population of the older lands. This, it was felt, could not safely be left to the operations of mere chance; and one of the great advantages of colonial possessions was that they enabled the country which controlled them to deal in a scientific way with its surplus population and to prevent the reproduction of unhealthy conditions in the new communities. These objects were carried out in a series of colonising companies which Wakefield promoted. The Colonisation

Society was founded in 1830 and great interest was aroused in emigration between 1830 and 1840 in England. Systematic and scientific colonisation was being studied.

The settlement of South Australia in 1836, the first considerable settlement in the North Island of New Zealand, and the two admirably designed and executed settlements of Canterbury and Otago in the South Island of New Zealand, were all examples of his methods undertaken by the New Zealand Company in 1839.

Other instances of State-aided emigration were the settlements of Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth in the Cape Colony financed by the British Government in 1817 and 1820; and this brought the first considerable body of British inhabitants in South Africa, hitherto almost exclusively Dutch. An unsuccessful plantation at Swan River in West Australia was also a State-aided scheme. The settlement of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland by discharged soldiers and sailors in 1749 has already been noted.

The building of the British Empire during this period, as has been traced here, was not accomplished without opposition, or with any universal expectation of results that have actually crowned the work of the Empire builders. The economic motive for colonisation in the early part of the nineteenth century seemed to have lost much of its vitality due to the influence of a new school of economic thought, the school of Adam Smith, Ricardo and Malthus. Their ideas had begun to affect British policy as early as the twenties, when Huskisson took the first steps on the way to free trade. The colonial rivalry of the 16th and the 17th centuries, especially the contest between Holland and England, and the world con-

flict of France and Great Britain in the 18th century had been largely inspired by the Mercantile doctrine that colonies were beneficial and necessary to the mother country. Mercantile statesmen in the 17th and 18th centuries had confidently cultivated and carefully regulated colonial commerce with the two fold object of creating a favourable balance of trade and rendering the nation economically independent of foreign countries. This Mercantile theory, however, was undermined late in the 18th century by the sharp criticism of Turgot and Adam Smith. The political economy taught by Turgot and Smith was summarised in the two French words *laissez-faire*. Of course it took a goodly number of years for the *laissez-faire* doctrine to bear fruit in practical politics. In fact, it may be stated that the long Revolutionary and Napoleonic struggle between Great Britain and France (1793—1815) was in the nature of a contest for Mercantile ends. Colonial revolts, moreover, seemingly proved mercantilism to be as disastrous in practice as it was unsound in theory. Great Britain lost her thirteen American colonies by attempting to enforce the mercantile trade regulations of the "old colonial system." Early in the 19th century the Spanish colonies in America likewise revolted from the mother country, and Brazil established its independence of Portugal in 1822. These disasters, following in the train of long and expensive colonial wars, only confirmed the convictions in the minds of the European statesmen that expending money and blood to acquire new colonies was unwise and unjustifiable.

In Great Britain the exponents of *laissez-faire*, (such men as Huskisson, Cobden, Bright, Peel and Gladstone) subsequently became so influential that

they were able to procure the repeal of the old Navigation laws in 1849, to sweep away multifarious customs duties and triumphantly to proclaim the inauguration of an era of Free Trade. The essence of this doctrine, as it affected colonial policy, was that the regulation of trade by government, which had been the main object of the old colonial policy, brought no advantages, but only checked its free development.

Richard Cobden, the famous English free-trader, even went so far as to declare in 1849, as follows:—
 “ If we do not draw in our horns, this country with all its resources, will sink under the weight of its extended empire.” John Bright was no less outspoken in condemning imperialism and maintaining that the cost of acquiring and defending colonies was more than their worth. Gladstone was not so radical a “ Little Englander,” but he was decidedly reluctant to extend the British dominions. Even Disraeli once said “ the wretched colonies were millstones about our necks.” The “ Times ” advocated in a leading article the cession of Canada to the United States on the ground that annexation to the great Republic was the inevitable destiny of that colony and that it was much better that it should be carried out in a peaceable and friendly way than after a conflict. In 1863 Goldwin Smith published his letters on “ The Empire ” and though he advocated its speedy and almost its forcible dissolution, he met with little opposition. He argued that the colonies were not a source of strength to England, but of weakness, that military help from them was out of the question, and that they were on the contrary likely to lead England into wars of their own, as well as to prove an unnecessary expense. Canada especially, he thought, should be kindly but firmly removed from her connection with England

before she was involved in a war with the United States on her account. In any case, Goldwin Smith considered it an absurdity that England should be involved in a large annual outlay in protecting countries which brought her no return in taxes, and whose government was of necessity really independent. The argument that England could gain by a trade monopoly with her colonies he regarded as a mere relic of mercantilism; free trade, he imagined, would soon be universal, in which case it made no difference whether the colonies belonged to England or themselves or another country. Moreover, even if this happy state of things were delayed and the colonies were foolish enough to impose tariffs, it seemed unreasonable to expect that they would treat England in a preferential manner. Finally, he laughed at the argument that the colonies would be valuable as an outlet for the surplus population of England, and pointed out that British subjects emigrated to the United States as freely as to the colonies, and thought they would always emigrate to any country which offered openings, quite irrespective of its nominal ownership by any European Power.

Sir Charles Dilke's "Greater Britain" published in 1869 completely endorsed Goldwin Smith's views, though he was an ardent believer in the supremacy of British culture and advocated an alliance between all the English-speaking peoples. Such an alliance, Dilke thought, would come more easily if the colonies ceased to be dependent upon England and if Canada, in particular, joined the United States. Dilke today is chiefly remembered as the Imperialist of 1890, who, ashamed of his former views, published "Problems of Greater Britain" in order to correct his previous error and expound his new imperialistic doctrine.

The influence of the Manchester school on English statesmen with regard to the colonies may be seen in the statements of the three Permanent Under Secretaries for the Colonies, whose successive reigns cover the period from 1836 to 1871, all of whom expressed "separatist" views. Sir James Stephen went so far as to state in his diary, shortly before his retirement in 1846, that the recent appointment of a Governor-General for Canada was "not unlikely to be the last that will ever be made." Merivale, who followed him, was opposed to the extreme views of Goldwin Smith, but took for granted the ultimate separation of the colonies; while Lord Blachford, who next held office, admitted that as late as 1871, he himself "could hardly realise the possibility of any one seriously thinking the contrary" of his views that the "function of the colonial office is to secure that our connection (with the colonies), while it lasts, shall be as profitable to both parties, and our separation, when it comes, as amicable as possible." This opinion he adds "is founded first on the general principle that a spirited nation (and a colony becomes a nation) will not submit to be governed in its internal affairs by a distant government, and that nations geographically remote have no such common interests as will bind them permanently together in foreign policy, with all its details and mutations." The example of the United States was accepted as conclusive proof of their sentiment. Thus it will be seen that the English people up to 1870, with the exception of one very small group of thinkers, were not only opposed to any extension of the Empire, but were also strongly in favour of emancipating the colonies. India was always considered a separate problem, and it was assumed that she must remain

in English hands; but for the rest, all parties agreed in regarding the Empire as a temporary problem and the colonies as children who were now reaching maturity, and who would of course like the United States separate from the parent.

The triumph of the doctrine of free trade meant that the principal motive, which had earlier led to restriction upon the self-government of the colonies,—the desire to secure commercial advantages for the mother country—was no longer operative. The central idea of the old colonial system was destroyed by the disciples of Adam Smith, and there no longer remained any apparent reason why the mother country should desire to control the fiscal policy of the colonies. The Liberals of the Manchester school advanced the theory that self-governing institutions in the colonies were a preliminary to separation as was the case with the thirteen American colonies and the events of the Canadian Rebellion of 1837. In their opposition to the new economic imperialism, the Liberals did not sound the humanitarian note alone. They questioned the value to the United Kingdom of colonial expansion and they believed that the world-encircling structure built at so great a cost would not prove durable.

From 1837 to 1867 the tendency in England was, therefore, towards the abandonment of colonies and dependencies. This was partly due to the free trade ideas already mentioned, and partly due to the Canadian Rebellion of 1837, partly to disgust at wars with savages, with the Kaffirs in South Africa and the Maoris in New Zealand, partly to the first Afghan War, the Sikh Wars and the Sepoy Mutiny in 1857.

The Canadian Rebellion of 1837 was due to the discontent of the Canadians, both French and English,

at the system of government. The self-governing institutions established in the Canadian colonies by the Quebec Act of 1791 very closely resembled those of the American colonies before the revolution and the present constitution of India. They gave to the representative houses control over taxation and legislation, but neither control over, nor responsibility for the executive. *

The constitutional friction between the executive (governor) and the elected house was at its worst in Québec, due also to the racial conflict where the executive body was British, while the great majority of the assembly was French. † And the conflict was producing a very dangerous alienation between the two peoples. It resulted in the rebellion of Papineau in Quebec and that of William Mackenzie in Ontario in 1837. The situation was quite as alarming as the situation in the American colonies was in 1775. Though the rebellion was put down, the Whig Government sent out Lord Durham, one of their own number, to report on the constitutional deadlock in Canada. Durham was one of the most advanced Liberals in Britain, a convinced believer in the virtues of self-government, and he took out with him two of the ablest advocates of scientific colonisation, Edward Gibbon Wakefield, and Charles Buller. Durham's administrative work was not a success, his high-handed deportation of some of the rebel leaders was strongly condemned, and he was quickly recalled. But he had time to study and understand the situation, and he presented a masterly Report on Canada in 1839, which is one of the classics in the history of

* Compare the provincial governments in India and the Government of India Act of 1919.

† Witness the parallel and present situation in India.

British Imperialism. It was generally said that the report was the product of the three men. "Wakefield thought it, Buller wrote it, and Durham signed it." The effect of the report was the pacification of Canada and the temporary union of the provinces of Upper Canada and Lower Canada. Its most far reaching effect was in the establishment of responsible government in English speaking colonies. Durham's explanation of the unhappy condition of Canadian politics was not that the colonists were given too much liberty, but that they had not been given enough. They must be made to feel their responsibility for the working of the laws which they adopted, and for the welfare of the whole community. As for the conflict of races, its only cure was that both should be made to feel their common responsibility for the destinies of the community in which both must remain partners. Lord Durham's recommendations were fully carried into effect, partly in the Canada Act of 1840, but more specially by a simple instruction issued to governors, that they must henceforth choose their ministers in the British fashion, on the ground that they commanded the support of a majority in the elected house, and that the governors themselves must be guided by their advice. A crucial test of this new policy came in 1849 when the ministers and the parliamentary majority proposed to vote compensation for property destroyed in 1837. This to many seemed compensation for rebels and the indignant royalists were urging that the governor, Lord Elgin, should veto it. He firmly declined to do so, and thus gave an invaluable lesson to both parties. Hence-forward friction between the Canadian colonies and the mother country ceased.

Twenty years later, the various colonies, once as full of mutual jealousies as the American colonies had been before 1775, began to discuss the possibility of federation. With the cordial approval and co-operation of the Home Government, they drew up a scheme for the formation of a United Dominion of Canada, including the distant British Columbia and the coastal colonies of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island, and the adoption of this scheme in 1867 turned Canada from a bundle of separate settlements into a great State. To this State the Home Government later made over the control of the vast and rich lands of the North West, and so the destinies of half a continent passed under its direction. The Canadians adopted the British political system, *i.e.*, the parliamentary principle and not the presidential system as in the United States of America, and the provinces in Canada, unlike the states in the United States of America, are subordinate to the central government. The British principle of concentration of responsibility by the subordination of the executive to the legislature was adopted by Canada.

Lord Grey, Secretary of State for War and the Colonies (1846-1852), applied the idea of Lord Durham's report to other British possessions. The discovery of gold in Australia in 1851 and the growth of the sheep farming industry led to the rapid increase of population and the development of the Australian colonies. The transportation of convicts was also stopped in 1868, due to the resentment of free settlers. The Australian colonies were endowed at an early date with the familiar system of representative but not responsible government. In 1852 the British Parliament empowered the various Australian

colonies to elect single-chamber constituent assemblies to decide the forms of government under which they wished to live. They also decided to adopt the British system *i.e.*, legislatures of two chambers with ministers responsible to them. Two years later in 1854, New Zealand was endowed with the same system under the government of Sir George Grey (1845-54). A federal constitution was also tried for New Zealand, but failed. South Africa alone was not yet given self-government, owing to the Boer question and the Kaffir wars.

To none of the tropical settlements, dependencies, and garrison towns or coaling stations were the institutions of full responsible government granted. Some of them possessed representative institutions without responsible ministers; in some the governor was assisted by a nominated council, intended to express local opinion, but not elected by the inhabitants; in others the governor ruled autocratically. But in all these cases the ultimate control of policy was retained by the home government. In nearly all the possessions, of a tropical and semi-tropical nature, the British inhabitants were not permanent settlers, but were present solely for the purposes of trade or other exploitation, while the bulk of the population consisted of backward peoples, and to have enfranchised the mass of the population would have led to the tyranny of the whites over the blacks.

During the Crimean War, the office of the Secretary of State for the Colonies was created in 1854, and on the transfer of India from the East India Company to the Crown in 1858, the office of the Secretary of State for India was also created. During this age, when self-government was being

extended to the chief regions of the British Empire, India, the greatest dominion of them all, did not obtain the gift of representative institutions even on the most modest scale. And that in spite of the repeated assurances of men like Sir Thomas Munro (Governor of Madras). Munro wrote in 1824, exactly a century ago, "we should look upon India not as a temporary possession, but as one which is to be maintained permanently, until the natives shall have abandoned most of their superstitions and prejudices and become sufficiently enlightened to frame a regular government for themselves, and to conduct and preserve it. *Whenever such a time shall arrive, it will probably be best for both the countries, and the British control over India should be gradually withdrawn.* That the desirable change contemplated may in some after-age be effected in India, there is no cause to despair. Such a change was at one time in Britain itself at least as hopeless as it is here. When we reflect how much the character of nations has always been influenced by that of government, and that some, once the most cultivated, have sunk into barbarism, while the others, formerly the rudest, have attained the highest point of civilisation, *we shall see no reason to doubt that if we pursue steadily the proper measures, we shall in time so far improve the character of our Indian subjects so as to make them able to govern and protect themselves.*" The great day predicted by Munro has not yet come, though it is a century since he wrote of it. The first period of British rule in India, from 1757 to 1833, was a period in which the East India Company regarded India as primarily a source of profit. In 1833 the company was forbidden to engage in trade, and the profit making motive disappeared. The shareholders

of the company continued till the abolition of the company in 1858 to receive a fixed dividend out of the Indian revenues.

Until 1833 it had also been held that the maintenance of British supremacy required that the higher offices should be reserved to the members of the ruling race. The Act of 1833 had laid down as a fundamental principle that "no native of the said territories..... shall by reason of his religion, place of birth, descent, or any of them, be disabled from holding any place, office or employment." Though this restriction was theoretically abolished in 1833 it was not until our own time, *i.e.*, 1920 that this principle was carried out in practice and even now with several limitations. In the Foreign and Political Department of the Government of India, in the artillery branch of the army, and even in the infantry and cavalry, Indians are not admitted to office even now, though they hold nearly all the minor administrative posts in all the departments of administration with the exceptions named above. Then too, the Anglo-Indians and Eurasians have almost a complete monopoly of the higher services in Posts and Telegraphs, Railways, Salt, Abkari, Forest and Police, until recently when the Indianisation of the services was accepted in principle by the Montford reforms.

In general, no constitutional changes were introduced in India, even after the Crown took over the administration, except the Act of 1861 which provided for a nominated legislature, and the responsibility of Parliament was definitely fixed for the welfare and government of India, though the actual responsibility even now rests with the British Officials—the man on the spot—as India has never been made a party question in the House of Commons; on the other

hand, all the parties alike subordinated the interest of India to the interests of the merchants and manufacturers of England.

The period 1815—78 may, therefore, be said to be an era of practical British monopoly in colonial expansion. It had greatly increased in area since 1815, in spite of the doctrine of *laissez-faire* of the Manchester school of thought. British Imperialism is the result not of a conscious intention on the part of a large section of the people during this period, but of a group of colonial reformers such as Gibbon Wakefield, Carlyle, allying themselves with a group of statesmen like Lord Elgin, Lord John Russell, Lord Grey and Lord Carnarvon, who continued to believe in the unity of the Empire even during the period when the Manchester school seemed most triumphant. The colonial reformers based their faith partly on their desire to relieve the industrial misery in England by emigration to the colonies, and partly on the desire to extend the prestige and honour of England.

CHAPTER VI.

BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY, 1878-1919.

In a recent book on "Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism" by C. A. Bodelsen, the writer says that it was just at the time of the publication of "Greater Britain" by Dilke in 1869, that the reaction against "separation" began. In 1868 when Gladstone's ministry was suspected of being almost about to carry out a separatist policy with regard to the colonies, the opposition to a disruption of the Empire, hitherto almost unexpressed, gathered itself together to combat it. The occasion which led to the gathering of the Imperialistic forces was the refusal of Lord Granville to support the New Zealand colonists in their efforts to suppress the rising of the Maori population, whose country they had occupied. The policy of evacuating New Zealand had already been pursued by the Tory Government which had preceded that of Mr. Gladstone, but the inclusion of John Bright in the new cabinet, the severity of Lord Granville's repudiation of the colonists, and the known opinions of the Prime Minister himself, led to the belief that a policy of active separation was to be inaugurated.

At first the organised opposition seemed unimportant. The Royal Colonial Institute, founded in 1868, was at first social and scientific rather than political. Lord Granville himself was one of its Vice-Presidents. It shortly, however, developed strong corporate views and through Sir George Grey, and its first important Liberal convert, W. G. Forster

opened a campaign in favour of Imperial unity. In 1871 the mere opposition to the separation policy of the Liberal Government gave way to a more active policy of Federation, and Mr. Bodelsen in his "Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism" gives an interesting account of the numerous schemes put forward in the seventies for turning the British Empire into a single Federation.

It was at this moment that Disraeli intervened. In 1872 Disraeli saw that the imperial movement might be made into an asset to the conservative party. The first thing to do was to popularise the colonial questions. Next he must make the Empire intelligible and, even if possible, romantic. Finally he must convince the public that conservatism and Imperialism were one. To turn the growing imperial sentiment into a popular jingoism was the first great result of Disraeli's political genius. The second was to re-make the Conservative party. The gathering of Imperialistic forces to its standard was the more remarkable because, as Mr. Bodelsen has pointed out, Conservatives had been as indifferent to imperial unity before 1824 as Liberals themselves. Active "separatists," it is true, were commonly Liberals, but Conservatives were not imperialists. On the contrary, the early imperialists were, many of them, Liberals, and hitherto the question had not been a party one. Another result of Disraeli's work was to "kill" separation. During the fight that raged from 1874 to 1885 over the Near East, over South Africa, over Egypt and over Ireland, the views commonly held by both Liberals and Tories, only a few years before, disappeared from party politics. Disraeli's victory, like that of Palmerston on the Near East question, led to the conversion of his enemies, so

much so that in 1881, Mr. Gladstone deprecated the idea that any body of men were insensible to the glory and responsibilities of the colonial empire and declared that "the business of founding and cherishing those colonies is one which had so distinctly been entrusted by Providence to the care of the people of this country, that we should almost as soon think of renouncing the very name of Englishman as of renouncing the very great duties..... imposed on us with regard to the more distant, but not less dear, portions of this great British Empire." In 1890 Dilke published his "Problems of Greater Britain" repudiating his earlier views of 1869 in "Greater Britain."

Beneath the imperial sentiment is always found the influence of the capitalist adventurer, the overseas investor, and later the capitalist newspaper. It is, therefore, not merely the Royal Colonial Institute, nor Disraeli, nor Froude, nor Seeley, who were responsible for the change; the ultimate facts were the increase in the English population and the need of new markets and new sources of raw materials. Certain sets of views appeal to men at certain times for reasons which are partly economic and partly psychological. Disraeli and his friends supplied the psychological basis of imperialism. The dominating influence on the development of British Imperialism since 1870 has been the economic motive once again. It is easy to understand that British manufacturers and merchants, whose virtual monopoly of the raw materials and markets of the world was challenged by the rising competition of America, Germany and Japan, were likely to favour the consolidation and extension of the British Empire. They desired to "open up" uncivilised Africa and found condi-

tions in every way more favourable where political control was combined with economic. They also hoped to find rich markets in the colonies. For them clearly Imperialism meant freedom for the investment of superfluous energy and capital and the consequent achievement of greater wealth and power. Investment in colonial mines, rubber, forests, plantations, and railways yielded interest varying from 5 to 50 per cent. The large profits to be gained from colonial investments naturally attracted capitalists; and it is not surprising that men with their money invested in colonies should become eloquent advocates of a vigorous colonial and naval policy, especially when the expense of such a policy would be borne by the tax-payers of the nation at large. The influence, which investments have exercised in promoting imperialism, was revealed in 1911 when the German Government manifested great interest in Morocco, largely because the Mannesmann Brothers were financially interested in Moroccan mines. To cite another case, the beginnings of British rule in Egypt may be traced directly to the desire of the British Government to safeguard the Egyptian investments of British capitalists.

It is also not difficult to see that as population increased in England, the colonies became more attractive as fields of emigration—attractive at least to philanthropists, if not always to the unemployed. There is also nothing surprising in the revival of federal schemes, now that communications were more easy and colonial friendship (and even representation in the House of Commons) seemed more possible.

The patriotic motive also played its part in the annexation of new territories. If the new territory happened to be a sparsely settled region, it would

serve as an outlet for emigration from the mother country; if densely populated, the new dependency was probably sadly in need of European culture and orderly government; if only a barren island, the new colony would at least be a valuable coaling station for the Navy. In any case, the average citizen felt a warm glow of satisfaction when he beheld the ever-growing blotch of red, or yellow or purple that depicted on the map "Our Empire." The American who was quite certain of the necessity of conferring the benefits of American civilization upon unwilling Filipinos, was inspired by the same patriotic egotism which convinced the German of Germany's world mission, and moved the Englishman to talk of the "white man's burden." To every patriot it seemed obvious that the "manifest destiny" of his nation was to expand, to rule "inferior races" and to become a world power. Patriotic sentiment of this variety, manufactured by the capitalist Press was invariably favourable to aggressive imperialism. While economic forces were mainly responsible for making Imperialism popular, other fields and forces such as religion and metaphysics, and ethics and psychology, history and political economy, biology and even astronomy were all found to offer justification for the new imperialism. Bismarck's influence in popularising his theory, that it was always best to get what you wanted when you could, and wise only to pay attention to moral issues when there was a chance of any one believing in your sincerity, was great in the colonial field. It is interesting to see how far this doctrine has been accepted among Empire builders and how far morality became an article reserved for home consumption. A second line of inquiry would reveal a closely related tendency of thought springing from the popular mis-

application of Darwinism, which, in some mysterious way, was held to prove that the fittest would only survive if the white man undertook the burden of the black man's resources. More interesting still will be to investigate how the new working-class public, as it learnt to read but not to criticise, and the new suburbia which Prof. Hobhouse has noted as one of the potent forces in modern political development, were taught by the capitalist Press of the late nineties, to find in Imperialism some of that colour and romance for which they craved and which the conditions of modern industrial life did so little to satisfy.

Consolidation of British Power in the Near East 1878—1885.

As was already explained in the last chapter, British colonial policy, from the Congress of Vienna (1815) to the Congress of Berlin (1878), though largely unconscious and instinctive, and directed even by force when necessary, endeavoured to safeguard India and to gain a monopoly of the routes to India both by land and sea. The method was threefold: (1) to secure sovereignty over vantage points on the mainland or islands strategically placed for dominating ocean thoroughfares and for coaling stations and naval bases, (2) to extend political and economic control over the countries bordering on India and those through which any other European power might reach waterways leading to India, and (3) to frustrate the attempts of other European powers to secure preponderant political influence or economic position in any country bordering on India or along the water routes to India. From 1878 onwards British statesmen pushed a vigorous policy of protecting the routes to India, instead of the negative method of forbidding

others. The Suez Canal created a new problem for British diplomacy. When Ferdinand de Lesseps, who had obtained a concession for the canal from Said Pasha, Viceroy of Egypt, failed to secure the necessary confirmation of the Sultan of Turkey, he realized that the British were intriguing against him. He ~~went~~ to London to induce the British Government to withdraw its opposition. Lord Palmerston told him that the canal was a physical impossibility, that if it could be dug it would injure British supremacy and that the proposal was a device for French interference in the Near East. Despite British hostility and the refusal of London bankers to co-operate in financing the project, de Lesseps carried it to a successful completion. The canal was opened in 1869 and within a few years it became self-supporting. In 1875 by excellent statesmanship, taking advantage of a lucky opportunity, Disraeli on behalf of the British Government purchased the shares of the Egyptian Khedive for £40,00,000 and became the largest stockholder in the Suez Canal Company. The new trade route through Egypt and the Red Sea suddenly increased the importance of the Near East in British Imperial policy. After the Russo-Turkish War of 1877—78 the traditional British policy of supporting the integrity of the Ottoman dominions was abandoned, because tangible compensation was to be sought within the Ottoman Empire to offset the Russian influence in the Balkans and the Russian menace in Central Asia; and the Suez Canal, which in a few years had become a vital artery to the British Empire was to be brought under British military control.

The consolidation of British Power in the Near East, which resulted in checking Russia's penetration into Armenia and Afghanistan and in ousting

French influence from Egypt, was accomplished by the Cyprus convention, the Second Afghan War and the military occupation of Egypt. The Cyprus convention and its annex, signed July 1878, assigned the island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England as long as Russia did not restore to Turkey, Kars and the other conquests made by her in Armenia. *The Cyprus convention was an acknowledgment of the abandonment of the policy of maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and it substituted the policy of compensation, which was in the next generation to become the accepted rule in dealing with China and other weak states.* Following the Cyprus convention Great Britain had to compensate France for the extension of the British Power in the Mediterranean. This was done by an agreement between Salisbury and Waddington, who represented France at the Congress of Berlin, that Great Britain's occupation of Cyprus would be accepted by France, in return for which concession, France would be given a free hand in Tunisia. This policy was to become common usage in the future relations of European with backward states. European Powers would condone acts of aggression against weak states as accomplished facts, in return for the assurance that similar acts contemplated by them would not be opposed.

At the same time the jurisdiction of the Government of India was extended as far as Aden at the entrance of the Red Sea, and British diplomacy and military intervention in Afghanistan, Persia, and the Persian Gulf has been managed from India with the revenues and resources of India. The rivalry between Great Britain and Russia for the control of Afghanistan, which had begun as early as 1840, was

not discussed at the Congress of Berlin. The British refused to allow the status of Afghanistan to become an international problem and contended that Afghanistan owing to territorial contiguity must ally itself solely with Great Britain. In November 1878, when a British envoy sent to the Amir for the purpose of concluding such an alliance was turned back at the frontier, the British declared war and invaded Afghanistan. The result of the long and protracted war was that Britain's exclusive right to control the foreign affairs of Afghanistan was recognised by the new Amir, a nominee of the British Government. This treaty remained in force till 1919 when it was abrogated by a new Afghan treaty recognizing the independence of Afghanistan.

In April 1880 Disraeli went out of office, due to the unsatisfactory nature of the Afghan War and military reverses in the Transvaal and South Africa. In the electoral campaign of 1880 Gladstone referred to the Cyprus and Transvaal annexations as follows:—
“If those acquisitions were as valuable as they are valueless, I would repudiate them, because they were obtained by means dishonourable to the character of our country.”

Though Gladstone denounced economic imperialism during the years when he was leader of the opposition, deplored the use of British troops in Asia and Africa, declared that the methods of British diplomacy were un-English, and reiterated in and out of Parliament his belief that it was bad morals as well as bad business, for a free people like the British, to endeavour to take away the freedom of other peoples, yet as prime minister he was powerless to limit or arrest the extension and consolidation of Britain's overseas empire. During the second Glad-

stone ministry the Afghan and Boer Wars were continued. The North Borneo Company was given a Royal charter. Basutoland and Bechuanaland were placed under British protection. Tembuland was annexed and Lord Salisbury's encouragement to France to invade Tunisia was not repudiated.

Egypt.

During the course of the 19th century, the Turkish Viceroys of Egypt had become virtually independent monarchs and assumed the title of Khedive. The financial control of Egypt, begun in 1876 to assure the payment of interest to European bond-holders who loaned money to Egypt, allowed the French and British to become influential in Egypt. The Egyptian National Debt was begun by Said Pasha, son of Mahomet Ali, who borrowed from London bankers about five million pounds at a discount of 20 per cent. Ismail who succeeded him in 1863 found it easy to float loans through European bankers at ruinous rates like this. It took only twenty years for Egypt to become bankrupt. In 1875 Ismail Pasha had to sell out everything he owned to satisfy his creditors and in this way the British Government secured the Suez Canal shares for a cash payment of four million pounds—none of which went to Egypt. In 1876 the British and French established a dual control of Egyptian finances. A Frenchman supervised Egyptian public expenditure while an Englishman took charge of the revenues. The railroads and the port of Alexandria were internationalized. Khedive Ismail in 1879 attempted to rid Egypt of foreign intervention and was promptly deposed. France and Great Britain put his nephew Tewfik Pasha on the throne, and re-established the dual control. In 1882 the Eyp-

tians revolted against the conditions under which they were living. A massacre of foreigners in Alexandria on June 11th 1882 (somewhat similar to the Boxer rising) led to the bombardment of the port by the British fleet. The French fleet, which had come to Alexandria simultaneously with the British, ~~refrained~~ from taking part in the demonstration. Pressure was brought to bear upon the Sultan of Turkey, Suzerain of Egypt, to send troops there to put down the insurrection. When the Sultan refused, the British Government invited France and then Italy to take part in a military expedition "to restore the Khedive's authority." France and Italy declined. A strong British force was landed in the Suez Canal. The Egyptians were routed at the Tel-el-Kebir, on September 13th, 1882. Arabi Pasha, leader of the anti-foreign movement, was deported to Ceylon. The British authorities assured the Khedive that they wanted only to restore order by means of making secure an Egyptian Government under the control of the Khedive. The military occupation was announced to the people of Egypt as temporary, and the promise was given that the troops would be withdrawn as soon as tranquility was re-established. Similar assurances were given to the Sultan by the British Ambassador at Constantinople and to the European Powers by the British Foreign Office. Gladstone informed Parliament that there was no intention to remain in Egypt, because this "would be absolutely at variance with all the principles of Her Majesty's Government and the pledges we have given to Europe." The assurances of Gladstone did not satisfy the French Government, which protested formally against the abolition of the dual control by the Khedive in January 1883. For twenty years the

French made trouble for the British in Egypt and encouraged the nationalist movement. Henceforth the British were supreme in Egypt, the dual control was replaced by an English Financial Adviser in 1883, and the Khedive of Egypt, although remaining in theory a vassal of the Turkish Sultan, was in practice the puppet of British commissioners. Egypt did not, however, formally become a British Protectorate until the outbreak of War between Great Britain and Turkey in 1914. The 12,000 square miles of fertile land on the banks and delta of the Lower Nile, and the 390,000 square miles of surrounding desert, which together constitute Egypt, form probably the most important of Great Britain's African possessions. One of the results of the British occupation of Egypt was the re-conquest of the Sudan, the vast region South of Egypt, traversed by the thin ribbon of rich Nile land. All the country from Egypt, south to Uganda, which was independent of Egypt from 1885 to 1898, was conquered between 1882 and 1900 by combined British and Egyptian forces, brought under the joint rule or "condominium" of Great Britain and Egypt and labeled "the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan."

After having financed and dug the Suez Canal and having enjoyed for over half a century a privileged position in Egypt, the French could not reconcile themselves to seeing others reap where they had sown, as in India and Canada in the 18th century.* The occupation of Egypt turned France against Great Britain in every part of the world, and it was not until 1904 that the French Government, in exchange for a free hand in Morocco, acknowledged the new status over the Nile. Sudan, though nominally a part of Egypt, was in revolt owing to the incitement of a

Mohammadan religious fanatic, the "Mahdi." The Sudan was won back by Sir Herbert (later Lord) Kitchener, the 'Sirdar' or commander of the reorganised Egyptian army, between 1896 and 1898. The joint rule or "condominium" of Great Britain and Egypt was imposed upon the Sudan in 1899. The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, though not a valuable territory, was also coveted by the French Government and great diplomacy had to be used to remove the rivalry of the French from this region. Its possession implied the control of the Upper Nile and was considered vitally necessary for the prosperity and safety of Egypt.

Under the energetic administration of able British financial advisers, such as Lord Cromer and Lord Kitchener, many abuses were done away with, praiseworthy reforms were instituted for the benefit of the downtrodden fellahen or peasantry, finances were put on a sound basis, the administration of justice was reformed, and profitable irrigation works were undertaken, culminating in the construction of the magnificent Assuan Dam (from 1898 to 1902). A representative assembly was created in 1883, and in 1913 legislative powers, in addition to a veto on new taxes, were entrusted to the assembly. Notwithstanding this enlightened and comparatively liberal treatment, the Egyptians were discontented. The educated Egyptians, especially the young men who had studied abroad, felt the stirrings of a national patriotism, as in the parallel case of India. Arabi Pasha's insurrection of 1882 had been crushed to the ground, but the echoes of his slogan "Egypt for the Egyptians" had never died away. British rule might be benevolent but it was foreign rule and therefore intolerable. This was

the spirit which inspired the Egyptian Nationalist agitators to present a petition for liberty to the Prince of Wales at Cairo in 1906.

As in India, the nationalist agitation in Egypt was confined to a small class until the end of the World War. When the British Government proclaimed Egypt a British Protectorate in 1914, for the duration of War, King George sent a letter to the new Sultan explaining that the protectorate was simply a war measure, and that the British Government intended to preserve the independence and integrity of Egypt. The Egyptians, despite their religious faith, contributed materially to the campaign against Turkey, and made possible, together with the Arabs of the Hedjaz, the British conquest of Palestine. But after the armistice the protectorate was not abolished, and when the Egyptians elected a delegation to go to the Peace Conference at Paris, its principal members were arrested by the British military authorities and deported to Malta. An uprising followed in Egypt, which was severely suppressed. The Egyptian delegation was subsequently released and allowed to go to Paris. But no attention was paid to it there, and the British succeeded in inserting recognition of their protectorate over Egypt in the treaty of Versailles. Though the uprising was suppressed in Egypt, the country was not pacified; and confronted with troubles in Ireland, India and Mesopotamia, the British Government sent to Egypt Lord Milner at the head of a commission to appraise the strength of the nationalist sentiment. The result was a recommendation that the protectorate be withdrawn and a treaty negotiated with the Egyptians, acknowledging their independence, and reserving to Great Britain only the right to garrison the Suez Canal, to control foreign relations, and to safeguard

the interests of foreigners in Egypt. The British Foreign Office, however, insisted upon retaining a certain number of officials in Egyptian Government's service and upon maintaining garrisons in Cairo and other interior cities and using Alexandria as a naval base. A fresh rising occurred and the great nationalist leader Zaglul Pasha, whose deportation to Malta in 1919 had been the origin of the troubles, was arrested and deported to Ceylon where he was imprisoned. Public opinion in England was aroused and the primary object of the occupation of Egypt was held to be the protection of imperial communications through the canal. If that privilege be granted in the treaty, why should the British Government, asked its critics in England, refuse the advice and warning of Lord Milner and insist upon retaining control of the internal affairs of Egypt? The commercial advantages of controlling Egypt and the opportunity of putting several thousands of men on the Egyptian pay roll at good salaries would make the British occupation of value. But the common people of England did not think these gains to be commensurate with the money and human lives invested in the enterprise. Following the example of granting freedom to Ireland, the British Government issued a proclamation in 1923 announcing to the world that the King has made Egypt a free State, Great Britain retaining only control of the Suez Canal and the right to protect Egypt against any foreign aggression; Sultan Fuad has changed his title to Melek (or King) and Zaglul Pasha was recalled from Ceylon and elected Prime Minister of Egypt. He resigned office after the murder of Sir Lee Stack a year ago. The new ministry seems to be more favourably inclined towards Britain.

British Imperial Problems.

Great Britain has come out of the World War with increased prestige and territories, and more prosperous as a world power than when she entered it. The tie that binds the British Empire is that of interest. The British Empire grew to its present dimensions because it paid the British to have overseas possessions. For the benefit of the industries and commerce of the United Kingdom the British invaded and conquered large parts of Asia and Africa and annexed islands all over the world. In regions of the temperate zone where white settlement was possible, the mother country was compelled to grant the colonists self-government, and relations were gradually adjusted until they rested upon mutual interests. The question of placing on a satisfactory basis the political and economic relations between Great Britain and her self-governing dominions has been an issue since the Boer War. In all other parts of the Empire, the British ruled by force and for the benefit of the United Kingdom, which furnished the force and paid the bills. The final outcome, however, of the relations between Great Britain and her self-governing dominions will be governed by the element of mutual advantage in the association, and between Great Britain and her subject peoples the relations will remain as they are if the British continue to believe that it pays to hold these people in subjection and if they continue to have the money and manpower to do so.

At the time of the American Revolution, in order to prevent the spread of the movement to Canada, by the Quebec Act of 1774, they granted the recently acquired French of Quebec a large measure of auto-

nomy. Later, Canada, which was becoming preponderantly an English-speaking country bordering on the United States and developing in the same way as the United States, could never have been kept within the British Empire, on any other basis than that of autonomous, representative institutions. This furnished the example for Australia and New Zealand, when they increased in wealth and population sufficiently, to start upon their own feet. As the alternative to constant rebellion, very costly to put down, South Africa was made a self-governing dominion in 1909 within the decade after the Boer War. Following upon five years of armed resistance to British authority Ireland (except Ulster) was given dominion status in January 1922 under the name of the Irish Free State. With the exception of Canada the self-governing dominions have come into existence in the 20th century and Ireland in 1922.

Following the example of Canada, all the self-governing dominions have shown, from the beginning of their quasi-independent existence, the determination to place their own interests before those of the mother-country, and to demand a share in shaping Imperial policies and enjoying Imperial privileges, if they were to be expected to assume imperial responsibilities. This had caused them to question and deny the original credo of world politics, *i.e.*, that the extra-European world existed for the benefit of Europe. At the time of the Boer War, Sir Wilfred Laurier answered the British Government's appeal for a contribution in money and troops in the following terse sentence, "Canada does not intend to be drawn into the vortex of European militarism." Later the Canadian Government decided that, if Canada were to be called upon to contribute to the

support of the Imperial Navy, the ships should be used in Canadian waters, be manned by Canadian officers, and fly the Canadian flag. The Canadian Parliament passed in 1919 a resolution that British titles and honours be not conferred upon Canadians, as South Africa has done in 1924, thus sharing Canada's feeling of separateness. Canada and the other dominions have established their claim to complete tariff autonomy, but because of trade advantages, are willing to grant imperial preference in their tariff schedules. Canada has appointed her own diplomatic representative in America (U.S.A.), to act in conjunction with the British Ambassador on all purely Canadian affairs. On the question of emigration all the self-governing dominions have barred their Indian fellow subjects from their respective countries thus creating several classes and grades of citizenship in the Empire. While the citizens of self-governing dominions along with the people of Great Britain can enter the public service of India, reside and trade with India, they have by their own immigration laws and franchise laws deprived Indians already settled there of equal political rights. The latest cases are the Natal Borough Ordinance of 1924 and the Anti-Asiatic Bill of 1926.

The participation of the Dominions in the War against Germany, involving the raising and sending of armies to Europe and heavy expenditures, naturally led them to demand representation in the Imperial War Cabinet, and from this to separate delegates at the Peace Conference and to membership in the League of Nations, the steps were logical. At a conference of Premiers in London in 1907, the so-called colonial conference, the virtual independence of the Dominions and their equality with the United Kingdom, had

already been recognised by the adoption of the principle that "the Crown is the supreme executive in the United Kingdom and in all the Dominions, but it acts on the advice of different ministries within different constitutional limits". This principle was re-asserted in the Imperial conferences of 1915, 1917, 1918 and 1923. But this did not solve the problem of the participation of the Dominions in all important matters of common imperial concern *i.e.*, foreign policy and foreign relations. The participation of the Dominions in the Peace Conference and their separate membership in the League of Nations emphasized their sovereign status. But it is difficult to see how the Dominions can have an effective voice in Imperial foreign policy under the present constitution. They can advise and warn, as they did in 1921, in the matter of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was advantageous to the British political and trade interests in India and the Far East (Hong Kong) and yet by the veto of the dominions the project had to be dropped. The danger to the solidarity of the British Empire, as far as the self-governing Dominions are concerned, lies in the inevitable divergency of economic and political interests, from divergent economic and political conditions and from the desire of the Dominions to share in the privileges of Empire. The Dominions feel that the expansion of Japan is a menace to their security and the admission of Japanese immigration into their country is undesirable. Then Great Britain will have to choose between her political interests in India and Hongkong and the slightly profitable political and sentimental tie with her dominions.

At the Peace Conference South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand demanded their share of the German

Colonies, even though they themselves are sparsely populated and they carry their immigration laws into their new territories, India with her teeming population has been shut out from further expansion even in tropical and semi-tropical thinly settled countries like East Africa. If India is to be held a dependency of Great Britain, with the aid of the self-governing Dominions, it is reasonable to suppose that the Dominion premiers will be demanding a share of the good jobs and that Dominion trade interests be considered in the exploitation of these countries; on the other hand, the sponsorship by the British Government of the policy of Australia and New Zealand, to exclude Asiatics from settlement in vast regions that they themselves cannot colonise or develop, imperils future relations of England and India, and England and Japan. Australia with a greater area than the United States has scarcely more than five million people, five-sixths of whom live in the South Eastern tip of the continent. And yet the Australian Premier said recently that the continent could support 100 million white people in their accustomed standard of living, and in this opinion Lord Northcliffe, then visiting Australia, concurred. Canada as large as the United States has only 12 million people, New Zealand and South Africa have each scarcely more than a million white population, and the possibilities of development are vast. And yet, these Dominions, clamouring for immigrants and sorely needing labour, exclude Indians—their fellow subjects in the Empire. By the most generous calculation of increase, Europe, if she directed all her immigration towards these Dominions, could scarcely fill their needs for a hundred years. It is a case, as the Australian Premier said, of safe-guarding the patrimony of our great-grand

children. Will Japan and India wait a hundred years until they have hardly elbow room in their respective countries? This is the greatest problem in world-politics to-day. Not content with this extensive dominion, Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand have each been given former German colonies in tropical areas as mandates, to which they have carried their exclusive immigration laws. South Africa has already mismanaged her mandate in South-West Africa. As far as India is concerned the question of emigration, the problem of Empire Citizenship and colonisation of tropical Africa (such as Kenya, Uganda, etc.) are the rocks on which her connection with the Empire may founder, if wiser statesmanship does not prevail. Sir Theodore Morrison, writing in 1918, suggested that the former German East Africa should be given over to India as a mandate, as the natives of India will be better able to teach the Africans the modern arts of civilisation; he also argued that Africa is sparsely populated and it can therefore provide room for expansion for the teeming population of India, without prejudice to the interests of the African natives. The adoption of such a scheme would have solved the population problem of India as well as helped the African native by bringing him into contact with the more advanced Indian people. The British Government did not press for the adoption of this plan and the problem of Indian immigration, barred from the self-governing dominions and even from the tropical colonies, remains an acute problem both for India and the Empire. It is an admitted fact that Europeans can not be acclimatized to tropical countries, yet they zealously exclude the Indian people, who can by their thrift, labour and industry utilize the great undeveloped resources of the tropics. The pro-

blem of the 20th Century is the adjustment of relationships between European and non-European races; and that problem can only be amicably settled if the European states adopt the policy of 'live and let live' and not a "dog in the manger" policy.

The self-governing dominions are not of as much benefit to the industries and commerce of Great Britain as the British tax payer might in justice hope for. The dominions get more from the mother-country and Empire than they are prepared to give. Canada largely made her own way. But Australia, New Zealand and South Africa were liabilities to the tax payers of England for a long time. The United Kingdom will never get a return upon the South African investment. It is true that Ireland was held in subjection because of her unfortunate geographical position and for economic reasons, but for a century the English paid dearly for the doubtful privilege of ruling Ireland. In time of War, the dominions are not likely again to prove themselves a precious asset to the mother country if their own interests are not involved. No European nation has benefited from the exploitation, or rather attempt at exploitation, of peoples of European stock. The relations between Europe and Asia or Africa on the contrary, have generally proved so profitable up to the war of 1914, and even now in the case of Africa, that the European nations were willing to risk wars with one another in order to enjoy that privilege.

Now let us take the case of India. India is in a very real sense the corner-stone of the British Empire. It is the richest colonial prize that the world has ever known. A large part of the revenues of India go to England for "home charges" and more than two-thirds are spent in the maintenance of a military

establishment that has been used to extend the British Empire elsewhere in Asia and in Africa and to defend Great Britain's interests on the battlefields of France and Gallipoli. As a field for capital investment, India has been worth to Great Britain all her other colonies put together. She has furnished generations of Englishmen with a comfortable living. Her connection with Great Britain was so profitable to the latter that successive generations of Conservative, Liberal, and even Labour statesmen have supported the Government's Indian policy, and India has been ruled out of party politics. For India's sake, Siam, China, Persia and Egypt were despoiled, Tibet was invaded, three wars were fought with Afghanistan, Russia and France were first antagonised and then conciliated, and the doctrine of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was first upheld and then violated. The real test of British statesmanship in India centres round the problem of emigration and the fiscal policy. When the Government of India raised the duty on cotton goods from $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. to 11 per cent., the Lancashire cotton industry, manufacturers and workers together, sent a deputation to the then Secretary of State for India the late Mr. Montagu to protest against this increase. The deputation explained that Lancashire interests were superior to Indian interests, and they demanded the annulment of the increase. Supporting this position the "Morning Post" said editorially "The British Empire in India was founded for the good of the British trade We do not believe in indulging in beautiful ideals at the expense of some millions of our fellow Englishmen." The same sentiment was expressed by Sir John Strachey as long ago as the 15th March 1877, in his financial statement before the old Impe-

rial Council while advocating the imposition of excise duties, as follows:—"We are often told that it is the duty of the Government of India to think of Indian interests alone, and that if the interests of Manchester suffer it is no affair of ours. For my part, I utterly repudiate such doctrines; I have not ceased to be an Englishman because I have spent a greater part of my life in India and have become a member of the Indian Government. The interests of Manchester, at which foolish people sneer, are the interests not only of the great and intelligent population engaged directly in the trade in cotton, but of millions of Englishmen. *I am not ashamed to say that while I hope that I feel as strongly as any man the duties which I owe to India, there is no higher duty in my estimation than that which I owe to my own country.*" If the ideas expressed by Sir John Strachey and the "Morning Post" are to be driven to their logical conclusion, there would be nothing wrong in the wholesale impoverisation of India in order that England might be enriched, and Englishmen might be benefitted. In accordance with this policy, the excise duties have been levied since 1877 on Indian manufactured cotton goods to protect the interests of Lancashire. The Indian Nationalist movement will die out not by repression but by satisfying the legitimate demands of the Indian people, such as the spread of free and compulsory primary education, and the curtailment of the ruinous military expenditure to the proportion necessary for the protection of life and property in normal times, Indianisation of services on an Indian scale of pay, and the adjustment of Indian tariffs in the interests of India (not of Great Britain or of her self-govern-

ing colonies) are among some of the other important demands.* Finally if the Indian people are forced to bear their share of the burden of defending and maintaining the British Empire, they ought to receive in return privileges within the Empire enjoyed by *British subjects of European origin*. This means that there should be a partnership on equal terms in the Empire with the same kind of citizenship for all, and Indians should be allowed freely to enter and colonise parts of Africa and Australia. Mr. Lloyd George and other British statesmen admitted that these demands of His Majesty's Indian subjects though they seemed legitimate to the British Government, involved offending other imperial interests. These demands were rejected by British manufacturers and industrial workers and by public opinion in the self-governing Dominions and colonies. It seems probable, therefore, that England cannot afford to allow any of the real power in Indian affairs to pass out of the hands of British military and civilian officials, as this would mean the end of European expansion in Asia and of the economic imperialism upon which the prosperity of Great Britain is believed by the imperialists to rest.

The effect of imperialism on democracy has been disastrous. In dealing with their colonial possessions even the most democratic nations like England and the United States have thrown their democracy overboard. The general type of modern colonial government has been the autocratic rule of a magistrate or "Governor General", appointed by the home gov-

* The principle of tariff autonomy has been conceded by the erection of the Indian Tariff Board. While the book was passing through the Press, the Governor-General announced the suspension of the cotton excise duty in January, 1926.

ernment and responsible to the home government rather than to the colony. The so-called "Legislative Councils" existing in many colonies have no real control of the government and are as a rule partly elective, (as is the case in India). The reason for this repudiation of democracy is obvious, *i.e.*, self interest, though British public opinion has always been divided upon the question whether suppression of liberties of other peoples is justifiable and whether it actually pays to conquer and hold them against their will. Other stock reasons are law and order, sacred trust, duty to civilisation, and the white man's burden, etc. The barbarous tribes of the South Sea islands, the uncivilized negroes of Uganda, or the cannibal tribes of Dahomey, could hardly be entrusted with the ballot. In India and Egypt the illiteracy of the vast majority of the population (which the ruling Power has done nothing to remove even in a century and a half) would furnish an excuse for undemocratic bureaucracy. But even were it possible, through the diffusion of education, to overcome this practical obstacle, there would still remain the fundamental difficulty, that if the inhabitants of the colonies had their way, they would undoubtedly in almost every case put an end to the domination of the alien ruling power.

CHAPTER VII.

ECONOMIC IMPERIALISM OF THE UNITED STATES..

The Nineteenth Century was not only a century of nation-building but also of empire-building on a colossal scale, a century of European emigration and colonisation, a century during which the white race seized whatever regions of the earth remained still unappropriated or were too weak to preserve themselves inviolate. Thus magnificent imperial claims were staked out by various Powers either for immediate or for ultimate use.

Many were the causes of this expansion. One was the extraordinary increase during the century of the population of Europe—perhaps 175 millions in 1815 and more than 450 millions a century later. This is unquestionably one of the most important facts in modern history, and it is the fundamental cause of the colossal emigration. The New Imperialism of the 19th century received its impulse from the Industrial Revolution and the French Revolution. The former produced the railway, the steamship, the telegraph and the telephone, which annihilated distance and made the occupation of distant colonies infinitely more feasible, their commerce more valuable, their administration easier. The Industrial Revolution also enhanced the value of colonies as markets for manufactures and as sources of supply for raw materials and food-stuffs. In yet another way the Industrial Revolution imparted a mighty impetus to

economic imperialism by creating a class of capitalists who were willing to invest their money in colonial enterprises; for the business men who had realised fortunes from their factories or railways at home were ever eager to increase their wealth by building railways, organising industries, or developing mines in Africa, South America or Asia.

The debt of the new Imperialism to the French Revolution was twofold. In the first place, the French Revolution and the subsequent insurrections inspired by the French Revolution, meant in a general way the victory of the bourgeoisie over feudalism and 'divine right' monarchy, and enabled the bourgeoisie to control the government for the benefit of its own interests, that is, business interests. These business interests demanded Colonial expansion. In the second place, the French Revolution led to the development of such an intense spirit of national patriotism that all classes were proud to assist in making any colonial acquisitions which might add to the glory, extent, and power of their nation.

Revival of European Colonial Expansion and the Partition of Africa.

The year 1878 (the Congress of Berlin) marks a turning point in the history of Europe. The relations of the European nations up to that time were affected more by questions arising in Europe itself, than by the struggle carried on outside of Europe for the possession of colonies and markets. It was no longer on the Rhine or the Danube, but in Tunis, in Egypt, in Nigeria, in Manchuria, that European foreign offices found the centre of gravity of their diplomacy.

England was the greatest colonial power at that

time, and owned a rich tropical domain and extensive settlement colonies in the temperate zone, and in order to secure the protection of her trade, she commanded the sea-routes by means of her many naval stations. Spain, Holland and Portugal, the earlier great colonial nations, still had important colonial possessions, but they now played, from both the economic and the political point of view only a secondary part. France, after the wars of Napoleon, had mere fragments left from her wonderful colonial empire built up in the 17th and 18th centuries; but under the Restoration and Napoleon III, she set foot in Algiers, Senegal and Cochinchina. Her defeat in 1871 brought a sudden end to her prospects. When, after a few years, she had recuperated her strength, it was in colonial expansion that she sought employment for an activity, which did not find ground for exercise in Europe. This determination was at first dictated to her spokesmen by political ambitions; only later did they invoke economic motives. France had no emigration, and her economic equilibrium and the character of her export industries, almost all luxury or semi-luxury articles, did not seem in her present case to call for a vast colonial empire. In 1881 a French protectorate was proclaimed over Tunis and Upper Niger, and two years later over Annam. France was in need of an outlet for her industries and her capital. Answering an interpellation concerning the Tonkin enterprise in 1883, Ferry said that the colonies were to serve as a 'safety valve'. They are always "for the wealthy countries a most advantageous investment of capital". France is full to overflowing with capital and is materially concerned in this side of the question. They are an outlet for the products of the French industry, for the 'colonial ties' with

the mother country suffice, since "economic preponderance follows political predominance" Bismarck was pleased to see France directing her activities outside Europe, as he foresaw chances of a clash with England, which perhaps might compel the French Government to make a rapprochement with Germany.

The repudiation of Free Trade in Germany was, however, a tremendous stimulus to the German colonial movement. Emigration was assuming alarming proportions. For the decade 1871—1880 the number of German emigrants had risen to 585,000, for the three years 1881—1883 it reached 570,000 and in the absence of German colonies they went to settle in foreign lands. "This stream of emigrants, going out with all they have," said Moldenhær, "furnishing knowledge and skill to our national enemies, is a tax in gold and blood paid by Germany to foreign lands". At the close of 1882 the Kolonialverein was founded in Frankfort by men of all parties and of various professions. Less than ten years later, in April 1884, South West Africa was placed under the Empire's protection, and almost at the same time the German Government annexed territories in Togoland and the Cameroons. Germany in her turn was launching upon the policy of colonial expansion.

Only the African continent still offered to European enterprise unclaimed territories, with expanses inhabited by backward native populations, whose isolation had kept them out of the western movement. The white nations had so far secured a footing only along the edge of the continent, England in the South, France in the North and Germany in the West. In 1876, Leopold II, King of Belgium, had founded in Brussels the Association Africaine Internationale, the

object of which was to promote the exploration and civilization of the Black Continent. It became three years later the Association Internationale du Congo. The Congo committee obtained Stanley's services in order to deal with the natives of those regions and to place them under the authority of the committee. This was the beginning of the keen rivalry between the Belgian sovereign on the one hand, and on the other France, England and Portugal. The claims of those nations, which invoked the hinterland doctrine, according to which the occupation of a stretch of territory along the coast involved the exclusive right of exploitation and ownership of the interior regions behind the coastal colony, clashed with one another and embodied many causes of conflict. This rivalry was adjusted by an international conference in Berlin at the close of 1884. The first Act (February 1885) recognised the Congo Free State; it resolved that freedom of trade should be guaranteed to all the nations in the 'Conventional basin' which embraced the whole of Central Africa from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean and included extensive British, French, Portuguese and German territories. Freedom of trade implied that no import duties should be levied for an object other than the expenses of administration, and that the freedom of transportation over rivers, highways and rail-roads could not be limited by differential rules or rates. This was a new principle, the recognition of the right to trade under conditions of strict equality for all the nations in an internationalized area. This open-door policy was a movement of reaction against the policy of economic exclusiveness enforced by all the colonial powers, with the exception of England, by means of preferential customs duties between the home country and her colonies.

The dangerous hinterland doctrine was abolished by the Conference. The Berlin Act required that notice of the occupation of a new territory and of the creation of a protectorate should be given to all the colonial powers. These then sought to secure their own share of the vacant territories in Africa without having to incur the expense of immediate occupation and the eventual risk of dispute over the determination of frontiers. This was the object of a series of treaties defining "spheres of influences", by which the signatory powers mutually recognised one another's political rights and economic privileges over lands delimited in the Act, without prejudice, of course to the rights of nations not parties to the treaty. The principal treaties of this kind are: the Anglo-German treaties of 1885, relative to South West Africa, and of 1890 which determined the respective spheres of both nations in Eastern Africa, recognised the British protectorate over Zanzibar, and gave the island of Heligoland back to Germany; the Franco-German agreements of 1885, fixing the frontiers of the French Congo and the Cameroons, and of 1894 delimiting their respective spheres of influence in the region of Lake Tchad; and the Anglo-French treaties of 1890 relative to the lands of the Niger and of Sokoto, and recognising the French Protectorate over Madagascar, and of 1898 concerning the Niger regions. To carry out the occupation and the development of these territories, there re-appeared the charter companies, which had played so important a part in the 16th and 17th centuries. England created in 1880 the British North Borneo Co., in 1886 the Royal Niger Co., in 1888 the British East Africa Co., and in 1889 the British South Africa Co., which under the leadership of Cecil Rhodes, holds so large a place

in the history of South Africa. Germany had already organised in 1885 the German East Africa Co., and Portugal in 1894 founded the Portuguese Mozambique Co. Unlike the former companies that were mostly commercial and enjoyed a monopoly, the new ones were first and foremost of a political character. Invested with administrative rights, their object was to open up territories through railroad-building, farming and mine prospecting. They had no commercial monopoly.

This revival of colonial expansion had been undertaken originally from political motives, and the first move of one nation soon drew in the others, which were unwilling to be left behind in the annexation of the only extensive lands still unclaimed. But it was not long, before this revival was influenced by the notion of economic needs, not indeed immediate, but foreseen by statesmen in a more or less proximate future. Industrial development had increased the importance of tropical lands, certain products of which—rubber and vegetable oils, coffee and cocoa for example—were being used in ever increasing quantities. At the same time, the rebirth of the policy of protection came to re-inforce these ideas of expansion. Colonial possessions continued to be markets where the home people enjoy a privileged position. The great industrial nations believed it necessary to secure the possession of territories where their masters of industry and merchants should be able to supply themselves under the best conditions, and where could be found outlets both for the utilization of their available capital and for the surplus of their production. The foreign investment of the three great capitalist Powers of Europe had assumed great proportions by the beginning of the 20th Century. Thus England invested

four billion pounds, France two billion pounds and Germany one billion pounds. At the same time, it was estimated that the annual increments to the foreign holdings were increasing. The United States of America was still on the eve of the Great War among the debtor nations. The amount of European capital invested there, principally in railroad bonds, was valued at one billion pounds, on the other hand the Americans had made investments, although for a much smaller amount, hardly equalling one quarter or one-fifth of the former sum, in some countries of the New World, particularly Canada, Mexico and Peru. The American Government adopted in 1908-9 the policy of "Dollar Diplomacy" under Mr. Taft's presidency. Mr. Taft declared as follows: While our foreign policy should not be turned a hair's breadth from the straight path of justice, it may well be made to include active intervention to secure for our merchandise and our capitalists opportunity for profitable investment which shall insure to the benefit of both countries concerned." This policy of Dollar Diplomacy was repudiated by Woodrow Wilson in 1914, when he declared that he would deny government support to American enterprises in foreign countries, should they attempt to abuse their power to exploit peoples too weak to defend themselves.

It is in accordance with this new policy that President Wilson demanded the withdrawal of American participation in the Six Power loan to China in 1913.

It is not customary to think of the United States as a colonizing country, yet the whole history of the United States from 1787 to the present has been one of steady territorial expansion. The area of the original thirteen states forms less than one-tenth of

the territory which is under the flag of the United States to-day. No other nation has relatively increased to so great an extent and colonised its acquisitions so largely with its own people. The history of American expansion may be divided in two periods. First, there is the era extending from the close of the Revolutionary War of 1783 to the year 1867. It was during this interval that the United States acquired by successive treaties with Great Britain, France and Spain all the land included in the North West territory as it was then called, in the Louisiana purchase and in Florida. During this interval also, the United States secured by conquest from Mexico and by the admission of territories which had declared their independence of Mexico, the enormous areas of Texas, the South West and the Southern Pacific slope.* All this territory was contiguous; it included nothing remote from lands already possessed, and its acquisitions did not impair the compactness of American territory. All of it, however, is territory which was intended to be and indeed has now been parcelled into States of the Union with full rights of statehood. The expansions of this period merely represented the logical rounding off of the United States frontiers.

The activity of the Americans during this period has been mostly applied to the settlement and development of the extensive territories along the valleys of the Ohio, Mississippi and Missouri. In the decade 1880-1890 the westward progression had reached the

* See Edward Bicknell 'The territorial acquisitions of the United States, 1787-1904' for a general account of these additions to the United States territory; and also see Hinsdale 'The Old North-West, the beginnings of our colonial system.'

limit of the arable lands. The frontier of colonization, after having been for two centuries in perpetual advance, was now fixed; arable lands were all appropriated and the call of the West was no longer the magnetic attraction which so many generations had obeyed. Within 20 years from 1870 to 1890 the population had grown from 38,500,000 to 63,000,000. During this period the number of immigrants, mostly adults in their full strength, had been 6,000,000. The check of further westward expansion and the progress of industry suggested an ambitious plan, the realization of which was undertaken by James G. Blaine, *i.e.*, to develop American commercial relations with 'Latin America.

The second period, "extending from 1867 to the present time, has been marked by territorial acquisitions much less extensive and of a different sort. By the purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867, the United States acquired its first non-contiguous possession. During the period, from 1871 to 1899, the United States was engaged in domestic reconstruction after the Civil War. All the surplus capital of the nation was needed at home for the development of domestic resources and the expansion of railroads and industries. This period was known in American history as the "era of good feeling". By 1899, however, the United States had a great deal of surplus capital to invest in the foreign fields. The United States therefore began to look for new countries where raw materials could be found and trade carried. America still believed in the mercantile theory that trade followed the flag, and she therefore embarked upon a policy of economic imperialism and expansion, abandoning her traditional policy of isolation. The turning point in her change of policy was marked by the

outbreak of the Spanish American War, which resulted in new acquisitions of non-contiguous territory such as Porto Rico, the Philippines and other islands in the Pacific Ocean. All the territory, acquired by the Americans before the Spanish War, was in regions suitable for white colonization. Military or even territorial government was but a temporary measure for a period of transition. The newest lands would sooner or later be in every way on an equal footing with the oldest. The only exception was Alaska, where owing to the inhospitable climate, there was not and may never be a sufficient population to form an independent state. But it must be remembered that in 1867 when Alaska was purchased, most Americans believed that Canada would shortly come into the Union, after which Alaska would cease to be a detached fragment and become a natural north-western frontier of the country. The acquisitions, since the Spanish-American War on the other hand, are tropical lands already thickly settled by natives, foreign in speech, and race to the American civilization; and hence an emigration of Americans to these lands cannot be expected.

The American people have in the past been aware of this distinction and have more than once shown their repugnance to holding alien dependencies. We have an instance of this in the history of their relations with Liberia. In 1820 a band of negroes sent by the American Colonization Society founded a settlement on the West African coast, the United States taking no official part in the affair except to send government supplies at one time to keep the colonists alive. In 1837 they formed themselves into a Commonwealth and ten years later assumed the title of a sovereign state, which, owing to the feeling against free negroes in the south, was not recognised by the

United States till 1862, after the outbreak of the Civil War. Though the American Government had made representations to the Powers on behalf of Liberia and assumed a "quasi-parental relationship" to her, and would oppose its forcible annexation by a European Power, yet they did not maintain a protectorate over this black republic, although called upon to do so by the European Powers. For additional examples of the policy of keeping free from territories inhabited by people of another race, we may turn to the refusal of the Senate to ratify the treaties for the annexation of St. Thomas (1867) and San Domingo (1870) and to President Cleveland's withdrawal of the Hawaiian treaty (1893). From the beginning of the Spanish War, the United States has changed its policy and begun the policy of annexation. In July 1898 Hawaii was annexed, and at the end of the same year, the Peace of Paris assured to the United States possession of Porto Rico, of the Philippines, and of Guam in the Ladrones. In 1899, as the result of a treaty with Germany and Great Britain, the Americans acquired the island of Tutuila and its dependencies (in the Samoa group) as a coaling station suitable for naval purposes. The Hawaiian islands too are of interest, chiefly on account of their commercial and strategic value. In their social structure they are unlike the territories obtained by the Spanish War, for although Americans form but a small minority of the total population, their influence has been dominant for many years. In 1902 the United States concluded an arrangement for the purchase of the Danish West Indies, but the treaty was not ratified by the Danish Senate. By the Treaty of 1917, however, the Danish West Indies were purchased by the United States. In 1903 they obtained from the newly con-

stituted republic of Panama, practical possession of a strip of land on each side of the future Isthmian canal. In 1906, the collapse of the Cuban Government in the face of an insurrection, led to the landing of the American troops by the provisions of the Platt amendment, and the consequence is that Cuba is virtually a protectorate of the United States.

The United States has thus become a colonial power in the fullest sense of the term. Its latest acquisitions since 1898 are all situated in the tropics. They are small in extent as compared with the colonial Empires of Great Britain, France, Holland and even Portugal, but they are thickly settled and have been for long used to European rule. Owing to certain peculiar characteristics, the problems they present are not quite the same as those of the colonies of the various nations, and as the ideals of their American owners add another element of variety, their relation to the United States, which holds them, is in some ways different. The development of colonial expansion has followed the movement of industrial expansion in the United States. From 1893 to 1899, the export of manufactured goods doubled, passing from \$ 158,000,000 to \$ 339,000,000 and in 1900 it increased again by \$ 100,000,000. American manufactured goods thus made their appearance even upon the markets of Europe. (A. D. Noyes, 'Forty years of American Finance.') European manufacturers and statesmen were really frightened for a time. The creation of the Steel Trust, then of the Shipping Trust capped the climax of their fears. Such terms as "the American Peril", and "the American Invasion", held for sometime a good deal of space in their newspapers and periodicals. In 1900, the "Statist" of London wrote as follows:—"The capacity of the

United States to compete in foreign markets with the most advanced nations of Europe has been made super-abundantly manifest." And in 1902, Mr. Lozzatte proposed to convene a European customs conference with the view of studying a policy of common defence against the United States. In the United States this situation created a feeling akin to frenzy. In the Introduction to the Review of the World's Commerce for 1898, an official publication, the author, after showing that the United States was fast making itself industrially independent, added, "The industries of the United States have reached the point where it seems not only practical but comparatively easy for them to supply a considerable portion of the world in addition to the home market." The same year the President of the American Bankers' Association, in his inaugural address at the annual convention of the Association, exclaimed in a tone of triumph: "We hold now three of the winning cards in the game for commercial greatness, to wit, iron, steel and coal. We have long been the granary of the world, we now aspire to be its workshop, then we want to be its clearing house." Economic prosperity in the United States thus favoured the sudden birth of a genuine imperialistic state of mind. Upon the close of the Spanish War, the United States was established in Hawaii, Guam and the Philippines in the Pacific, and in Porto Rico in the Caribbean Sea, where they had besides imposed their protectorate over Cuba with the right to create a naval base at Guatanmo.

American policy in the Hawaii and the Pacific.

Early in the 19th century, American missionaries were sent by the congregational churches of New

England to the Sandwich or Hawaiian islands, and under their influence the natives had organised a government based on western principles. A delegation of plenipotentiaries from this new nation visited the United States and Europe in 1842, asking for recognition and the protection of the Christian Powers. The recognition was readily given by the United States, but in addition thereto, an important declaration was made by Secretary Webster to the Hawaiian delegation and by President Tyler to Congress. It was stated that in view of the preponderating trade and intercourse of the United States with these islands, and of the greater interest of America in their fate, the United States Government would insist that no European nation should take possession of or colonize them, nor subvert the native government. (Daniel Webster's Works, Vol. VI p. 478.)

This declaration was repeated by successive Secretaries of State and in 1851 by Webster again. The position assumed was in effect that of a virtual protectorate on the part of the United States. It is the application of the Monroe Doctrine to Hawaii. While Mr. Marcy was the Secretary in 1856, an effort was made to bring about the annexation of the islands to the United States, but the movement was frustrated by the death of the King of the islands. Secretary Fish (1871) in discussing annexation said that it was clear that the United States could not consent to the transfer of the islands to any powerful maritime or commercial nation. "Such transfer" he added "would threaten a military surveillance in the Pacific, similar to that which Bermuda has afforded in the Atlantic. The latter has been submitted to from necessity, in as much as it was congenial with our government, but we desire no additional similar outposts in the hands of

those who may at some future time use them to our disadvantage." (Quoted in Wharton's International Law Digest, Vol. 1. p. 423.)

In 1875 a commercial reciprocity treaty with Hawaii was negotiated by Secretary Fish and it was renewed and continued in existence until the final consummation of annexation in 1898. One of the strongest motives for the commercial reciprocity treaty was a desire to bind these islands more strongly to the United States.

Another step in the extension of American influence in the Pacific Ocean* was taken in 1872, when Commander Meade of the United States Navy negotiated with the chief of Tutuila, one of the Samoan group, a commercial agreement, with provision for the use of the port of Pago-Pago as a naval station. This agreement took the shape of a formal treaty in 1878 and that brought about the tripartite government by the United States, Great Britain and Germany of the whole of the Samoan group. The United States was released from the tripartite agreement in 1899, and at present possesses only Tutuila and the naval station of Pago-Pago.

American Policy in the Carribean Sea.

The growth of the American commercial and financial interests in the Carribean, during the past two decades, is remarkable. It is also noticeable, how without any deliberate policy on the part of the United States, but wholly as a result of circumstances, there had taken place a corresponding development in the political control of these regions by America. As a result of the war with Spain, the United States had acquired ownership of Porto Rico and a practical pro-

tectorate over Cuba. The United States has also purchased the Virgin Islands from Denmark in 1916 and the Panama zone from Columbia. To prevent the landing of the troops of European nations in San Domingo, to enforce the payment of money claims due to their nationals, the United States has assumed control of Dominican custom houses and its financial administration. To prevent a similar landing in Haiti, and to protect the lives and property of their nationals during a succession of revolutions in Haiti, America has assumed practical sovereignty over that republic. And for both of these reasons, the United States interfered in Nicaragua and now controls its destinies. Prof. E. M. Borchard of Yale and Prof. Wm. R. Shepherd of Columbia hold that in every case of interference, the result had been good for the country concerned. Law and order, according to them, have never been so well preserved, production so highly stimulated, foreign commerce so carefully fostered and the investment of capital so successfully encouraged. Though material prosperity of the countries in question has been vastly increased, this process of economic imperialism has roused the suspicion, fear and animosity of the South American Republics. The policy of economic imperialism encouraged the investment of American capital in the Carribean Sea, with its resultant defects of "Dollar Diplomacy". All signs point to a further control by the United States in the financial rehabilitation and the political guidance of other Carribean countries. Hence the protagonists of the policy of economic imperialism declare that their policy should be consciously adopted and frankly avowed by the United States. But they forget the adage that good government can never be a substitute for self-government.

They contend that it was the manifest destiny of the Carribean Sea to be an American lake, and that it therefore behoves American diplomacy to start taking stock of the future by securing possession of the colonies of Great Britain, France and the Netherlands in and about the Carribean. With the opening of the Panama Canal, the Carribean has been raised again, as it was three centuries ago, to a commanding position among the trade routes of the world. The upholders of imperialism say that all the interests, political and economic, of the United States merge in keeping this region as an American sphere of influence for the peace of the Western hemisphere, for the welfare of its inhabitants, and for the security of the Panama Canal. They say that all these are endangered by the possession of colonies in that region by European countries, especially by great powers. Even distinguished Americans claim that it is for the benefit of all three parties concerned, the European powers, the inhabitants of the colonies, and the United States that the colonies should be absorbed by America. The islands, according to them, are geographically and strategically a part of the United States. They claim that both the French and Dutch colonies show a declining commerce and are dependent for their financial existence upon annual subsidies by the home government. The commerce of the British colonies, on the other hand, is chiefly with the United States. As a last argument, they say that what has been accomplished for the welfare of the people of Porto Rico in the development of education, growth of industry and internal improvements is an object lesson to the inhabitants of all the other islands, who would, given an opportunity, no doubt show the same eager desire for annexation to the United States, as did the people

of the Virgin Islands when the proposal was made for their purchase from Denmark. There are some responsible people in the United States who advocate the acquisition of the Carribean possessions of France and England by cancelling the war debts that the United States had advanced them during the late European War.

The advocates of the policy of economic imperialism and "Dollar Diplomacy" in the United States will do well to recall the words of President Wilson in this connection: "It is a very perilous thing to determine a foreign policy in terms of material interest" and *"morality and not expediency is the thing that must guide us in our relations with other nations"*. If this advice were to be accepted by the people and successive governments of the United States, it would be safe to predict that the American policy will be to assist in every possible way the Carribean republics to develop and strengthen their self-government and independence, instead of imposing upon them a government by outsiders whose culture and point of view in every fundamental are so alien.

The annexation of Hawaii had been asked for a long time by the representatives of American interests who had promoted the cultivation of sugar in those islands and who wanted to gain free admittance to the American market for their product. Hitherto they had been unable to overcome the hostility of public opinion to any extra-continental extension of territory. The war furnished them the occasion to gain their point. The Hawaiian islands are, by their geographical situation, a protective outpost for the American coast on the Pacific, therefore from the very beginning of the hostilities national security had required their annexation.

The acquisition of the Philippines was an entirely unexpected consequence of the war. "At the beginning of the war" says Prof. Paul S. Reinsch "there was perhaps not a soul in the whole Republic who so much as thought of the possibility of his nation becoming a sovereign power in the Orient." The Sino-Japanese war had given a new aspect to the far eastern question; the break-up of China seemed near. Americans looked upon the Chinese market as a natural field for commercial expansion; they were about to be shut out of it. Their traditional policy forbade their seizing a portion of Chinese territory even under the doctrine of "sphere of influence"; American public opinion would not stand for that. The occupation of the Philippines presented economic advantages also. Might not Manila become a commercial emporium rivaling Hong Kong some day, and were not the Philippines a possible field of activity opening up interesting opportunities to American capitalists and merchants? These arguments seemed to justify the annexation of the Archipelago. In his instructions to the American commissioners charged with the negotiation of peace, President McKinley insisted, on the other hand, upon the liberal economic policy which the United States intended to follow. "It is just to use every legitimate means for the enlargement of American trade, but we seek no advantages in the Orient which are not common to all. Asking only the open door for ourselves, we are ready to accord the open door to others. The commercial opportunity, which is naturally and inevitably associated with this new opening, depends less on large territorial possessions than upon an adequate commercial basis and upon broad and equal privileges." In

spite of these resolves, the United States was not long in extending its iron regime of protection to its colonial dependencies.

In 1898 President McKinley championed the construction of an inter-oceanic canal in his annual message to Congress in the following terms: "The construction of such a maritime highway isindispensable to that intimate and ready inter-communication between our eastern and western seaboard, demanded by the annexation of the Hawaiian islands and the prospective expansion of our influence and commerce in the Pacific, and.....our national policy now more imperatively than ever calls for its control by this government." The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty concluded in 1901, abrogated the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 with England, and the new treaty of 1901 provided for the neutralization of the canal, and instead of a collective guarantee, the United States assumed the sole responsibility, simply promising that "the canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations". The opportune revolution of Panama (November 1903) made it possible to build a canal on American territory, and since its completion, military works have been undertaken at both ends to insure its security. The Hay-Pauncefote treaty, which roused no protests on the part of any European power, is an important event in the history of the United States; it marks the tacit acquiescence of Europe to its pretensions of hegemony over the lands bathed by the waters of the gulf of Mexico and of the Caribbean Sea. The sentiments of economic imperialism, that had drawn the United States into a policy of extra-continental expansion, were fostered for a while by a period of continuous

prosperity. The United States had turned from borrowing from Europe to lending her money. England had to call upon the New York market for the big loans made necessary by the baffling war she was waging in South Africa. From 1900 to 1902 American banks absorbed over 200 million dollars of bonds and—a novelty in financial history—these banks treated directly with the British Treasury. In 1900, the German Government sold in New York, 20 million dollars in bonds. Then at the time of the Russo-Japanese War, Japan sold to the United States an important portion of her loan. Thus the 'debtor nation' has become the chief creditor nation in the words of Mr. John Hay.

European countries have adopted practices of various kinds to assure the successful operation of a loan contract concluded between a foreign nation and their subjects. Thus, Great Britain has provided in such cases, for the selection of a British supervisor of the loans, and the government "takes cognizance" of the contract. The corporation of foreign bond holders, an association for the protection of British holders of the bonds of foreign countries, usually seems to receive material support from the British Government in its demands. Similar associations exist in Germany, France and Belgium.* For instance in 1901, France, Germany and England sent a fleet of battleships and blockaded the coast of Venezuela—the so-called pacific blockade for the recovery of contract-debts, due to their nationals from Venezuela. Through the friendly intervention of the United States once more, the matter was finally submitted to arbitration and was decided in favour of

* 41 Clunet '*Droit International*' 1914, pp. 137-140.

the creditor nations. The recent threat of Great Britain to despatch a warship to Guatemala to secure the payment of debts, and the resulting appeal of Guatemala to the United States, present a familiar situation in the relations of the United States with Latin-America. In the Dominican and unratified Honduras and Nicaraguan treaties with the United States, diplomatic protection is extended to the receiver or supervisor in the performance of his duties.

In 1904 the United States inaugurated the policy which has been given the name of "financial protectorate". The Dominican Republic was unable to ensure the service of her foreign debt; certain European Powers, whose nationals found themselves injured thereby, advised the American Government toward the close of 1904 that unless the United States assumed the management of the Dominican customs, guaranteed an equitable distribution of their proceeds among the creditors of the Republic, they would find themselves compelled to resort to measures of coercion, as England, Germany and Italy resolved to defend the interests of their citizens in 1902 against Venezuela. This appeal to the United States by the European Powers, is due to the existence of the Monroe doctrine, which prevents the occupation of any country in the American Continent by European Powers either for recovery of debts or for political purposes.

The United States, therefore, concluded in 1905 with the Dominican Republic a convention which, after sharp opposition and a few alterations, was ratified by the United States Senate in 1907. It gave the United States the management of customs and forbade the Dominican Government to increase its debt without the consent of the United States, until

the existing debt had been amortized. By the Platt Amendment, Cuba also is put in the same relation to the United States. Since then, Honduras, Nicaragua and the Republic of Haiti having fallen into similar difficulties, have had to accept the United States supervision over their customs and general financial control. This whole question of the collection of public debts was settled by the so-called Porter Resolution at the Hague Conference of 1907, which forbids the employment of force for the collection of public debts until the claims shall have been approved by an arbitration committee appointed by the creditor and debtor countries, and the payment thereof shall have been refused, or until the demand for arbitration shall have been refused or disregarded by a debtor country.

The sensitiveness of the United States in matters concerning the hegemony of the Caribbean Sea was manifested on two occasions in 1912 and 1913. In 1912 a rumour circulated that land had been purchased by a Japanese trading concern in Magdalena Bay in Southern California on Mexican Territory. Public opinion was aroused and the United States opposed the project. Likewise, when in 1913 a representative of an English firm sought to obtain a concession for the exploitation of oil fields in Columbia, the American Government stepped in and prevented the success of the negotiations. The purpose of the United States, to tolerate no possibility of intervention on the part of a foreign nation in the Caribbean, was shown once more in the treaty imposed upon the Republic of Haiti in 1915. The latter undertook not to give away through sale, lease or otherwise any portion of her territory to a foreign government, and not to conclude any contract with a foreign power

which might injure her independence. The United States had also concluded in 1914 with Nicaragua a treaty that submitted her to a political regime analogous to that of Cuba. Furthermore, Nicaragua granted to the United States, in consideration of a payment of 3 million dollars, the exclusive right to build a canal by the so-called Nicaragua route, and also the permission to establish a naval base in the adjoining islands, and another in Fonseca Bay for the protection of the Panama Canal.

If Europe has bowed before the policy of hegemony plainly affirmed by the United States in and around the Caribbean, such a dictatorial policy could not but arouse some ill-feeling among the republics of Latin-America, three of which at least, Argentine, Brazil and Chile are already great nations. These republics accept aid from the United States but they refuse to submit to its tutelage.

The expansion of the United States has not been directly brought about by conquest. With the doubtful exception of Porto Rico, there is scarcely a square mile of all the possessions of the United States that was originally won by the sword and continuously held by arms. The United States paid 20 million dollars for the Philippines, which the Spaniards were not sorry to part with—if one may credit the report that the islands would have been sold to Germany in case the United States had not insisted on buying them herself. And then finally in 1904 the United States purchased the canal zone from Panama, although it must be admitted that the United States were very prompt in recognising the independence of the revolting State.

Every one of these additions of territory of the United States was bitterly opposed by an influential

section of the American public. The Federalists, for example, were loud and fierce in their denunciation of Jefferson for the Louisiana purchase, which indeed is to be credited rather to Livingstone than to Jefferson himself. Forty years later, the hostility to the admission of Texas into the Union and to the purchase of California was almost as intense. The frequent proposals made before the Civil War for the purchase of Cuba never succeeded in winning popular approval; and even after the Civil War, when President Grant negotiated the annexation of San Domingo in 1870, the treaty was not ratified. The opposition to the retention of the Philippines was equally bitter and even more persistent. And here, plainly, the opposition had far more justification. It was one thing to expand by the inclusion of contiguous and thinly populated territory, and it was quite another thing to acquire a group of islands separated from the United States by thousands of miles. The Americans are not trained, by tradition and by experience, in the art of governing races of another colour; and they have no adequate machinery for this purpose—a purpose which they cannot help feeling to be foreign to the spirit of their institutions and they have no settled policy of remote acquisitions inherited and consecrated by time. Withal, the Americans have set an example of firm and yet liberal rule in governing alien races of the tropics.

One must never allow oneself to forget that everywhere and always men dislike being governed except by men of their own race and of their own choice, tacit or expressed. All men detest the rule of the alien, no matter how richly endowed with good intentions the foreign governors may claim to be. So long as the Americans believe in the Declaration of Independence,

so long as they are willing to be guided by the farewell address of Washington and the second inaugural speech of Lincoln, they will find themselves in a false position if they persist in ruling distant and alien people. The Americans have not the political machinery for ruling alien races; and to attempt to rule them is not in accord with their political ideals, which compel them to base their form of government on the consent of the governed. (See President Wilson's speeches on the 14 points.) Quite possibly it would be better for the Mexicans if the United States controlled Mexico, but it is for the Mexicans, as it is for the Cubans, to work out their own political salvation as best as they can.

The Constitutional Basis of Expansion.

The American constitution was not framed to cover the questions of colonies and their status. The makers of the constitution foresaw that the Union would eventually comprise more than the thirteen original states. They made provision, however, that new states might be admitted by Congress, and that any territory belonging to the United States, if not admitted to Statehood, should be governed in such a way as Congress might decide. The constitution did not, however, in express terms bestow on Congress the right to acquire new territory, and in connection with the Louisiana purchase in 1803, it was urged that Congress had no such right. The Supreme Court in 1810, however, settled this question by asserting the doctrine that the United States, as a nation, has the right to acquire territory either by conquest or by treaty to the same extent that any other nation has that right.

The chain of judicial decisions commonly known as the Insular cases lay down the following general rules with reference to the constitutional questions connected with the outlying possessions of the U. S. According to these decisions, new territories belonging to the United States are from the date of their acquisition, parts of the country, not mere possessions, but only those, which, like Texas and Hawaii, have come in by the action of both branches of Congress, enjoy from the first the full rights of the American constitution. Territory obtained by a treaty, like that gained from Spain, is subject to legislation of Congress, as if it were a mere possession. Consequently tariff duties cannot be imposed on importation from Hawaii, but may be and were for a time on goods from Porto Rico and are still on those from the Philippines.

The United States pursues the policy of preferential trade relations with its colonies. American products enter all the insular possessions free except only in Samoa, where the indefinite maintenance of the open door is guaranteed by treaty. Likewise from all the insular possessions local products enter the United States free. The rates of the United States tariff are in force in Porto Rico; but the Philippines, Virgin Islands, Guam and Samoa have individual tariffs. In the Virgin islands the tariff of the Danish regime is temporarily continued in force. No export duties are levied in the insular possessions other than the Virgin Islands, and there they are uniform regardless of the destination of the products.

The Payne Act of 1909 provided for free trade between the United States and the Philippines subject to the restriction on some products, like sugar and tobacco. By the Underwood Act of October, 1913, however, complete free trade between the United

States and the Philippines was declared. The Jones Law authorises the Philippine legislature to enact tariff laws with reference to countries other than the United States, but tariff relations between the Philippines and the United States must be under the sole control of the Congress. The rates of tariff in the Philippines are fairly high. The average duty imposed is about 25 per cent. *ad valorem* on goods from foreign countries other than the United States. The tariff on rice is fairly prohibitive. In the year 1918, the import duties of the Philippines amounted to Pesos 23,479,736.56. The total trade of the Philippines in 1920 was 300 million dollars. Roughly speaking two-thirds of the business of the country, or about 200 million dollars, is with the United States and one-third with all other countries. The proportion of gross business done with the United States has been steadily increasing. As the trade with the United States pays no custom duties, the result is that the total customs revenue has shown a tendency to fall off, while the cost of collection shows a steady increase; on the other hand if the Philippines were to levy duties on American goods also, Filipino goods would have to pay heavy customs duties when exported to the United States, such as sugar, to the extent of \$40 million in 1920, cigars to the value of \$10½ million, the duty on which would have been in the United States about \$30 million and on other articles. Further analysis of the customs shows that the principal articles exported in 1920, measured in value, were Copra \$2,565,438, Hemp in which the Philippine islands have a virtual monopoly \$35,632,000, Cocoanut oil, \$23,268,085, Sugar, \$49,619,025, and Tobacco \$12,721,028.

CHAPTER VIII.

AMERICAN POLICY IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

The Philippine archipelago consists of approximately 3,000 islands, with a total area of 115,026 square miles or about the size of the British Isles or Italy or Norway, and only a little smaller than Japan itself. The population in 1903 was 7,635,426 while in 1921 it was 10,956,000 or roughly an increase of 3 millions or over 50 per cent. during these 18 years of American rule. Of the total population 9,350,240 or about 90 per cent. are Christians (Catholics), while the rest consist of 434,868 Mohammadans, 540,054 Pagans, and 25,568 Buddhists. The foreign population of the Philippines is 83,145 of whom 55,212 or nearly three-fourths are Chinese (who are now excluded by immigration laws), 12,636 Japanese, 6,931 Americans, 4,271 Spanish and 1,202 British and all others 2,893 including French, Germans, and Swiss. The population of the Philippines is little more than that of Belgium or Canada.

Historical.

The Philippines were a dependency of various Hindu-Malayan empires in Indo-China, Sumatra, and Borneo from about 200 to 1325 A.D. The Indian influence seems to have extended as far as the Philippines during this period. From 1325 to 1405 the islands were subject to the Japanese empire of Mael Japahit. Shortly after 1400, Mohammadanism was introduced, but politically the islands were subject

to China during the reign of the Mung emperors from 1405-1440. From 1440 to 1565 Northern Luzon was subject to Japan, from Manila south it was subject to Mohammadan Borneo. Commercial relations also existed between the Philippines and Japan, India, Siam, Cambodia, the Malay Peninsula, Java, Sumatra, Borneo, and the Moluccas. Before the arrival of the Spaniards, the Filipinos had already attained a considerable degree of culture, which though bearing the unmistakable impress of Hindu influence, was uniformly Malayan. On March 16th 1521, the Philippines were discovered by Magellan in his attempt to reach the Moluccas by a western route. This date is important because it marks the beginning of the christianization of the Archipelago and of the introduction into the islands of western culture. During 1762-63, the Islands were seized by England, which sent an expedition from Madras, but they were restored to Spain by the treaty of Paris 1763. The British captured Manila and ruled it for three years under Alexander Dalrymple, in the middle of the 18th century. From these various partial conquests of the Philippines, there remains to-day a strong influence on the native customs, language, and religion, *i.e.*, the Mohammadan religion from Indian and Arabic sources, a dominant Chinese influence in commerce and trade, Christianity, Roman Law, and many features of civilization from Spanish sources. Racially, the mass of the Filipino population is of Malayan stock, though other types are to be found especially among the 10 per cent. of non-Christians. Chinese and Spanish race mixtures are common among the wealthy and better educated classes, this mixture seeming to strengthen the native stock. The inhabitants of Borneo, Sumatra, Java,

Formosa, and in some measure Indo-China (the Malay Groups) are racially the most nearly related to the Filipinos. Though most of the progressive and intelligent people know either Spanish or English, yet there is no common language in the Philippines even to-day. There are eight languages in the islands, each of which is used by not less than 500,000 people, and some seventy odd more which are used by smaller groups. Some of these dialects are so radically different that they are mutually unintelligible, so that English and Spanish may be said to be the common languages of the islands. The Philippine Public School system under the American rule has aimed to teach the Filipino children to speak English, so that it may become the common language of the people.

The dawn of the 19th century brought significant changes that had far-reaching results. From 1763 down to 1898 the islands were subject to Spanish rule. During the periods 1810-1813, 1820-1823, and 1830-1837, as a result of the nationalistic and liberal struggles Spain was going through, the Cortes was revived and representatives from different parts of the monarchy—the colonies included—were given seats therein. This naturally ushered in a period of constitutional and representative government for the Philippines. Moreover, by 1830, the Spanish commercial policy of trade exclusiveness for the colonies may be said to have come to an end in the Philippines. A few years later, Manila was thrown open to foreign trade and a freer and more liberal economic system adopted. In this way, the foundation for later political and economic growth and progress was laid.

The last decades of Spanish rule were marked by several reforms, but these reforms were altogether too conservative and came too late. The progress from

below was going on much faster than the reforms from above. Consequently there was much discontent and the Filipinos in August 1896 rose in revolt and sought to declare themselves independent of Spain. The rebellion was checked by the signing of the Pact of Biacuabato in December 1897, only to be renewed early in the year following. The Americans appeared on the scene May 1st, 1898, and on August 13th Manila surrendered to the American Commander Dewey, after simultaneous attacks by the American and Filipino forces. Meanwhile a Filipino Government had been established. This Government till late in 1899 was in control of the whole archipelago with the exception of Manila, Cavite, and a few other places which Spanish garrisons still held.

The United States obtained possession of the islands by conquest in 1898. The islands were formally transferred to the United States by Spain in the treaty of Paris, by the terms of which the United States paid Spain a sum of 20 million dollars for the transfer of the islands to the American sovereignty. Almost immediately, President McKinley announced that the Philippine islands would not be exploited for the aggrandizement of the American people in the following terms:—

“The Philippines are ours not to exploit, but to develop, to civilize, to educate, to train in the science of self-government. This is the path which we must follow or be recreant to a mighty trust committed to us.”

The 23 years of American occupation may be divided into the following four distinct periods:—First, the military period, from August 13, 1898 to July 1st 1901. During this period the islands were under a military governor and the insurrection against the

United States, headed by General Aguinaldo, was suppressed. Substantial beginnings were also made in the establishment and maintenance of a civil government, particularly in the opening of schools, in which the first teachers were non-commissioned officers of the army, in the establishment of the Judiciary and also in the matter of public health and public works. Organisation order No. 58 of 1900 of General Otis laid broad and secure foundations for the establishment of a civil government.

The second period is the organisation period from August 1st 1901, to October 16th 1907, and the third the constructive period from 1907 to 1913, while the period from 1914 down to the present day is the period of Filipinization. In view of the difficult situation which existed after the insurrection, the differences of languages, customs, and the conceptions of citizenship obligation, the progress which has been made in the 23 years of American occupation is extraordinary. It is a high tribute to Americans and Filipinos alike. The animosities have disappeared and there remains a spirit of confidence and friendliness for the American people. Much has been done, but much remains to be done. The great bulk of the Filipinos (Christians) have a desire for independence. Most of them desire independence under the protection of the United States, a small percentage desire immediate independence with separation from the United States. The non-Christians, constituting about 10 per cent. of the total population of the island, are for continued American control.

During the War with Spain, the American army and navy occupied both Porto Rico and the Philippines, and in the two years following, (till September 1st 1900) the islands continued under military government,

subject to the final control of the Secretary of State for War of the United States Government. During this interval a commission was sent to the Philippine islands to study conditions and to report upon a system of civil government for the islands, and its recommendations became the basis of later action by the United States Congress. Meanwhile, President McKinley also appointed a civil commission to serve temporarily as a legislative body for the island while executive powers remained with the military governor. Up to 1902, Congress took no action in the matter of a permanent scheme of Government for the Philippines. The President of the United States controlled the administration of the island by virtue of his power as Commander-in-Chief of the army. But in order to remove any possible doubt as to the legality of this situation, Congress in March 1901 by the so-called Spooner Amendment, gave the President in express terms "all the military, civil and judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippines until otherwise provided". The combination of military, executive and legislative powers of the commission continued however until September 1st 1901, when William H. Taft was appointed the first civil governor of the islands. Meanwhile various administrative departments were organised and a beginning was made towards the reconstruction of local self-government.

Local Self-Government.

During the first period—the period of military rule from 1898 to 1900—the Americans also introduced institutions of Local Self-Government, as one section of the McKinley instructions to the second Philippine Commission reads as follows :—"Without hampering

them by too specific instructions, they (the Taft commission) should in general be enjoined after making themselves familiar with the conditions and needs of the country, to devote their attention in the first instance to the establishment of Municipal Governments in which the natives of the islands both in the cities and in the rural communities shall be afforded the opportunity to manage their own local affairs to the fullest extent of which they are capable and subject to the least degree of supervision and control ” In pursuance of this policy, municipalities have been organised since 1901 and classified into first, second, third and fourth classes according to the population, with a larger number of councillors for the more populous ones. There are to-day over 900 municipalities and the majority of them are more rural than urban in their social and economic make-up. During the Spanish era, municipal institutions existed in the Philippines, though they were controlled to a large extent either by the local Spanish priest or by the local Spanish military officer. The United States Army authorities took over this directing control in local affairs during the period of military occupation. But as soon as Civil Government was established in 1901, a large measure of autonomy was given to these municipalities. Each municipality has an elective Council of 8 to 18 members. The Municipal Council was not a new institution among the Filipinos, because some sort of deliberative council is to be found in all Malay villages, regardless of their state of civilization. The election of this council by direct vote of the people was a new departure, but in the main by the new method of election the same individuals who had been community leaders in previous years were elected. It is only recently that the younger Filipinos from the

public schools have been able to oust the elders from community control and inaugurate an era of modern municipal development. Prior to 1903, the Philippine municipal council was quite independent of the provincial board, but the very strong tendency of these councils to spend all municipal funds for salaries and to pass ordinances in direct conflict with insular laws caused the passage of an Act in May 1903, which gave the provincial board the right to veto municipal ordinances and executive orders of the municipal president that were in conflict with the general law. Even that Act did not prevent the passage of occasional ordinances or the issue of occasional executive orders that were put into effect without being submitted to the provincial board for approval. Consequently in 1907 provincial supervision was made more complete by an act of the Philippine Commission requiring that all municipal ordinances and all executive orders be serially numbered and sent to the provincial board within thirty-six hours after their passage. In case the municipal authorities were dissatisfied with the reasons for the veto by the provincial board, they could appeal to the Governor-General for a final decision. Another important limitation of the power of the municipal councils was that part of General order No. 40 of the Military Governor in 1900 which has been re-enacted in every issue of the municipal code since that time. This clause reads in part as follows:—

“ There shall not be expended during any calendar year for salaries and wages of Municipal officials and employees, of every description, excluding those employed on public works, in Municipalities of the first class more than 50 per cent., in Municipalities of second class more than 60 per cent., in Municipalities of the third class more than 65 per cent.,

and in Municipalities of fourth class more than 75 per cent., of the annual revenues accruing to the Municipal general fund during the said calendar year Providing, however, that the provincial board, by and with the approval of the Governor-General, may by resolution authorize any incorporated municipality to exceed the foregoing percentage upon such conditions and under such limitations as may be prescribed by such resolution."

The Administrative Code of 1917 changed this section only to the extent of giving the final approving authority to the Filipino Secretary of the Interior, instead of to the Governor-General as heretofore. This slight change in the administrative laws was one of the fore-runners of the responsible-ministry controversy.

The municipal council and the municipal executive (President) are elected under the provisions of the new election law of 1900, which provides that an elector must be a male citizen of 23 years of age, and either a former official under the Spanish regime, a tax payer to the extent of Rs. 45 (\$15) a year, or a person who could speak, read and write English or Spanish. This age limit was reduced to 21 years in 1916. Women have no votes in the Philippines. The first elections of 1903 and 1905 were full of frauds and irregularities. From 1908 onwards, however, the elections have been conducted more satisfactorily, partly because of the increased experience in popular elections by both the voters and the election-officials, and partly because of a general elevation of public opinion in the matter of fair elections. Improvement in elections and the evolution of the electorate indicate, better than any other activity, the development of political consciousness among the Filipinos, and the progress they achieved

towards a popular system of government. The number of registered voters increased from 2.4 per cent. of the population represented in 1903, to 7 per cent. of the population in 1922. Of these registered voters about 96 per cent. actually vote. It is not easy to ascertain what per cent. of those who could vote do not register. But of those who do register, it is clear that there is no more indifference on election day in the Philippines than in France or even Great Britain. The number of voters qualified under the literacy test in 1905 was only 40 per cent. of the total, whereas in 1916 the literate voters made up 57 per cent. of the total and in 1919, 78 per cent. of the total. The number of votes cast at the general election in 1919 was 672,122 out of a total population of 10 million. Stated in more general terms, the electorate up to 1905 was largely the aristocratic and property owning class, and this class was only about half-literate. Whereas in 1922, the electorate consisted mainly of the products of the Philippine public schools of the last 23 years. It will be seen that political evolution in the Philippines is the result of the general education of the masses through the splendid work of the Philippine public schools. Even the most poverty stricken and isolated municipalities have been provided with practically the same facilities for primary education as the wealthier and more populous urban communities like Manila, Cebu, and Iloilo. The system of effective local self-government that obtains to-day in the Philippines is due to the excellent system of education that the Americans established and maintain in the islands.

Manila, the capital and the largest city in the islands, is governed by the provisions of a separate Act which provides for a board of six commissioners, of

whom three are appointed by the Governor-General with the assent of the Philippine Commission, one is a member *ex-officio* (City engineer) and two are elected by the people of the City. In the event of a deadlock in the board, the Governor-General is empowered to appoint a seventh member. This board has the usual powers of an American City Government. It appoints the city officials, enacts the local ordinances and controls the various administrative departments such as public works, police, health, and schools, but the city's budget does not become effective until approved by the Philippine Commission.

In July 1902, came the next step, when the United States Congress passed the Philippine Civil Government Act which remained in force till 1916, when the Jones Act was passed. The chief provisions of the Philippine Act of 1902 were as follows :—

The executive power was vested in a Governor-General (appointed by the President of the United States with the consent of the Senate) and in the heads of the administrative departments who were similarly appointed by the President of the United States. These administrative officials were also members of the Philippine Commission, which included along with them four other persons named by the President of the United States. This commission also remained the sole legislative body of the islands until 1907. Since that time it has served as the Upper Chamber of the legislature. Five departments were authorised by the Act of which only four were established, namely, those of (1) Interior, (2) Commerce and Police, (3) Finance and Justice, and (4) Public Instruction. Each was in charge of a commissioner with several bureaus within his department.

The Act of 1902 did not provide for the immediate establishment of an elective assembly or House of Representatives. It merely stipulated that such a body should be called within a certain time after the islands had been pacified and a census taken. These conditions were eventually fulfilled, and the first Philippine Assembly met at Manila on October 16th, 1907. The most significant landmark, along the onward march of Filipino representative government, was the inauguration of this Philippine Assembly in 1907. This Assembly consisted of not fewer than 50 nor more than 100 assemblymen chosen by the voters of the islands for a two years term. The voters included all male citizens 23 years of age or over (reduced to 21 years of age since 1916), who had any one of the following qualifications (1) speak, read and write either English or Spanish, (2) own property worth 500 pesos (£50) or pay not less than 30 pesos (£3) in taxes, or (3) appointment to any office of importance during the Spanish regime.

The right to vote did not extend to those who have remained subjects of Spain. The proportion of registered voters to the total population was less than 4 per cent., while in the United States under the manhood suffrage principle it runs from 15 to 20 per cent.

The Philippine legislature was made up since 1907, of two chambers the Commission and the Assembly. The powers of the latter include the levy of taxes, the making of laws, the borrowing of money, and the voting of annual appropriations. The elected Assembly gradually drifted into a position of permanent disagreement with the American controlled Commission, *i.e.*, the Upper Chamber and the Executive. In 1913, the Commission rejected 66 per cent. of the 131 bills sent to it by the Assembly,

while the Lower House refused to pass 71 per cent. of the 61 measures which originated in the Commission. Finally the Assembly refused to pass the annual appropriation bill—as happened in India and elsewhere frequently—though there is the usual provision that in case of the legislature's failure to make appropriations, the sums voted for the preceding year are available for carrying on the government. The Governor-General has no veto power, and indeed the Act of 1902 made no provision as to the term, responsibility, or special powers of this official. Such matters were left and still remain in the hands of the President. All laws made by the Philippine legislature must be transmitted to Washington, where the United States Congress may declare them void, but practically Congress never takes such action. Two delegates from the Philippines, chosen every two years by the Philippine legislature, are entitled to sit but not to vote in the House of Representatives at Washington. One delegate from Porto-Rico elected by popular vote has also the right to sit in the House of Representatives but has no right to vote in that body.

The first great period of American rule in the Philippines, therefore, ended with the Filipino Assembly in apparently hopeless dead-lock with the American controlled branches of the Government, as happened in India recently. It is at this crisis that President Wilson came into power and ordered that the Filipinos should at once be given a majority in the Philippine Commission and thus put them in control of both Houses of the Philippine Legislature. The dead-lock between the Filipinos and the Americans was thus broken, partially by the appointment of a majority of Filipinos to the Upper House of the Legislature, and partially because the new

Governor-General Harrison, appointed by President Wilson in 1913, exercised the powers of his office from the outset in accordance with the wishes of the Filipino leaders in matters which concerned the domestic affairs of the islands. If the British Government follows a similar statesman-like policy in India, the present dead-locks both in the Central and Provincial Governments can be soon broken to the mutual profit and advantage of both England and India.

The new Governor-General Harrison possessed a brilliant intellect, great personal charm and sympathy, and an entire absence of race-prejudice. He held office for a period of 8 years from 1913 to 1921, and during this period the process of Filipinization was extended to practically every branch of the insular, provincial and municipal Governments. Within nine months of the assumption of his office, 275 Americans holding high positions had been replaced by Filipinos, and in the eight years following, the number of Americans in the entire Government had been reduced to less than 4 per cent. of the total of officials and employees. Most of the remaining Americans were either technical experts or school teachers. The "New Era" inaugurated by Harrison was soon spoken of with enthusiasm by Filipinos and with bitterness and derision by a majority of the American residents of the islands. The American policy of Filipinization in the Philippines is a great example of what even a foreign Government imbued with honesty and sympathy can do for a dependency. The British Government in its policy of Indianisation has not been able to accomplish even a fraction of such good results in India during the last 25 years

as the American Government did during the short space of eight years in the Philippines, inspite of the fact that more educated, trained and capable men are available in India than in any other dependency in the World.

A system of local government has also been established in the islands under the Act of 1902. There are 36 regular provinces, each with a provincial Governor and certain administrative officials assisting him. The provincial Governor is elected every two years by a convention made up of the councillors of the municipalities within the province; the administrative officials are selected under the civil service regulations, and appointed by the Governor-General. The functions of the provincial governments are to look after the collection of taxes, to care for the main-roads, and to supervise the workings of the municipal authorities. The taxes, after they are collected, go in part to the insular treasury, in part to the Municipalities, and in part to the provinces, but the province is the chief unit for collecting them. Twelve other non-Christian provinces are entirely under the control of the Philippine commission and have no local governments of their own. The Provincial Board, that forms the legislative body in the Province (by the Act 2,586 enacted in 1916), consists of three elected members including the governor (elected), the provincial treasurer and another member elected by popular vote.

American policy in the Philippines up to 1916 may be summarized as follows :—

First, to instruct the Filipino people in methods of free institutions and self-government and to make a government partly of Americans and partly of Filipinos.

This policy was evolved into one of a government of Filipinos assisted by a few Americans. During 1913-1916, there was a Filipino majority in the Philippine Commission. During this period, the Filipinos were for the first time able to carry legislation even against the policy of the American Governor-General and administrations. Since the passage of the Jones Act in 1916, there is now complete Filipino autonomy in the municipal and provincial governments, complete legislative autonomy and practically complete Filipino executive administration (the Governor-General and the vice governor, being the only two Americans in the higher executive branch of the government). With an elected house and Senate, legislation since 1916 became increasingly radical in its paternalism and the entry of government into business enterprises such as the ownership of railroads, banks, development companies, and industrial concerns like coal, cement, etc. Another tendency in recent legislation has been the effort to take away from the American officers of the government supervision of the different branches of the government, and put it into the departments controlled by Filipinos. Act 2666 of the Philippine legislature provides that the secretaries of all departments (all cabinet members) must be Filipinos, against the provision of the Jones Act which requires that the Vice-Governor and the Secretary of Public Instruction must be an American and that the health duties should be under this officer. The Philippine legislature has endeavoured to evade this, by transferring the management of all government hospitals to the department of the interior, and by creating and placing in the same department a board of pharmaceutical officers, a board of optical examiners, etc.

The Home Government of the Philippines in the U. S.

The treaty of Paris 1900, a part of the supreme law of the United States, conferred the final exclusive power of determining the future of the Philippines upon Congress by providing that the civil rights and political status of the inhabitants of the territories thereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the United States Congress. The United States Supreme court has used, since the time of Marshall in 1810, emphatic language in affirming the "general," "plenary," "sovereign," "discretionary" and "supreme," power of Congress to govern the territories and possessions. As a matter of necessity, until Congress can act, the President has the right to issue orders for the government of acquired territory. Thereafter, the government of the new territory belongs primarily to Congress and secondarily to such agencies as Congress may establish. Congress may exercise its discretionary legislative functions over territories directly from Washington or indirectly through organised rule. It may legally transfer its power to a local legislative body. Congress, however, has expressly extended to the Philippines all the basic principles of the American constitutional system such as those relating to religious worship, personal liberty, individual property, freedom of speech and press, free access to the courts of justice, due process of law, and equal protection of laws, etc., with the exception of the rights of trial by jury and the bearing of arms. Though the sovereignty of Congress over territories and dependencies is unlimited, (except for the bill of rights expressly granted,) in practice Congress has not adopted a policy of petty interference with the territories and the insular administration in the Philippines.

The islands are practically removed from the field of congressional action, though Congress has the theoretical right of nullifying what it has once created. The Philippine Act of 1902 provided "that all laws passed by the government of the Philippine islands shall be reported to Congress, which hereby reserves the power and authority to annul the same." With a slight change in phraseology, the Jones Act of 1916 continued the same provision. This does not mean that acts of the Philippine legislature are suspended until approved by the Congress. On the contrary, Acts of the Philippine legislature are valid acts, until disapproved by the United States Congress, or held invalid by the courts. It means that the United States Congress retains the right of legislative veto, much in the same fashion as the British Parliament may annul any acts of the colonial legislatures.

Presidential control over the Philippines is exercised by the President of the United States through the War Department, and the Bureau of Insular Affairs, and the Governor-General of the Philippine islands. The Congress of the United States has created two agencies to serve the United States in the Philippines. One is the Government of the Philippine islands, and the other is the United States Army. These two agencies, the civil and military branches of the United States Government, act under the general supervision of the President of the United States. In other words the President of the United States possesses executive control over both the civil government of the Philippines and the military forces in the islands. He has the first power by virtue of the power of appointment and removal of all the high officials including the Governor-General, and the enforcement of the positive provisions of the laws. The Governor-General is responsible for

his administration to the people of the United States through the President. The Commanding General in the Philippines is likewise responsible for his administration through the Secretary of War to the President. The President of the United States has a general executive control and supervision over the government of the Philippines, and such control does not necessarily include the veto power over Acts of the Philippine legislature unless expressly authorised by law to do so. Sections 9 and 10 of the Jones Act of 1916 make his approval necessary before bills relating to the public lands, timber, mining, the tariff, immigration and the currency can become laws. The President also is the final arbiter in case of appeal of the Philippine legislature from a veto by the Governor-General.

Both the Attorney-General of the Philippine islands, and the attorney-general of the United States have definitely held that "the government for the Philippine islands should be regarded as a branch of the War department." Cabinet officers other than the Secretary for War, as for instance the Post-master General, in an attempt to issue orders to the Bureau of Posts of the Philippine islands have no authority over the government of the islands. Exceptions are the Secretary of the Treasury, who, through the United States Public Health service, has control over the Bureau of Quarantine service, and the coast and geodetic survey of the United States. All other regulations from Washington, of whatever sort, pass through the War department. The Secretary for War is also granted certain positive powers, as the right to make final decision on appeals from the ruling of the Insular treasurer confirmed by the Governor-General. The Philippine Autonomy Act would permit the United States President to place the Philippine government under some

department other than the War department, if he so desired.

To assist the Secretary for War in administrative supervision of the Insular possessions, there was early created (1901) a division of Insular affairs. The Philippine Act of 1902, continuing the Division as the "Bureau of Insular affairs of the War Department" provided that "the business assigned to the said bureau shall embrace all matters pertaining to civil government in the island possessions of the United States, subject to the jurisdiction of the War Department." The chief of the Bureau of Insular affairs is appointed by the President of the United States for a period of four years; while holding office, he has the rank and pay of a Brigadier-general. Two assistants, one with the rank of Colonel and the other of Major, are assigned to the Bureau. The Bureau of Insular Affairs, thus has some resemblance to the colonial offices of England and France. Its supervision extends to the purely Civil administrations in the Philippines and Porto Rico, (formerly to Cuba and Santo Domingo also). It furnishes the President, the Secretary for War, Congress, and the public of the United States with information as to the Philippines and Porto Rico. A former assistant chief of the Bureau gives the duties of this bureau as follows:—

"The Bureau constitutes the official repository of information, concerning these dependent people, and its chief advises and consults with the Secretary for War regarding all Federal matters affecting our island possessions. Most of the legislation proposed in Congress is prepared or suggested by the Bureau and submitted by the Secretary for War The Financial operations of these governments especially the Philippines place a direct responsibility upon the

War department, first in floating bond issues, second in guarding their deposits in this country, and third in purchasing supplies which are required by the government and are either unobtainable in Manila or San Juan or only at prohibitive prices In its relation to the operative personnel of the Philippine government, the Bureau upon the recommendations usually of the Governor-General, or the bureau primarily concerned, selects all but the highest officials, who are appointed in the United States. (Major Hunt, October 23rd, 1920). All administrative orders from Washington come through the Bureau of Insular Affairs. In so far as the Bureau of Insular Affairs and the War department have anything to do with policies, the aim "has been to foster autonomous governments in the islands subject to its jurisdiction, to avoid interference with the governments there established, and to protect such governments in so far as possible from interference by other departments and branches of our government." (Memorandum, War Department, March 4th 1914).

Resident Commissioners to the United States.

The Act of Congress of 1902 has provided for two Resident commissioners to the United States, to be chosen at the first meeting of the Philippine legislature, which first met in 1907. These positions were created to offset the control of the President and Congress by giving the Filipino people representation in the United States. The Philippines in this respect were placed in the category of territories. They are chosen by the Philippine House of Representatives and Senate voting separately. This method results, in practice, in the lower house selecting one commissioner and the upper

house the other. In case of a vacancy, the Governor-general of the Philippine islands makes a temporary appointment until the meeting of the Philippine legislature. The term of office was first two years, later changed to four years beginning with March 4th, 1913 and now by the Jones Act fixed at three years, beginning with March, 4th 1917 and triennially thereafter. The salary is \$7,500 per annum, plus another \$1,500 allowance. These moneys come out of the Treasury of the United States. The Philippine legislature also provides for a private Secretary for each of the resident commissioners, a portion of whose salaries are paid out of insular funds.

The Resident Commissioners have seats in the United States House of Representatives, and the right to be heard, but not to vote. They are also entitled to official recognition by all the departments of the United States government. The Commissioners also act as a clearing house of information for the thousands of Filipinos sojourning in the United States for reasons of business, education, or pleasure. They also look after the four cadets maintained by the Philippine government at the United States Military Academy and the United States Naval Academy respectively. Their chief function has been to voice the needs and aspirations of the Filipinos before the United States Congress, before the President, and before the American people. All Filipino relations with the United States are thus entrusted to these two Resident Commissioners, who act as a kind of ambassador between the United States and the Philippines. How effectively they have been discharging this function may be seen by the strength and vitality of the Independence campaign they have waged in the United States during the last few years.

The High Commissioner for India in London corresponds in some respects to the position of the Philippine Resident Commissioners at Washington. The chief difference is that the latter are elected by the Philippine legislature and have seats in the United States Congress, while the High Commissioner for India has no seat in either House of the British Parliament, and is moreover, appointed by the Government of India without being elected by the Indian Legislature. The advantages of a representative High Commissioner elected by the Indian Legislature to sit in the House of Commons and represent the Indian point of view cannot be over-estimated in establishing cordial and friendly relations between England and India. The wisdom of this procedure may be judged by its success in the United States.

CHAPTER IX.

HOME RULE IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

The Jones Act of 1916.

The Act of Congress of August 29th, 1916 is popularly known to some, by the name of its principal author, as the Jones Law, and is also known as the Philippine Autonomy Act. This law is the Organic Act for the Philippines and takes the place of a constitution or the fundamental law. It was the result of nearly three years of careful and thoughtful consideration by the U. S. Congress. There was a general agreement as to the administrative and legislative features of the bill. The preamble caused the only pronounced divergence of opinion. As the bill passed the House on October 14th, 1914, it promised ultimate independence for the Philippines and extended the powers of internal self-government. The Senate failed to take up the bill at that session. On the opening of the succeeding Congress, the Senate Committee on the Philippines reported a Philippine Bill differing slightly from the House Bill. During the debate in the Senate, what is known as the Clarke amendment, granting independence in not less than two nor more than four years, with a further provision that the President might extend the time and again submit the subject to Congress, was attached, and passed by the Senate in that form through the deciding vote of the Vice-President. The House rejected the Senate Bill with the Clarke Amendment. Thereupon a conference

committee of the two chambers agreed upon a bill, and in that form it passed and was signed by the President.

The preamble of the Act announces in a formal manner the Philippine policy of the United States. The Filipinos consider the preamble to the Jones Act as in the nature of an international covenant. A close student of its provisions says that the Jones Law has become a virtual international compact between the Americans and Filipinos, by means of which the Filipinos have accepted a temporary government under American Sovereignty, subject to the conditions, first that it shall be autonomous or chiefly in the hands of the Filipinos, and second that it shall be only preparatory to a complete independence, such independence to be granted "when a stable government can be established in the islands."

The Act provides for a framework of government for the Philippines, a Bill of Rights, and certain positive powers and prohibitions. The Act is a great improvement on the Act of 1902, as it provides for the broad delegation of Powers by Congress to the Philippine Government. This is also an advantage from an administrative point of view.

The Jones Act, as the Organic Act of the Philippines, is the centre piece of the Philippine constitution. The Philippine government is modelled after the Federal and State governments of the United States. Where the Filipinos have been free to act, their desire has been to improve upon their American model, so as not to perpetuate the defects of the American System. Intimate relationship between the executive and the legislature, the introduction of the budget system, and quite as much progress toward responsible government as is possible under existing conditions have resulted. The aim of the Filipinos seems to be to prepare the

way for a parliamentary system of government, as distinct from the Presidential type prevailing in the United States. The recognition of a Premier *de facto*, the inauguration of a Council of State, and the institution of the budget system are clear indications of this trend of Philippine affairs. It may be said that the Philippine system stands midway between the irresponsible American system and the responsible English system. The Jones Act is naturally modelled on the American Presidential system with a more or less personal division between the executive and the legislature. The creation of the Council of State, however, is a departure from the American system and an approximation to the British system of responsible government.

The Governor-General.

Supreme executive power is vested in the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. The Governor-General is an executive officer appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, and holds his office at the pleasure of the President and until his successor is chosen. He usually belongs to the same political party as the President of the United States. His salary is fixed by the Jones Law at \$36,000 or Rs. 1,08,000 per year. He is responsible, through the Secretary of War, to the President and the American people, for his acts. He is further subject to the restraint of removal or reversal by the President or the Secretary of War, and the rebuke of an informal and courageous public opinion. For many years the powers and duties of the Governor-General of the Philippine islands were not specifically stated in the Organic Acts. Even now, under the

Jones Act, he is given general supervision and control of all the departments and bureaus of the government of the Philippine islands. But, in addition, his powers are now clearly defined and specified as follows :—

The Governor-General appoints all important officials of the Philippine government by and with the consent of the Philippine Senate, with the exception of the Vice-Governor, the Justices of the Supreme Court, and the Auditors. The Wood-Forbes commission of 1921 recommended that in case of a deadlock between the Governor-General and the Philippine Senate in the confirmation of appointments, the President of the United States should be authorised to make and render the final decision. He has also the power to remove officials and to order an investigation of the conduct or of any action of persons in the government service. He is vested with the exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves, and remit fines and forfeitures. After due investigation he may order the deportation of a subject of a foreign power. He confirms the elections of Insular and provincial officials.

The Governor-General, finally, is considered as the head of a department, with direct control of the Bureau of Audits, the Bureau of Civil Service, and of unattached offices and branches of the Philippine government. He supervises the correspondence touching the foreign relations of the Philippines, such as correspondence with the Bureau of Insular Affairs, the United States consuls abroad, and the foreign consuls in the Philippine islands. Annually, and at other times, if necessary, the Governor-General is required to make official reports of the transactions of the government of the Philippine islands to the Secretary of War and through the latter to the President of the United States and the Congress. The Governor-General is

also the Commander-in-chief of the Philippine militia and constabulary, and of all other armed military forces maintained by the Philippine government. Although the constabulary is under the department of the Interior, yet by virtue of this provision, the Governor-General actually exercises more control over it.

In addition to these extensive powers, he has also the power (conferred on him by the Jones Act) to veto any legislation enacted by the Philippine legislature. A vetoed bill after its return to the legislature may be reconsidered and upon a two-thirds vote of the members elected to each house it can be again sent to the Governor-General. In case the Governor-General still refuses to approve it, then he will have to transmit it to the President of the United States, who has the final say on the matter. In the use of the veto, the Governor-General has really two capacities. When he vetoes a bill which he believes is impairing the exercise of the rights of American sovereignty, he is exercising that power in accordance with the spirit of the Jones Act, as the representative of the American Government in the islands, but when he vetoes a bill of purely domestic concern, he is considering himself a part of the legislative machinery, and unless his action is supported by an overwhelming public opinion it means interference with the legislative autonomy granted to the islands by the Jones Act. It is due to these considerations that the Governor-General has not often exercised his veto power. Governor-General Harrison vetoed only three bills and that was done during the first year of the Jones Act. Since that time he did not exercise the veto power till March, 1921, just before he left the Philippines. The veto as an institution has always failed or has become obsolete

whenever it is exercised by an authority not responsible to the people, in a representative system of government.

Though the Governor-General is vested by law with large executive powers and the power of veto, he rarely acts in matters of domestic concern, except with the advice of the cabinet or council of state, as is the case in the English self-governing colonies. The extent of the autonomy granted to the English self-governing colonies and that given to the Filipinos under the Jones Act is strikingly similar. In English self-governing colonies the rule is that in all matters of local concern, the local authorities should be given a free hand, and in matters of imperial concern, the Metropolis, represented by the Governor should act. In the Philippines the American policy has been to give the Filipinos as large a control over their domestic affairs as will not impair the exercise of American sovereignty. The Governor-General has also the ordinance power, a function somewhat unusual under the American system.

The executive official next in rank to the Governor-General is the Vice-Governor. The latter like the Governor-General is appointed by the President with the consent of the United States Senate. He is according to the Jones law, the head of the department of Public Instruction, and performs such other duties as the Governor-General may assign to him. He acts as Governor-General in case of a vacancy in this office. Should both the Governor-General and the Vice-Governor be unable, for any reason, to perform the duties of the office of the Governor-General, the President of the United States names the head of one of the executive departments to act temporarily as Governor-General. The Governor-General and the Vice-Governor are the only two Americans holding important political positions in the Philippine government. The Wood-Forbes

commission of 1921 recommended that "the responsible representative of the United States, the Governor-General should have authority commensurate with the responsibilities of his position." They further recommended that in case of failure to secure the necessary action by the Philippine legislature, the United States Congress should declare null and void legislation which has been enacted diminishing, limiting, or dividing the authority granted to the Governor-General under Act No. 240 of the 64th Congress known as the Jones Act.

The Governor-General of the Philippine islands is assisted in his exercise of the executive power by various departments and bureaus of the Insular government. The Philippine legislature is authorized by appropriate legislation to increase the number or abolish any of the executive departments with the exception of the department of public instruction, provided that all executive functions of the government are kept directly under the Governor-General or within one of the executive departments under the supervision of the Governor-General. With the approval of Governor-General Harrison, more than 80 Acts were passed by the Philippine Legislature which curtailed or made impossible of exercise, powers granted to the Governor-General by the Jones Act. Most of these powers were vested by the Philippine Legislature either in the Council of State, i.e., a cabinet created in October 1918 by executive order, or in the 'Committee of Three,' or in the Legislature itself.

The Organic law only limits the power of the legislature by directing the establishment of a bureau of non-Christian tribes, and by providing that the bureau of education and the Philippine health service shall be in the department of public instruction. At present

there are six executive departments *i.e.*, (1) the department of Public Instruction, (2) the department of the Interior (3) the department of Finance, (4) the department of Justice (5) the department of Agriculture and natural resources and (6) the department of Commerce and Communications. In these departments are grouped the various insular bureaus and offices. At the head of each department is a secretary assisted by an under secretary, who with the exception of the secretary of public instruction must be a citizen of the Philippine islands. These six heads of departments (Secretaries) constitute the Philippine Cabinet. The secretaries of departments, excepting the secretary of Public Instruction, are appointed at the beginning of each legislative session with the consent of the Philippine Senate. That means the secretaries are chosen in obedience to the popular will as expressed in such triennial elections. Members of the legislature can become at the same time cabinet heads. Secretaries of departments may be summoned by either of the two houses of the legislature for the purpose of reporting on matters pertaining to their departments. They will have to explain and defend their official acts to the legislature. If the houses can demand of them that they give an account of their official acts, they are responsible to the Houses, though ultimately responsible to the Governor-General as they do not resign in case of a vote of lack of confidence.

Prior to the Jones Act of 1916, there was only one governmental organ responsible to the Filipinos *i.e.*, the Philippine Assembly. It represented the Filipino people and its Speaker was their official mouthpiece and as the President of the party in power had considerable political patronage. The Speaker also was officially recognised by Governor-General Taft as next in

rank to the Governor-General and succeeding Governors-General and Secretaries of War have transmitted the idea into a settled policy. •

Under the Jones Act, however, two other organs of government were entrusted to the Filipinos; to the lower elective Assembly was added an elective Senate, and the Philippine legislature was given the power to re-organise the executive departments with the exception of the department of Public Instruction. The new Act intends that these three organs of government, the lower house, the upper house, and the Filipino cabinet of executive heads, should be responsible mainly to the Filipino people instead of to the President of the United States. The fundamental defect of the Jones Act is the absence of the provision for the responsible and undivided leadership in these three organs of government and the lack of one single body with an effective responsibility to the people.

To remedy this defect, Governor-General Harrison created the Council of State by an executive order to aid and advise the Governor-General on matters of public importance. This body may consist of such persons as may from time to time be appointed and summoned by the Governor-General. It now consists of the Governor-General as presiding officer, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President of the Senate, and the six members of the Cabinet. The Governor-General rarely acts in matters of domestic concern without the advice of the Council of State. With the respective presidents of the two houses of legislature (or leaders of the legislature) in the Council of State, and with one other cabinet officer at the same time a member of the Philippine Senate, the recommendations of the executive can ordinarily be expected to receive a favourable response from the legislature. In

turn, the legislature has made the enforcement of certain statutes dependent on the action taken by the Council of State. The Council of State meets once a week, usually on Wednesdays. The Council elects its own Vice-President, who presides over the council in the absence of the Governor-General. The speaker of the House of Representatives is the most prominent Filipino official historically and has therefore been elected its Vice-President. The Council of State has thus been established, among other things, to solve the problem of responsible leadership in the government. It is a co-ordinating factor of the Filipino elements in the executive and legislative departments of the government, while not being at the mercy of the legislature. The Governor-General sees in it a representative council on which he can rely for advice on domestic questions. It has also the power to prepare and approve the budget before the Governor-General sends it to the legislature. It also decides upon the expenditure of the government funds as provided by the Philippine legislature for specific purposes, like universal free education and sending of government students abroad. Its approval may be required by law when the Governor-General issues rules and regulations supplementing ordinary legislation. It finally decides upon the policies of the different departments of the government. It will thus be seen that a great deal of power has been concentrated in the Council of State, though in the main its functions are advisory in nature either to the Governor-general or to the legislature. Its suggestions can be approved, rejected, or modified except in the matter of the budget. It has not the formal responsibility for measures introduced in the legislature. The actual influence it wields in legislation and administration is due to a large extent to

the presence of the two presiding officers of the legislature, who are vested, independently of the Council of State, with extraordinary powers and prerogatives. The Council of State is nothing but the cabinet enlarged, due to the fact that there are other officials in the government who are more representative than the cabinet members, such as the presiding officers of both Houses. By the creation of the Council of State, the cabinet is dead; it has been supplanted by, this more influential body. The personnel of the Council of State may change as a result of the triennial elections and the alignment of new parties.

The Philippine Legislature.

The legislative power in the Philippines is vested in a legislature composed of a Senate, and a House of Representatives, both elected almost entirely by the qualified voters of the islands. Organisation of the Philippine legislature is much the same as in the several states of the United States or in Congress. The Senate constitutes the upper house of the Philippine legislature. One of the Senators is elected by the House as President of the Senate. The Senate has 24 members, consisting of two Senators from each of the 12 Senatorial districts. All are elected for terms of six years, with the exception of two Senators to represent the mountain provinces and the non-Christian tribes, who are appointed by the Governor-General without the consent of the Senate and without restrictions as to residence or length of office. One half of the elective membership is changed every three years by election. A Senator must be a qualified elector, over thirty years of age and be able to read and write either Spanish or English. He must also be a resident of the Philippines for two consecutive years.

Besides law-making, the Senate has three administrative functions to perform :—

(1) It confirms the appointments made by the Governor-General.

(2) It has power of impeachment, and

(3) Its consent is necessary before the Governor-General can change the import duties on rice established by the Philippine Tariff Act.

The House of Representatives succeeded the Philippine Assembly. It constitutes the lower house of the legislature. One of the representatives is elected to the office of the Speaker. A secretary and sergeant-at-arms for each House are also chosen. It is composed of 91 members, 9 of whom are appointed by the Governor-General to represent the provinces inhabited by non-Christian people. There must be at least one representative from each of the 36 provinces. A representative must be over 25 years of age and have been resident in the district for at least one year immediately prior to his election.

The legislature meets on the 16th day of October and continues in session for 100 days, exclusive of Sundays. Special sessions may be called by the Governor-General for a period not longer than twenty days. As a result both of Congressional delegation and of Judicial construction, it has been definitely determined that the Philippine legislature has general legislative power which is not prohibited by the Jones Law or otherwise covered by Congressional legislation. The Philippine legislature has practically the same powers in the Philippine islands, within the sphere in which it may operate, as the Congress of the United States. Various constitutional prohibitions serve to restrict this power such as, (1) it cannot diminish, although it may increase, the jurisdiction of the

Supreme Court and Courts of first instance, (2) it cannot amend, alter or repeal the provisions regarding the appointment of senators and representatives, (3) it cannot legislate on the tariff relations between the Philippines and the United States—that is left exclusively in the hands of the Congress, (4) it cannot abolish the Bureaus of Education and of non-Christian tribes or the Philippine health service. (5) it cannot levy export duties, (6) it cannot violate the provisions of the bill of rights, (7) Congress reserved the power to alter, amend, or repeal any law, franchise, or rights granted by the Philippine legislature, (8) the Governor-General and in some cases the President can veto legislation. All bills relating to the tariff, public lands, timber and mining, immigration and the currency or coinage must receive the signature of the President of the United States before they may be made effective. The Jones Act says that if the President does not sign the bill within six months after it reaches Washington, then it becomes automatically a law. In general the Legislative Chambers are conducted with dignity and decorum and are composed of representative men. The Council of State, through its members who are at the same time members of the legislature, can introduce measures in the legislature. The legislative caucus of the majority party often decides which bills should be passed. The Governor-General is empowered by the Jones Act to veto not only legislation but also to veto any item of an Appropriation Act. He may strike out any amount of money which is carried in an appropriation bill without nullifying the other parts of the bill. If the Governor-General disapproves of a bill, the respective houses can reconsider the measure, and by a two thirds vote repass it. If the Governor-General does not approve the bill, even then,

the President of the United States has the final and absolute power of approval or disapproval. The most important power of the Philippine legislature is that of raising revenues for the support of the government and of distributing the revenues in annual appropriation bills. The United States constitution and many other constitutions contain a provision, not here in force, to the effect that all bills for raising revenues shall originate in the House of Representatives. The advantage resulting therefrom is believed to be that the people have a direct influence upon the popular branch of legislature. Although not laid down in the Philippine Organic law, the insistence of the Philippine Assembly and later of the House of Representatives has finally caused the upper chamber to recognise this privilege of the lower house.

A provision peculiar to Porto Rico and the Philippines and somewhat analogous to a provision found in the Japanese and other constitutions is that "if at the termination of any fiscal year the appropriation necessary for the support of the government for the ensuing fiscal year shall not have been made, the several sums appropriated in the last appropriation bill for the objects and purposes therein specified, in so far as the same may be done, shall be deemed to be re-appropriated for the several objects and purposes aforesaid." This provision was continued from the Act of 1902. The Wood-Forbes Mission of 1921 recommended that "under no circumstances should the American government permit to be established in the Philippine islands a situation which would leave the United States in a position of responsibility without authority."

The most salient feature of the Philippine Legislative system is the importance of the part played by the

presiding officers of both Houses. This has its historical explanation in the power of the Speaker of the Philippine Assembly, who like the Speaker of the United States Congress is a party leader. The American system was adopted in the Philippines with the added advantage for the Filipino Speaker that he was considered next in rank and importance to the Governor-General for he was the most representative Filipino official in the government. He was consequently given even greater prerogatives than the American Speaker. He was given control of greater contingent funds, he could appoint members of the Assembly to work during recess with daily allowances. All these prerogatives of the Speaker of the Assembly have been preserved to the present presiding officers of the Philippine legislature, with additions of further and greater powers. Together with the Governor-General they now form the most powerful committee in the government, a committee which is in many cases above the Council of State. This committee is in fact a super-cabinet. Its consent must be secured before funds for public improvements can be allotted by the Secretary of Commerce and Communications. It is the final judge as to the voting of emergency funds, which amounts to about 3 million pesos a year, and it even approves the contracts of University Professors. Add to these, the fact that they are now members of the Council of State—in fact its recognised leaders, the Speaker of the Lower House being also the Vice-President of Council of State, and we may realise the tremendous powers now wielded by the presiding officers of the Philippine legislature. In this fact lies at once the weakness and strength of the Philippine constitutional system. Whenever political leadership in a legislative body is placed in the presiding officer, the tendency is always

towards less discussion, and the house loses much of its deliberative character, for he controls legislation by his power of appointing committees, his control over the committee on rules and his power of recognition. This system also prevents the complete establishment of responsible leadership, which is one of the main reasons for the establishment of the Council of State.

If the two Houses are controlled by different political parties or presided over by two men antagonistic to each other, then the harmony of this super-cabinet will be disturbed and the balance of power in this super-cabinet will be in the hands of the Governor-General.

The Council of State on the other hand is the guide and leader in legislation, in as much as its members prepare and introduce many bills in the Houses, in addition to the exclusive right of the Council of State to prepare and initiate the budget. The Philippine Government, though modelled on the American system, is in practice following the English principle of making the executive responsible for legislation also. Herein lies the strength of the Council of State.

The Speaker of the House of Representatives is the *premier de facto* of the Philippine system, though no *premier de jure* has been formally appointed. The control of the legislature over the executive is secured by the requirement that the secretaries of the departments must appear before the Houses and answer questions or interpellations, give information and explain the budget. This legislation has served to make the members of the cabinet in part responsible to the legislature. The secretaries also have the right of appearing before the Houses to explain matters of policy. Prior to 1916, there was an elected legislature, with an irremovable executive as in India, resulting in frequent friction and deadlocks between the execu-

tive and the legislature. The system of government from 1913 to 1916 was like that of an English crown colony, with a representative but not responsible government. With the passing of the Jones Act in 1916, and the creation of the Council of State in 1918, the Philippine government to-day is approximating to the responsible system of government as in the self-governing colonies of the British Empire. The experience of the United States in the Philippines has proved conclusively once more that the representative system of government must either logically develop into a responsible form of government, or else revert back to the military form of government, if frequent deadlocks and friction between the elected legislature and the irremovable executive are to be avoided.

The Administration of Justice.

• The Philippine judicial system is modelled upon Anglo-American precedents. Judicial Power is vested in the Supreme Court of the Philippine islands, Courts of First instance, Courts of Justice of the Peace, and the Municipal Court of the city of Manila. In one sense, the Supreme Court of the United States may also be considered as a part of the Philippine judiciary as appeals lie to that court from the supreme court of the Philippine islands. Like the American Judiciary, the Philippine Judiciary will on occasion stand as the protector of the rights of the people, will punish official transgressions and will even declare laws to be invalid.

The Supreme Court of the Philippine islands consists of nine judges, the chief justice and eight associate justices. They are appointed by the President with the consent of the United States Senate and

serve during good behaviour. The Judges of the courts of first instance and the other judges are appointed by the Governor-General with the consent of the Philippine Senate. Unless removed through impeachment proceedings, they serve until they reach the age of 65 years. 27 Judicial districts are constituted. One Judge of the first instance is assigned to each district, except the city of Manila which has four judges. One justice of the peace and one auxiliary justice of peace are appointed by the Governor-General for each municipality. They act under the supervision of the Judges of the first instance, who make recommendations as to suspension, removal or appointment to the Governor-General.

The Supreme Court of the United States has jurisdiction on appeal, or writ of error, over final judgments and decrees of the Supreme court of the Philippine islands in the following cases :—

(1) In which the constitution or any statute, treaty, title, right or privilege of the United States is involved.

(2) In which the value in controversy exceeds \$25,000, (or £5,000). The Supreme Court of the United States is inclined to follow the findings of the Supreme Court of the Philippine islands as to the facts, and to sustain the local law as applied by the court below, unless constrained to the contrary by a sense of clear error committed.

The Bureau of Justice is the legal branch of the Philippine governmental machinery. At the head of the Bureau of Justice is the Attorney-General, who acts as the general law officer for the Philippine government. He is the legal adviser to the government departments, prosecutes and defends in any court of justice all causes in which the government

or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. He has general supervision over the provincial and city law officers or public prosecutors of the provinces and cities.

The Supreme Court has the respect and confidence of the people. The other tribunals do not enjoy an equal degree of confidence. In the lower tribunals, generally speaking, the administration of justice is unsatisfactory, slow, and halting, and there is a widespread feeling among the people that political, family and other influences have undue weight in determining issues. The Justice of the Peace courts are the weakest point in the judicial administration. Complaints against these courts are numerous; due to the isolation of many of these tribunals, and the want of frequent and effective supervision and inspection, many abuses are perpetrated. A frequent cause of complaint is against the extreme action taken under the provisions of Act 2098 which enables the employers of labour to prosecute their labourers for breach of contract and in many cases to hold them against their will, resulting in a kind of legalised peonage. The labourers are kept in debt through the advance of money and supplies; and in return for these advances they agree to work for definite periods of time and under certain conditions. Under the provisions of the Act, should they leave before the completion of contract, they can be arrested and tried for violation of contract and for obtaining money and supplies under false pretences. During the fiscal year 1918, there were a total of 3,266 cases of this nature, of which 1,456 were convicted.

The administration of prisons and the reformatory methods adopted in the Philippines are based on the same lines as in the United

States and other progressive countries of the world. The Insular government maintains Bilbid Prison in Manila, the San Ramon Prison and Penal colony combined near Zamboanga and three others in the provinces. The total number of prisoners confined in all these prisons for 1920 was 5,254. Bilbid is the receiving station and distribution point of all classes of criminals. It retains convicts who cannot be worked outside and about 1,500 are employed in industrial work.

* Prisoners, upon arrival in any of these prisons, are physically examined, treated if found necessary, given a period of training in drill and exercise movements and if possible assigned to work for which preference is expressed.

The Iwahig Penal Colony has a reservation of 100,000 acres in the island of Palawan. There, a convict by good conduct may become a settler and receive one half of what he produces, the land, tools, and animals, etc., being provided for him. This colony is a partially self-governing community, founded originally somewhat upon the principle of the George Junior Republic. It has a population of about 1,200 colonists and has proved to be a most successful institution, far advanced in reformatory methods and results, the number of convicts returned to prison after release from the colony being extremely small. The Government of India can learn much with profit from the methods of the treatment of prisoners and prison reformatories now prevailing in the Philippines, modelled, as they are, on up-to-date western lines.

The Financial condition of the Philippine Islands.

The Philippine Islands contrary to general belief have maintained all the expenses of Civil Administration since the beginning of American occupation from

insular revenues and without assistance from the Treasury of the United States, which has, however, defrayed all the costs of the military and naval establishments and fortifications. The only aid received by the Philippine Government from the United States has been a \$3,000,000 appropriation for famine relief made in 1903. The cost of the defence, both military and naval, of the Philippine islands is not borne by the Philippines, and the amount saved out of this item is utilized for the moral and intellectual development of the islands, such as education, public health, and sanitation, and the development of agriculture, etc. The income of the Philippine Government in 1921 was \$45,445,451.45. The annual per capita revenue from the taxation amounted to Pesos 6.23 (\$3) in 1922. The following table indicates the disposition made of each peso of taxes paid during the last two years.

	Fiscal year 1922 in Pesos.	Fiscal year 1921 in Pesos.
Legislative service	P. .02 $\frac{1}{2}$	P. .02 $\frac{1}{10}$
Executive service15 $\frac{1}{2}$.13 $\frac{9}{10}$
Judicial service02 $\frac{1}{2}$.02 $\frac{3}{10}$
Law and Order12 $\frac{7}{10}$.14 $\frac{1}{10}$
Health service09 $\frac{1}{10}$.07 $\frac{1}{2}$
Other protective service01 $\frac{1}{10}$.02 $\frac{1}{2}$
Public Education32 $\frac{1}{10}$.28 $\frac{1}{10}$
Other social improvements03 $\frac{1}{2}$.03 $\frac{1}{2}$
Development of Commerce15 $\frac{1}{2}$.15 $\frac{1}{2}$
Development of Agriculture04 $\frac{1}{2}$.03 $\frac{7}{10}$
Other economic development03 $\frac{1}{2}$.04 $\frac{1}{2}$
TOTAL PESOS ...	1.00	1.00

The following statement shows the manner and the purposes for which the public funds were expended in 1923 :—

	Pesos.	Per cent.
Public education	17,191,603	25·8 per cent
Public Debts	10,592,601	15·9 ..
Industrial operation	7,746,263	11·6 ..
Public Health	5,499,927	8·2 ..
Law and order	4,560,015	6·8 ..
Development of Agriculture	3,507,115	5·3 ..
Development of Commerce	3,426,145	5·1 ..
Adjudication	2,218,690	3·3 ..
Roads and Bridges	2,060,500	3·1 ..
Executive direction and control	1,790,800	2·7 ..
Other economic development	1,768,763	2·6 ..
Legislation	1,566,209	2·3 ..
Revenue collection	1,439,363	2·2 ..
Other minor items	3,371,434	5·1 ..
TOTAL PESOS	66,739,428	100 per cent.

It will be seen from the above tables that more than 60 per cent. of the total budget in the Philippine islands is spent on the moral and material development of the people; Education absorbing more than this total taxation amount, (or 1/3rd of the whole budget) and the remainder on public health and sanitation, development of agriculture, commerce and industries. If a similar proportion of the revenues of India were utilized for the moral and material development of the country an increase of literacy and a decrease of death rate would have been the result and also a general improvement of agriculture and industries. One reason why the burden of taxation is so light in the Philippine islands is that the

United States has borne all costs of military and naval establishments necessary for the defence of the islands, and other expenses incident to the maintenance of the American sovereignty of the Islands including international, diplomatic and consular representation. The Philippine constabulary is a force of approximately 5,800 officers and men (mostly Filipinos) and is designed to meet the police needs for maintaining public order in time of peace. This force is not meant as an army of defence. In 1901, when William H. Taft was Civil governor there were about 20,000 United States soldiers scattered throughout the islands. As the country became pacified, the number was gradually reduced. In normal times, there are less than 6,000 American troops in the Philippines and about 10,000 native scouts who are also under the United States Government. Fortifications at Corregidor have also been built by the United States for the protection of the islands. The United States maintains a naval station at Cavite and keeps a small fleet of war vessels in the Philippine waters.

Of the total revenues of \$40,500,000, \$28,000,000 is from taxation direct, and \$10,500,000, from operating income and commercial and industrial utilities; this does not include the earnings of the Manila railroad, which the government owns through ownership of the stock acquired in January 1917. The Manila Railroad Company runs on the island of Luzon and has at present over 1,000 kilometres of rail. The controlling power of the government stock is vested in a committee composed of the Governor-General and the presiding officers of both the Houses of the Legislature. The Philippine government is perhaps the most paternalistic government under the American Flag. It has taken up many activities which are generally

left to private enterprise in Europe and America. It has followed a policy of nationalizing and controlling industries when public welfare demanded such a step. For the purpose of helping in the agricultural, commercial and industrial development of the Philippines, a Philippine National Bank was started in 1916 with 51 per cent. of the stock owned by the Government of the Philippine islands. A law was passed compelling all municipal and provincial governments to deposit their funds in it. Branches of the Bank have been established in New York, in Shanghai, and in many Provincial capitals. The government exercises its control over the bank through a government committee consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The original capital of the National Bank was 20 million pesos. It has been increased since. The assets have already reached over 300 million pesos. The Bank is authorised to make loans not to exceed 50 per cent. of its capital and surplus, and all amounts realised from the sale of real estate bonds. It is also authorised to issue circulating notes, the amount of which shall not exceed the paid-up capital stock and surplus of the bank plus the amount of its gold coin.

The greatest development company established by the Philippine government is the National Development Company. Its authorized capital is 50 million pesos. It has been given great powers. It can engage in any commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprise necessary to the economic development of the country and its public welfare. The stock of the company is controlled as in other government companies by a committee of three presided over by the Governor-General with the Presidents of the two Houses of legislature as members.

Other development companies owned by the government are the National Cement Company, the National Iron Company and the National Coal Company for the development respectively of cement, iron and coal. The Wood-Forbes commission of 1921 recommended that the Philippine Government should as far as possible get out of business and keep out of business in view of the losses sustained by the Philippine National Bank, and the Manila Railroad Company. From the Filipino view point, however, the losses of their bank and railroad constitute the price for the many benefits which they in return have obtained. The National Bank has been the best instrument in giving the necessary impulse to Philippine agriculture and industries. Due to its aid, sugar production in the islands has almost doubled.

An analysis of revenues derived from taxation shows the receipt from internal revenues to be \$18,500,000 or two thirds of the total. The rate of taxation has been sharply advanced. The insular gross revenue from taxation in 1913, before the Filipinos were given virtual control of their government, was \$12,500,000 as opposed to \$28,000,000 in 1920, an increase of 124 per cent. The bonded debt of the Philippine islands in 1920 was \$22,000,000 for the reduction of which is laid aside nearly \$5,000,000 sinking fund, so the net liability is something less than \$17,500,000. A comparison with the public debt of other countries demonstrates that the Philippine islands has a smaller bonded debt than most countries, the per capita being \$1.81, compared with \$25 in Cuba, \$237.07 in the United States, \$853 in England, and \$1159 in France. The Dutch East Indies with \$1.92 is the nearest, while the public debt of India is Rs. 19/- per head or about a little over \$6.

The Jones Act provides that the entire indebtedness of the Philippine government shall not exceed 1/10th of the total valuation of its property. In addition to the insular revenues, there are the provincial and municipal revenues. These are expended by the Provinces and municipalities by the vote of their own local authority. The revenue and expenditure of these local bodies have grown enormously, about 100 per cent. during the last eight years. The increase in government expenditure is due to the rise in the cost of materials, and the creation of new offices and bureaus together with the rise in salaries.

CHAPTER X.

PUBLIC EDUCATION, HEALTH AND SANITATION.

Moral and material development of the Philippine Islands.

No other activity of the American government in the Philippines has received such encouragement from both the people and the government of the islands as the public school system established there by the Americans. The progressive development of the school system has been phenomenal as may be seen from the following table :—

Annual Enrolment of the Public Schools.

	1898	1902	1907	1914	1920
Pupils	4504	200,000	479,978	621,030	935,678
American Teachers†	847	746	658	341	316
Filipino Teachers†	1914	6141	7013	7234	20691

† Including men and women teachers.

Expenditure	\$6,869,654.50
Number of Schools	7000

In 1920 the public owned 4063 and rented 1163 school buildings. Twenty per cent. of the revenues of the government are spent for school purposes. The amount spent for each student per year is \$9.50 (the figure for the United States being \$36.62). The amount per capita for the entire population of the

Philippine islands is \$0.86 or nearly 3 rupees per head. Expansion of the public school system has taken place so rapidly that efficiency has not been able to keep pace with it, though the percentage of the population in the schools is about 10 per cent. (the percentage for the United States in 1918 being 20.13).

According to the official census estimate of 1918 cabled to the War Department by the Acting Governor-General, 37 per cent. of the people are literate and over 70 per cent. of the population over ten years of age are literate, so that to-day the Philippines is the most literate country in Asia next only to Japan. The enthusiasm of the Philippine legislature for the cause of education is commendable. The first Act of the Philippine Assembly in 1909 was the appropriation of one million pesos for the erection of public school buildings. The Philippine Legislature appropriated in 1918 the large sum of 30 million pesos to defray the expenses of a five-year school programme calculated to give almost free elementary education and to accommodate in the schools all the Filipino children who may desire to attend them. This large sum was voted for free elementary education in all of the schools in which prior to 1919 tuition fees had been collected. During the years 1912 to 1917 the voluntary contributions of the people to the support of education increased from 198,000 pesos to 479,000 pesos. In addition to the grants from the Insular treasury and provincial funds and contributions, every municipality is required by law to make ample provision for the support of all the schools established within its jurisdiction.

In every municipality there is a school board consisting of from four to six members as the division

superintendent may determine, in addition to the President of the municipality who is a member *ex-officio*. One half of the members, except the president, are elected by the municipal council and one half are appointed by the divisional superintendent. All the members are elected or appointed for a term of two years. It is provided that at least one elected and one appointed member shall be women, thus making two or more members of the schools of the town women. The Board reports to the divisional superintendent as to the conditions and attendance of the pupils, recommends sites and plans to the municipal council where the school houses are to be erected, and finally reports annually to the municipal council the amount of money which should be raised for the current year by local taxation for school purposes.

The Department of Public Instruction is the only department which is provided for in the Jones Law (Sec. 23). By the provisions of that law it includes the Bureau of Education and the Bureau of Health (Philippine Health Service). The only other Bureau that has been placed under it by the Legislature is the Bureau of Quarantine service. The Department also supervises the private schools. The Vice-Governor is made the head of the department of Public Instruction by the Jones Law.

The Bureau of Education administers the public school system of the islands. There is a Director of Education at the head of the Bureau, assisted by an assistant director. The Director of Education has by law the following powers and duties:—

(1) He shall establish elementary schools in every town in the islands where practicable. (2) He shall have the authority to establish night schools. (3) He shall fix the salaries of teachers within the limits estab-

lished by law. (4) He shall fix the curricula for all public schools under his jurisdiction. (5) He shall maintain in the Philippines, normal schools to furnish superior instruction to teachers as may be by law allowed or required.

The Bureau of Education is much larger than any other government bureau or organisation in the Philippines. The number of teachers, men and women employed exceeds 22,000. The schools number approximately 7,000 in which are enrolled nearly 1,000,000 pupils. The total expenditure for the support of the public schools reaches 15 million pesos out of the total budget of 90 million pesos. And it is planned to increase this annual appropriation year by year until at least 1,500,000 children are attending schools regularly, out of the total population of 10 million.

One of the principal objects of the Philippine public school system is to teach children to speak English so that it may become the common language of the islands. During the last 20 years, English has been taught in the Schools as a compulsory subject and the result is that almost every young man educated in the public schools knows English. English has thus become the common medium of communication, building a spirit of solidarity among the people. It has also resulted in a widely circulating press and the creation of an instructed public opinion. There are 45 daily newspapers published in English with a total circulation of 131,400 in addition to 69 weekly and other publications with a circulation of 195,000 for a population of 10 million, all of which show that there is a well-informed public in the Philippine islands, though the people of the remote provinces still depend largely for the circulation of news by word of mouth

as in the case of India. *Still the public opinion of the country is educated by lantern lectures, travelling libraries, bulletins, etc.

There are generally four types of schools under the Bureau of Education :—*i.e.*,

- (1) Primary
- (2) Intermediate
- (3) Secondary
- (4) Special schools for educational purposes.

The primary and intermediate courses are included in the elementary schools. The secondary school courses are divided into general, normal, housekeeping and household arts, commercial, and agricultural.

The following table illustrates the various courses offered in the four types of schools and the number of pupils studying in each :—

Course.	Annual enrolment Dec. 1922.
ELEMENTARY.	
General	1,004,151
House-keeping and household arts	31,427
Agricultural	24,431
Trade	13,917
SECONDARY.	
General	24,712
Normal	4,323
Agricultural	1,406
House-keeping and household arts	1,367
Trade	949
Commercial	339
Surveying	63
	59
Total ...	1,107,144 pupils.

While the General courses do not prepare as definitely for vocations as do other courses, they, however, afford abundant opportunity for training in industry through the teaching of such subjects as hand weaving, gardening, and wood working to boys and sewing, cooking, housekeeping, handweaving, embroidery and lace making to girls.

The Bureau of Education has also provided special courses for vocational purposes such as farm-schools, agricultural schools, settlement farm schools, industrial schools, the Philippine normal school, the Philippine school of commerce, the school for the deaf and the blind, the Philippine nautical school, and the Philippine school of arts and trades all located in Manila.

The Philippine public school curriculum, as is well-known, provides a very liberal amount of industrial training for the boys and girls. For boys it provides training in such industrial subjects as hand weaving, gardening, woodworking, ironworking, furniture making, shoe making, etc., for girls it provides training in sewing, cooking, house keeping, handweaving, loom weaving, embroidery, lace making, etc. The object of these courses is not only to train skilled artisans and craftsmen but also to impress upon the children the dignity of labour. The industrial and agricultural training, adapted to the needs of the people, provided by the Philippine public school system, has engendered this spirit and contributes to the growth of scientific farmers and trained industrialists. The following table shows the enrolment in the more important of the industrial courses and the estimated

value of production in schools during 1921-1922 :—

Course.	Enrolment during 1921—1922.	Estimated Value of production in schools.
		Pesos.
Sewing (girls) ...	282,822	681,236·62
Hand-weaving (boys and girls)	270,391	304,688·78
Gardening (boys) ...	181,411	836,991·29
Embroidery (girls) ...	88,665	166,691·61
Cooking and house keeping (girls) ...	41,084
Lace making (girls) ...	31,051	57,356·13
Wood-working and Iron-work- ing (boys) ...	14,091	481,250·91
Bamboo rattan furniture making (boys) ...	6,361	48,427·83

Hand weaving is taught in such forms as basketry, hat making, mat making, slipper making, fan making, and handbag making. The total estimated value of production in all the industrial classes in the public schools during the year 1921-1922 was about Pesos 3,420,500. By far the greater part of the industrial production of the schools is disposed of locally. In some of the courses, however, the output is in excess of local demand. In such cases the oversupply is shipped to Manila to be disposed of in the wholesale and retail stores of the General Sales Department, which is operated as a part of the Industrial division of the general office of the department of Education.

At the end of the school year 1921-22, there were in the Philippines 371 public vocational schools. Of these 338 were schools of agriculture, 23 were trade schools, 7 were normal schools, 1 was a commercial

school, 1 was a nautical school and 1 was a school for deaf and blind. These three latter are entirely supported by the Insular funds, in addition to the Philippine Normal School at Manila, the Central Luzon Agricultural School and the Philippine School of Arts and Trades.

Since the Philippines is a predominantly agricultural country agricultural education here naturally assumed in all of its phases an importance that is not fully realised or appreciated by the Government and people of India. Of the 338 public schools of agriculture, 14 are boarding schools (called agricultural schools) with farms averaging 460 hectares in size, 13 are day schools (called farm schools) located in well settled communities and on farm sites averaging 28 hectares in size, and 311 are rural schools (called settlement schools) located in isolated and backward communities (chiefly among the non-christians) and on farms averaging 22 hectares in size. The total number of pupils in these 338 schools is about 30,138 with 2,721 hectares of area of school land under cultivation, the value of production from farm schools has been Pesos 501,558.19 during the year 1921-1922.

There was a bill in 1924-25 before the Philippine legislature called the Agricultural Education Bill, which aims at better co-operation between the Insular government and the local government in the provision of more adequate facilities for the teaching of agriculture. The further extension of agricultural education depends upon the passage of this bill.

Filipino children, not attending schools of agriculture, are also engaged in such agricultural activities as gardening, club work and tree planting, as may be seen from the following table showing the number of public schools with gardens, number of pupils taking

gardening and the estimated market value of products, raised in school and home gardens during 1921-1922 :—

Number of schools with gardens.....6,512.

Number of pupils with home gardens.....161,448.

Number of pupils taking gardening...181,411.

Estimated market value of products raised in school and home gardens.....Pesos 836,999.29.

Agricultural clubs.....1,477.

Estimated market value of products raised in the Agricultural clubs, Pesos 381,394.40.

Agricultural club work in the public schools centres round such activities as pig raising, poultry farming, fruit-growing, corn-growing, and vegetable growing for boys and cooking for the girls.

A considerable portion of Filipino students (about 75,000) receive instruction in private schools, which are under the supervision of a superintendent of private schools, an official directly under the Secretary of Public Instruction, and responsible to him. The policy of the government is to have the private schools follow the same plan of courses as the public schools.

Physical education in all its phases is a compulsory subject required of all the able bodied pupils in all the public schools in the Philippines. The present course in physical education has been in use for the last three years. It requires of elementary pupils participation in such activities as marching, calisthenics, dancing, impromptu games, and group athletics, of secondary boys participation in such activities as games, military drill, and group athletics, of secondary girls in marching, dancing, etc. Phonographic and orchestral accompaniments stimulate physical drill and dancing. In addition, health and sanitary inspections of all schools and relief exercises

in all classes are held. Annual playground demonstrations are given to popularise the value of physical education.

The results of this scheme of physical education and health work in the Philippine public schools may be seen in the success of the Filipino athletes who have on two occasions won the championship of the Orient in the Far Eastern Olympiad, in competition with athletes from Japan and China. The results of the excellent system of physical education may also be seen in the extremely small death rate in the Philippines when compared with the other eastern countries of Asia.

Closely associated with, and contributed to largely by agricultural, industrial and vocational, physical and health education are the other important phases of education—civic and moral—neither of which is in any way neglected in the Philippine public school curriculum and both of which have much to do with character building. Much has been done through the schools to promote civic enterprises which have had for their great object the welfare of the people in general. The people of the entire islands, especially in remote municipalities and barrios, have been enlisted in public welfare movements by the teachers of the public schools. Chief among these activities are the civic educational lectures given in every community, food and Red Cross campaigns, and co-operation with other bureaus, especially in work pertaining to agriculture and health.

The Library Movement.

Despite the fact that public school libraries in the Philippines are almost entirely dependent upon fees, benefits, donations, etc., rather than upon public

taxation for their support, much progress is being made each year in establishing them, and in augmenting the number of books in them. During the year 1921-1922 there were a total of 2,758 school libraries with a total of 482,023 books. In addition, the Bureau of Education furnishes travelling libraries to different school divisions, which are of great benefit to pupils and to the public in out-of-the-way places. Though under the Department of Justice, an educational activity of the Philippine government is the Philippine Library and Museum. This is not only a single library but is a system of libraries. It is the purpose of the government to place branches of the library in all the provinces. At present there are four library branches in the capitals of the provinces. In the central library there are over 500,000 volumes. An important activity of the Philippine Library and Museum is the Legislative reference division, which has been established to help members of the Legislature and other officials in the preparation of bills and to furnish them such information on public affairs as can be found in the 340,000 books and publications in this division. The work of the division covers the investigation of legislation and governmental activities of other countries. There are 360 public libraries distributed all over the Philippines maintained by either the Insular, provincial or municipal governments. In addition to these, there are semi-public libraries belonging to the bureaus of education, religious corporations and civic organisations. The University of the Philippines was founded by an Act of the Philippine legislature in June 1908. At present there are seven colleges in the University the colleges of Medicine and Surgery, Engineering, Law, Agriculture, Education and Veterinary departments, in addition to the six schools attached to the University.

The six schools are in Dentistry, Pharmacy, Fine arts, the Conservatory of Music, the Forest school and the Graduate School of Tropical Medicine. The organisation and administration of the University is modelled on the lines of the State Universities of America. There were 4,130 students with a teaching force of 379 professors and assistants in the University of the Philippines during the year 1920 for the preparation of the Filipinos to meet the professional and scientific requirements of their country. The cost of operation of the University was \$755,926.57. In addition there are 2,700 Filipinos attending colleges and schools in the United States. 0.13 per cent. of the total population is receiving higher education. At present these institutions are not turning out a sufficient number of graduates to meet the needs of the situation. The Graduate School of Tropical Medicine was one of the best in the East though it is not in operation now.

The University of the Philippines is not meeting the demands upon it in as satisfactory a manner as could reasonably be expected. Unlike in India, the number of people receiving secondary education and higher education in the Philippines is small, being 0.89 per cent. and 0.13 per cent respectively, while 35.9 per cent. of the people have received primary education.

The expenditure for public education per capita of population in the Philippines was 2.141 pesos in 1921. The liberality of the appropriation for education will be appreciated when it is remembered that the total per capita tax is 6.40 pesos. In other words one-third of the total taxation is devoted to public education. The sum is further augmented by municipal appropriations and various local contributions in the form of money, labour, and materials.

The Philippine Health Service.

The Philippine Health Service represents the combination of a series of sanitary reorganisations dating as far back as September, 1898, when the first Board of Health in the Philippine islands after the American occupation came into existence. In 1905 the Bureau of Health was created and in 1915 it became the Philippine health service. The Philippine health service looks after the sanitary conditions of the country, including the city of Manila. It supervises all the government hospitals with the exception of the Philippine General Hospital and other hospitals under its control. It administers the partially self-governing leper colony at Cuilon. It sees that the school houses and their premises, the prisons and penal settlements are kept in good sanitary condition. It is empowered to enforce quarantine regulations in time of epidemics or threatened spread of dangerous communicable diseases. How effectively it has discharged these functions may be seen from the decreasing death rate per thousand during the last two decades shown in the following table :

Year.	Death rate.		Birth rate.		Infant death rate.	
	Manila.	Provinces.	Manila.	Provinces.	Manila.	Provinces.
1904	45·57	26·10	33·80	40·06	801·86	203·71
1913	22·58	18·85	33·25	39·34	322·46	147·55
1920	26·47	20·73	43·54	36·54	213·102	160·71

At the head of the Philippine health service is the Director of Health, aided by the advice and assistance

of the Council of Hygiene. This is a body, having seven members appointed by the Governor-General upon the nomination of the Secretary of Public Instruction. The Director of Health need not necessarily accept the advice of this council. Outside Manila the Municipal organisation unit is either one of the following three kinds :—

- (1) Municipal Board of Health
- (2) Municipal Health District
- (3) Municipal sanitary division.

There are besides, a board of food inspection in charge of matters relating to the enforcement of the food laws and a leper board committee in charge diagnosing leprosy, its treatment, and the discharge of the cured patients. The Cuilon leper colony is the largest single leper colony in the world, where the modern treatment of leprosy is given for over 5,000 patients. This treatment consists of the administration of various esters of chaulmoogra, and results so far obtained in this colony seem to be very satisfactory. Recently a British scientist visited the colony and recommended that India should establish a similar leper colony for the scientific treatment and eradication of this disease.

The work of the Philippine health service is summed up in a recent memorandum of the Director of Health in the following words :—

“ Public Health work in the Philippines compares fairly with that of the other oriental countries. Up to the year 1917, the death rate had been brought down to the minimum figures possible with the means at hand. The annual death rate for 1901, a year unburdened by extensive epidemics—was 41 per 1,000 inhabitants, later in 1905 it was brought to 28 per thousand. We have made great strides in sanitation

during the past 20 years. The comparative death rate scale for 1917 shown below proves that we are certainly better off than most oriental countries.” :—

Comparative death rate scale for 1917.

COUNTRIES.	Death Rate per 1,000 Inhabitants.
ORIENTAL.	
China	40.00
India	35.00
Straits Settlements	31.64
Ceylon	27.00
Burma	24.93
Philippines	22.29
Porto Rico	28.50
ANGLO-SAXON.	
United States	14.70
England	13.70
Canada	12.70
South Australia	11.73
Queensland	11.00
New Zealand	10.35
Italy	18.20
France	17.70

Although sanitation in the tropics, by the very nature of climate and general environment, is difficult to handle, yet the progress attained in the Philippines along this line since the American occupation has been rapid, especially since 1913. Cholera and small-pox have been wiped out, malaria checked, typhus controlled, and beri-beri reduced. In general, the death rate has decreased and the birth rate gone up. Infant mortality has been brought down, and the Philippines is now one of the healthiest countries in the Orient.

CHAPTER XI.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROGRESS IN THE PHILIPPINES.

The development of Agriculture and Industries.

The Department of Agriculture and Industries, as its name indicates, covers the activities of the government calculated to foster the development of agriculture and the national resources of the Philippines. It has under its supervision the Bureau of Agriculture, the Bureau of forestry, the Bureau of lands, the Bureau of science, the weather bureau, and the various agricultural colonies and settlements of the government.

The functions of the Bureau of Agriculture are to collect and disseminate useful information pertaining to agriculture in the Philippine islands, to encourage the use of improved agricultural methods, and in general to promote the development of the agricultural resources of the Archipelago. The Bureau has undertaken the following works:—

(1) The introduction of new domesticated animals, and the improvement of the domesticated breeds, now found in the islands.

(2) The control and eradication of diseases of livestock.

(3) The investigation of soil and climatic conditions and the methods of producing and handling agricultural products.

(4) The introduction, production and distribution of improved seeds and plants.

(5) The control and eradication of diseases of insects and other pests injurious to cultivated plants.

(6) The operation of a system of demonstration and agricultural extension work.

(7) The collection of agricultural statistics, and

(8) The publication and distribution of bulletins, circulars and other printed matter.

For the furtherance of these ends, the Bureau has established and maintained experimental stations, farms, and established stock farms for practical agricultural instruction. Some of these stations are under the joint operation and control of the bureau and the provinces and municipalities. The Bureau of Agriculture also has supervision over the agricultural colonies of the government. At present there are four of these agricultural colonies. They are the Bohol Rice colony, the two Filipino Agricultural colonies and the Mamungan American Agricultural colony.

The net expenditure of the Bureau of Agriculture in 1922 under Act 2,997 was Pesos 1,175,880.06 or Pesos 0.288 per capita. The farming population according to the Philippine census in 1918 were 4,081,302 out of a total population of 10 million people. In other words, about half the total population is engaged in agriculture, the principal crops being rice, coconuts, sugar cane, corn, tobacco, magney, cocoa, coffee, etc., as may be seen from the following table for 1922.

	Area Cultivated in Hectares.	Amount Produced.	Average yield per Hectare.	Total Value of production in Pesos.
Rice ...	1,661,430	43,436,830 Cavans	26.14 Cavans	139,935,080
Sugar Cane ...	240,820	7,200,070 Piculs	31.8 Piculs	59,948,250
Cocoanuts ...	444,570	68,239,000 Nuts	55,267,680
(Average of 190 trees per Hectare) ...				
Corn ...	549,960	6,416,450 Cavans	12 Cavans	29,125,200
Abaca (manila hemp) ...	494,990	1,913,770 Piculs	7 Piculs	19,918,860
Tobacco ...	59,870	650,580 Quintals	11 Quintals	6,019,870
Magney ...	27,670	268,700 Pictals	14 Pictals	1,694,470
Cacao ...	1,080	984,300 Kilos	1,148,100
Coffee ...	800	1,148,900 Kilos	822,800
Total ...	3,481,270 Hectares.	313,880,310 Pesos.

[One cavan of rough rice equals 44 kilos, one picul equals 63.25 kilos, one cavan of cleaned rice equals 57.5 kilos, one quintal equals 46 kilos, one cavan of

shelled corn equals 58¹/₂ kilos, and one peso (Philippine currency) equals Rs. 1/8/- in Indian currency.]

It will be seen from the above table that the average yield per hectare of rice, corn, sugar, tobacco, abaca, is far more than the yield in India. This increased production is due to the more scientific methods, and the help given to farmers by the Bureau of Agriculture. There is usually an agricultural congress held in Manila every year composed of representative farmers from all over the islands. It is convened for the purpose of discussing matters pertaining to agriculture, and of acquainting the government with the needs of the farmers. In addition, 39 provincial and municipal chambers of agriculture in different provinces have been organised. The object of these organisations is to unite the progressive agriculturists of different localities and give them an opportunity to study and discuss their problems together and to voice their opinions collectively whenever necessary.

In order to make known to the people the different activities of the Bureau of Agriculture, especially along the demonstration and extension activities, the farm advisors and agricultural assistants deliver lectures on such agricultural topics as cattle-breeding, seed selection, marketing facilities, and manures, etc. There were held in 1922, 1529 meetings with an attendance of 34,535 farmers, not including individual talks made by the fieldmen with the farmers. The agricultural extension agents, as they are called in the budget of 1923, are assigned mainly to provinces where the most important products are raised—and there foster and encourage the better and greater production of these products. The farming class, realising the importance and advantages of improving the crops, select their seeds for the next season's planting with

the assistance and advice of the farm advisers and agricultural assistants. The following table shows the popularity of this kind of work among farmers in 1922 :—

Seeds.	Farmers helped.	Amount selected
Rice 	1320	724·4 cavan.
Corn 	3368	219·5 cavan.
Sugar cane 	119	485840 points.
Tobacco 	24	6 gantas.
Vegetables 	436

In addition, co-operative demonstration plots (826 of rice, 346 of corn, 18 of tobacco and 120 of sugar cane) were started by farmers in 1922 in the different provinces and worked under the guidance of the farm advisers and their assistants, the purpose being to show to farmers by actual demonstration and comparison the difference between the improved and the unimproved methods of farming and to persuade them to adopt the former. Locusts had done no little damage to crops in all the provinces, and the farm advisers of the Bureau of Agriculture also devoted themselves to the locust extermination work in addition to their field work in the demonstration farms.

Another activity of the Bureau of Agriculture is the organisation of rural-credit societies for the purpose of lending money to small farmers. The first rural-credit association was inaugurated on October 19th, 1916. There were in 1920 over 500 associations distributed throughout the Provinces. Some of these

associations have been granted loans by the Philippine National Bank in amounts equal to their paid-up capital. These loans are usually made at 8 per cent. per annum, and the association can in turn lend to the borrowers at 10 per cent.

The work of the animal husbandry division consists of experiments in the improvement of cattle breeding, horses, poultry and swine, etc., in public breeding farms. One of the most serious losses in the Philippines has for many years been due to the prevalence of rinderpest, with a consequent annual loss of hundreds of thousands of cattle and caraboi and this loss falls most heavily on the poor Filipino agriculturist. The government scientists and veterinarians have long been working for an effective remedy, which has now been discovered and made effective by Dr. W. H. Boynton of the Bureau of Agriculture. The Boynton vaccine is now being successfully made use of on a large scale. It has already been a great success in Masbate and in the provinces around Manila. The successful campaign against rinderpest in the Philippines is an incalculable boon to the islands and a great gift to the millions of people in the Far East and in India.

Another aid to farmers against animal diseases is provided by the Insurance of Work animals Act No. 2,573 as amended. Under this Act, insurance agents are appointed by the government to insure animals at a nominal sum, so that if the animals die, their owners may have money to replace them. From 1919 to December, 31st, 1922, there were 17,300 insurance applications presented by 4,000 persons from the different provinces; out of these 13,800 were approved. The number of head of cattle insured in 1922 was 11,281 and the number of deaths 812 during the same

period, giving an average mortality of 7.2 per cent. 5 per cent. was charged for animals not immunized by the Boynton vaccine and 4 per cent. only for those immunized in accordance with the law. 113,449.91 pesos were collected as premiums, as against pesos 101,422.28 which was paid as indemnity claims, leaving a balance of pesos 11,761.63 to pay future claims.

The work of the Animal Insurance Division of the Bureau of Agriculture has been very useful to the people and relieved a great deal of suffering and hardship both to the work-animals and the small farmers.

The bureau of science is the most important single institution in the Philippines and for years it rendered vitally important service not only to the Philippine government in its various departments but also to the world at large, through its scientific research work. It attained a position of great eminence and credit. The bureau of science makes investigations, conducts researches, and does work of a scientific nature and publishes the results of investigations in chemistry, biology, anthropology, and mineralogy. The large volume of the work of the Bureau consists of the chemical examination of materials of all kinds, submitted by other bureaus and departments, such as imported drugs from the Bureau of Customs, and soil samples from the Bureau of Agriculture. The bureau also manufactures serum for the use of the different bureaus and departments, such as the serum for vaccination, rinderpest inoculations, etc. It maintains several collections of natural history, such as insects, birds, snakes, etc. It has also under its jurisdiction the aquarium in Manila, consisting of live specimens of fishes. The bureau also publishes the Journal of Science containing the results of its scientific investigations.

Other bureaus under the Department of Agriculture are the Bureau of Forestry, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Weather. The Bureau of Forestry is charged with the preservation and administration of the forests of the Philippine islands. It also supervises the work of lumber mills, by seeing that the owners do not violate the law and live up to the concessions granted them by the government. 99 per cent. of the forest lands belong to the government. The Bureau of Lands is in charge of the administration of laws relative to public agricultural and mineral lands and the friar lands. It also grants homesteads and leases public lands. According to the new public land law, a home-steader may apply for 24 hectares of public land. One person cannot purchase more than 100 hectares and a corporation cannot purchase over 1,024 hectares. The lease usually covers a period of 25 years after which it may be renewed.

The weather bureau has long been a scientific institution of international standing. It maintains a system of weather forecasts and storm warnings, which are sent to the ports and the farmers. It also publishes bulletins and other works on seismography, climatology, meteorology and astronomy, etc.

The intimate connection of the Department of Agriculture with the farmers of the Philippines has endeared the department to the people in a manner that is not realized in India. The United States is probably the only other country in the world, where the government does so much for the farmer. The Departments of Agriculture in India are merely ornamental when compared with the excellent work that is being done in the Philippines.

To sum up the economic aspects of the American rule in the Philippines, it may be stated briefly, that

the American policy has been on the whole one of non-exploitation. The Natural resources of the islands have been preserved almost intact for the Filipino people. The reciprocal free trade between the United States and the Philippines, coupled with a protective Philippine tariff against other nations have made the islands economically dependent upon the United States. Economically, the resources of the Philippines are to-day perhaps the least developed (except India) and the poorest large and populous colony in Asia (excepting again India and Java).

Recent Political developments.

It is now a quarter of a century, since the United States took over the possession of the Philippine islands. During this period of twenty five years, marvelous progress has been made in education, public health, sanitation and the development of agriculture and industries under the benevolent protection of the American flag; a flag which is described as "an emblem of liberty and not of slavery, a symbol of humanity and civilization and not of selfishness and exploitation." The Filipino people enjoyed a large measure of autonomy for the last eight years out of the quarter of a century. The Philippines enjoy the same powers and status as the self-governing colonies of the British Empire, like Australia, and Canada. They have an elected legislature, elected governors in the provinces, and representative Filipinos at the head of all the executive departments leaving only two important American officials, the Governor-General and the Vice-Governor in the whole administration. The progress of the Filipinos in all directions is so great during this quarter of a century that President Harding declared, "It is unequalled by any other people

under similar conditions and within the same period of time." It can safely be stated that no people under the friendly tutelage of another, have made so great a progress in so short a time. The task of building up a truly representative form of government is no doubt made much easier by the fact that the great bulk of the people belong to the same religion (Christian), and race (Malay) and that they are free from caste distinctions unlike in India.

The moral and material progress of the people of the Philippine islands may be seen from one or two indications. The degree of literacy has increased from 5 per cent. to nearly 40 per cent. in 1923 and over 50 per cent. of the children of school going age are enrolled in schools, so much so that the Philippines today is the most literate country in the Orient, second only to Japan. The death rate has declined from 45.57 per thousand in 1904 to 22 per thousand in 1921. The development of agriculture and industries has been remarkable, so that outside Japan again, the Philippines is the only country in Asia that has scientific farming and produces the greatest amount of rice, sugar, tobacco, etc., per acre of land. India and China are very much behind the Philippines in scientific agriculture.

So much for the moral and the economic development. Now turning to political progress, the Philippines enjoy even now the most democratic form of government in Asia, not excepting even Japan. The present status of the Philippines may be described as follows in the words of President Harding:—

"Gradually and without violence the functions of the government have been taken over by the people themselves, leaving only the tenuous connection of the Governor-General."

Much of course depends upon the personant, character and statesmanship of the Governor-General. Harrison, the former Governor-General, had no trouble with the Philippine Legislature or the people. But the present Governor-General, Leonard Wood, seems to have different experience. Differences between him and the Philippine Legislature and the leaders arose, though unlike the Viceroy of India he has no power of certification. In July 1923, the Filipino members of the Cabinet and the Council of State resigned in a body as a result of frequent conflict with General Wood. The immediate cause of their action, they stated to be the 'illegal' reinstatement of a member of the secret service of the City of Manila, who had been suspended from office. This incident, however, they declared to be the culmination of the general policy of the Governor-General "to intervene in and control even to the smallest details, the affairs of our Government, both insular and local in utter disregard of the authority and responsibility of the department heads and other officials concerned" General Wood while accepting the resignations, reported to the Secretary of War as follows :—

"This concerted action was a result of pre-arrangement and was evidently made for the purpose of securing a restriction of the exercise by the Governor-General of his power of supervision and control under the Organic Act and to force by irregular means a further curtailment of American authority in the Philippine islands....."

The Philippine Legislature immediately supported the resigning members of the Council of State by passing resolutions addressed to the United States Congress and the President demanding the removal

of General Wood from office. The Philippine Legislature sent a special Mission to Washington which presented the following charges against General Wood to the President and the Congress of the United States :—

“ Governor-General Wood has set at naught all understandings the Filipino people have had with the American Government, and has ignored the assurance given them by the late President. He has most decidedly taken a backward step depriving our government of the key and the nerve-centre of the former autonomous administration—the Counsel of the Filipinos. He has surrounded himself with a secret Cabinet composed of military and other extra-legal advisers, which has encroached upon the legitimate functions of the Filipino officials in the government. He has broken asunder the bonds of concord that united Americans and Filipinos after the bloody struggle of 1899, a concord that reached its highest expression in the first years of autonomous government. He has placed himself over and above the laws passed by the Philippine legislature, laws that have never been declared null and void by the Courts or by the Congress of the United States. He has claimed for himself an unlimited executive responsibility that neither the existing laws nor the practices already established have recognized. He has deviated from the policy of the American Government to give the Filipino people an ever-increasing self-government, a policy announced by every President beginning with President McKinley and ratified by the Congress of the United States in the Jones Law. He has abused the veto power, exercising it on the slightest pretext on matters of purely local concern that did not affect the sovereignty of the United States or

its international obligations. ' Thus he has attempted to control our legislature, a prerogative that has never been claimed by the elective executives of America, by the President of the United States, or the Governors of the several States. He has disregarded the right of the Senate in his exercise of the appointing power. He has destroyed our budget system, the greatest achievement in the financial administration of our government. He has endeavoured to defeat the economic policy duly laid down by the Philippine legislature for the protection of the rights and interests of the Filipino people in the development of the resources of the Islands."

6 In reply to the above charges, President Coolidge expressed his unqualified support of the Wood administration by declaring as follows :—

" The Government of the United States has full confidence in the ability, good intentions, fairness and sincerity of the present Governor-General. It is convinced that he has intended to act and has acted within the scope of his proper constitutional authority. Thus convinced, it is determined to sustain him and its purpose will be to encourage the broadest and most intelligent co-operation of the Filipino people in this policy..... "

He further declared that any legislation passed by the Philippine legislature, which encroaches upon the authority of the Governor-General in violation of the provisions of the Jones Law, is null and void and in no way binding upon that official. This declaration is somewhat curious in view of the declaration of his predecessor, President Harding, in 1921 to another Filipino Commission that " no backward step in diminution of your domestic control is to be sought." The Filipinos regarded this assurance of President

Harding as implying that there would be no retrogression from the autonomy which they had attained during the Harrison regime (1913—1921), though from the legal point they obtained that position of autonomy by stretching the Jones Act of 1916.

The result of President Coolidge's attitude is that the parliamentary system of Government established in the Philippines under the Harrison regime has been replaced by one based more nearly upon the separation of powers (as in the case of the American government) as was originally intended by the Jones Act. The Governor-General as a consequence has no need to consult the leaders of the legislative chambers and to take advice of the Filipinos. The Council of State lost the services of the two speakers of the Philippine legislature and reverted to the position of the Cabinet of the Governor-General.

The statement of President Coolidge has the effect of going back upon the preamble of the Jones Act of 1916 which says that "Independence will be given as soon as stable government is established in the Philippines." It also means that the Republican party will not be bound by the Congressional pronouncement of 1916 passed by the Democratic party. This is the more regrettable when we remember the declaration of President Harding belonging to the Republican party in 1921, to the effect that the United States Government will respect the Act and preamble of 1916.

As a result of this reactionary policy of General Wood and President Coolidge, the *Nacionalista* party in the Philippines, *i.e.*, the party that resigned from office in 1923, gained an immediate and overwhelming victory in the senatorial bye-elections and in the general elections of 1925, defeating their rivals the

its international obligations. ' Thus he has attempted to control our legislature, a prerogative that has never been claimed by the elective executives of America, by the President of the United States, or the Governors of the several States. He has disregarded the right of the Senate in his exercise of the appointing power. He has destroyed our budget system, the greatest achievement in the financial administration of our government. He has endeavoured to defeat the economic policy duly laid down by the Philippine legislature for the protection of the rights and interests of the Filipino people in the development of the resources of the Islands."

In reply to the above charges, President Coolidge expressed his unqualified support of the Wood administration by declaring as follows:—

" The Government of the United States has full confidence in the ability, good intentions, fairness and sincerity of the present Governor-General. It is convinced that he has intended to act and has acted within the scope of his proper constitutional authority. Thus convinced, it is determined to sustain him and its purpose will be to encourage the broadest and most intelligent co-operation of the Filipino people in this policy..... "

He further declared that any legislation passed by the Philippine legislature, which encroaches upon the authority of the Governor-General in violation of the provisions of the Jones Law, is null and void and in no way binding upon that official. This declaration is somewhat curious in view of the declaration of his predecessor, President Harding, in 1921 to another Filipino Commission that " no backward step in diminution of your domestic control is to be sought." The Filipinos regarded this assurance of President

Harding as implying that there would be no retrogression from the autonomy which they had attained during the Harrison regime (1913—1921), though from the legal point they obtained that position of autonomy by stretching the Jones Act of 1916.

The result of President Coolidge's attitude is that the parliamentary system of Government established in the Philippines under the Harrison regime has been replaced by one based more nearly upon the separation of powers (as in the case of the American government) as was originally intended by the Jones Act. The Governor-General as a consequence has no need to consult the leaders of the legislative chambers and to take advice of the Filipinos. The Council of State lost the services of the two speakers of the Philippine legislature and reverted to the position of the Cabinet of the Governor-General.

The statement of President Coolidge has the effect of going back upon the preamble of the Jones Act of 1916 which says that "Independence will be given as soon as stable government is established in the Philippines." It also means that the Republican party will not be bound by the Congressional pronouncement of 1916 passed by the Democratic party. This is the more regrettable when we remember the declaration of President Harding belonging to the Republican party in 1921, to the effect that the United States Government will respect the Act and preamble of 1916.

As a result of this reactionary policy of General Wood and President Coolidge, the *Nacionalista* party in the Philippines, *i.e.*, the party that resigned from office in 1923, gained an immediate and over-whelming victory in the senatorial bye-elections and in the general elections of 1925, defeating their rivals the

Democratic party *i.e.*, the 'party that co-operated with the Governor-General in their constitutional crisis. The new legislature passed a bill in 1925 providing for a plebiscite to be held on the independence issue, but Governor-General Wood vetoed it and the issue remains where it was, leaving bitterness and resentment amongst the Filipinos instead of the co-operation and friendship that the United States Government desires.

The Independence Movement.

It will be seen from the foregoing pages that the Philippine Islands are already enjoying Dominion Status, *i.e.*, the same status and powers enjoyed by the self-governing British Colonies like Canada and Australia. But the Filipino people are not content with this relationship. They demand immediate and complete independence, as was promised to them by the Jones Act. The United States government with the enactment of the Jones Law in 1916, formally and officially promised to recognise the independence of the Philippine Islands as soon as a stable government could be established therein. The policy of the United States towards the Philippines has always been interpreted by the American statesmen to mean the ultimate independence of the islands. The uncertainty has been only as to the time for such independence.

On the conclusion of the war, the Philippine legislature sent in 1919, the first Philippine Mission to Washington with instructions to request the fulfillment of the preamble of the Jones Law. The representative of the American government in the Philippines who supervised the establishment of the government under the Jones Law, *i.e.*, former Governor-General

Harrison, has concurred^d in the report of the Philippine legislature, as to a stable government. He reported to the United States Congress through the joint committees which heard the first^d Philippine Mission, that there was already in the Philippine islands, the stable government demanded by the United States Congress, "namely, a government elected by the people, and supported by the people, which is capable of maintaining order and of fulfilling its international obligations." President Wilson in his farewell message to Congress officially certified that the Filipino people have already performed the condition imposed upon them as a pre-requisite to independence. He said :—

"..... Allow me to call your attention to the fact that the people of the Philippine Islands have succeeded in maintaining a stable government since the last action of the Congress in their behalf, and have thus fulfilled the condition set by the Congress as precedent to a consideration of granting independence to the islands. I respectfully submit that this conditional precedent having been fulfilled, it is now our liberty and our duty to keep our promise to the people of those islands by granting them the independence, which they honourably covet."

Had President Wilson and the democratic party been returned to power in 1921, probably this pledge would have been fulfilled. But the Republican party was returned to power in the United States in 1921, and President Harding appointed the Wood-Forbes commission in March 1921 to investigate the stability of the Philippine government and their fitness for independence. Mr. Forbes was a former Governor-General of the Philippines while General Wood had considerable experience in Cuba and is the present

Governor-General of the islands. The commission arrived in Manila on May 4th, 1921, and the report of the commission was submitted to the President on October 8th, 1921, recommending among other things that "the present status of the Philippine Islands continue until the people have had time to absorb and thoroughly master the powers already in their hands."

The commission, however, admitted that there is a general desire everywhere for independence in the Philippines and that a "reasonable proportion of government officials and employees are men of good character and ability and reasonably faithful to the trust imposed upon them. and that many Filipinos have shown marked capacity for government service and that the young generation is full of promise and that the legislative chambers are conducted with dignity and decorum and are composed of representative men. We feel that the lack of success in certain departments should not be considered as proof of essential incapacity on the part of the Filipinos, but rather as indicating lack of experience and opportunity, and especially lack of inspection."

As a result of this report, the United States Government has taken no steps to change the status of the Philippines, in spite of the certificates of former Governor-General Harrison and the late President Wilson. In 1922 a second Independence Mission was sent by the Philippine legislature to Washington, demanding independence. President Harding replied to the mission that "no backward step is contemplated, no diminution of your domestic control is to be sought but that independence will not be granted." For a third time in January 1924, the Philippine legislature sent a

petition through a special commission of independence, headed by the Speaker of the Philippine House of Representatives to the United States Congress, demanding immediate independence, on the ground that a stable government exists in the Philippines, capable of insuring peace and tranquility and the security for all nationals and foreigners alike, and "that the next step in the development of our relationship is the immediate establishment of a Philippine free republic, consecrated to the ideals of liberty, and justice which America has upheld throughout her history."

As a result of this third mission of independence in January, 1924, Representative Fairfield of the United States Congress drafted a bill to enable the people of the Philippine islands to form a constitution and establish the government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. This Philippine constitution was to be formed by a constitutional convention to be duly summoned under the terms of the Fairfield Bill. The Bill also provides that all foreign affairs, loans, and treaties of all kinds of the Commonwealth shall be exclusively in the control of the United States and that there shall be free trade between the two countries. Under the provisions of the bill, the Governor-General is to be elected by the people of the Philippines, along with an elected legislature of two houses as at present. Finally the Bill provides that "not earlier than 30 years after the inauguration of the government established under the constitution herein provided for, the people of the said Commonwealth shall have the right by plebiscite to express their wishes regarding their future relationship to the United States, and if their wishes so expressed are for complete and absolute independence of the United States, the same shall be granted." The

Bill based on the Commonwealth type of government was favourably reported in the United States Senate and the House of Representatives, though President Coolidge took a decided stand against any immediate change in the government of the Islands.

The passage of this Fairfield Bill may or may not satisfy the aspirations of the Filipinos. But it constitutes a forward step in the relations of the colonial powers to their tropical dependencies and approximates to the standard of "trusteeship" laid down in the mandate principle of the League of Nations. The American government is likely to pass this or a similar bill in the near future. Such an action would be a forward step in the right direction, as the first instance of a colonial power granting autonomy to a people of a different race on purely humanitarian and altruistic grounds. The action of the United States in this direction may have a far-reaching influence on the colonial policy of Great Britain, France, Japan and other colonial powers in Asia and facilitate the adoption of the mandate principle to all the colonial dependencies in Asia and Africa. As an American writer puts it "Philippine independence will light a new lamp in Asia." And Asia houses and feeds one half of the human race. The whole of Asia and the world is watching anxiously to see whether America will put the principles of self-determination and the 'consent of the governed' into operation in a land within the confines of her own possessions.

CHAPTER XII.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE MANDATES SYSTEM.

The control of the tropics has been the goal of the industrial nations of the world. Realising the vast natural resources of the tropics, the European nations have during the last 400 years penetrated every tropical country in the world and have controlled it directly or indirectly. The contribution of tropical products to the economic life and welfare of the temperate regions can be best estimated by comparing the economic conditions of the temperate regions before and after the introduction of tropical products. In other words, what would be the changes in the economic life and welfare of the temperate regions if they were not supplied with any rubber, cotton, hemp, sugar cane, petroleum, oils, drugs, tea, coffee, spices, and minerals from the tropics? First of all, the most obvious result would be the sudden breakdown of the industrial system of Europe and America which are dependent upon these articles for their raw-materials. As a result, the mills and factories would have to be closed down for lack of raw materials and the labour market in the temperate regions will be greatly disturbed. For instance, if cotton from India, Egypt and other tropical countries is no longer shipped to Liverpool and Manchester, the English textile industry will have to be closed down and the workmen, several thousands, deprived of employment with the prospect of starvation. The same

thing may be said to be true of other industries, rubber, sugar, timber, hemp., palm oil, etc., products exclusively grown in the tropics. The tropics do not merely supply articles of food like tea, coffee, fruits, spices, dyes and drugs but also the prime necessities of life in the economic and industrial world, without which the industrial and manufacturing systems of the world will be paralysed. These raw materials of primary importance provide employment for millions of workmen in the factories and workshops of the industrial world.

Dyes, drugs, ivory, mahogany, cedar, ebony, teak-wood, rubber and minerals like copper, silver, and tin (from the Malay States) have now come to be indispensable though they might have been luxuries at one time. Even in this age of invention and research, the reliance on the tropics for their products is daily increasing and will soon reach a stage when the tropical products will be the very basis for the economic life and welfare of the temperate regions, as well as of the tropics. Research and invention has made this reliance somewhat decreasing only in one direction. Formerly the only source of dye stuffs, such as indigo, saffron, and other dyes, was from the tropics. But with the recent discoveries of aniline dyes from coal-tar, it has become possible to get dyes independent of the tropics. Research in other directions has failed to provide proper substitutes for tropical products. Artificial rubber cannot be made with any degree of success on a large scale, so the only possible supply for the entire world is from the equatorial belt—the home of rubber and gums. Now, all the industries, such as automobile tyres, rubber bottles, etc., are dependent entirely for their trade on the regular supply of that article from the tropics. The same is true of other

products. Thus a large portion of the working population as well as the capitalistic classes of the temperate regions are dependent for their livelihood and profits on tropical products and raw materials. It will also be apparent that the greater part of the commerce and industries of the temperate regions could not have been maintained without a regular supply of tropical products. On the other hand, some of the tropical peoples are dependent for their economic advancement on the white man, as they lack the motive force, the individual initiative, capital and enterprise to grow these products and scientifically manufacture them on a large scale. The economic life of the temperate regions will suffer heavily without the aid of tropical products and raw materials.

It is because of the vast importance of the tropics and the principle of self-determination enunciated in the war, that the system of mandates was adopted by the League of Nations in Paris in 1919. During 1915 and 1916, the Round Table group discussed the whole question of the future relations of the advanced and backward races, and the settlement of the future of the colonies taken from Germany. In 1916 Mr. Philip Kerr (then editor of the Round Table) in dealing with the general subject of the political relations between advanced and backward peoples, wrote of the "duties of trusteeship" resting upon the former for the welfare of the latter, including the duty of aiding the backward peoples to attain a capacity to "govern themselves," declaring this to be the ultimate "purpose of the tutelage of the backward by the advanced races." He concluded that "ruling people ought to govern the dependency as trustees for all mankind," and that "all other nations have an equal title to trade and commerce with them subject to whatever restrictions

are necessary for the welfare of the inhabitants. Here are three or four of the principles of the mandate system, and a clear implication that something must be done to enforce these principles of the trusteeship. J. A. Hobson in his book, "Towards International Government" 1915. (pp. 138-141), points out the amount of international friction caused by competition in the colonial world and by the exclusion of alien capitalists or merchants from colonial territories by those states having them under sovereignty. He also points out the conflict of interest between the governing state and the natives, and the vices of native exploitation. He then asks what a hypothetical international council could do to remedy this situation. The principle of open-door and equality of opportunity for the capital and trade of other nations, embodied in the Algeiras conference has been accepted by Hobson. General Smuts writing in 1918 in a book entitled "The League of Nations; a practical suggestion" lays down the principle of "no annexation," "self-determination," and the "open door" and develops the idea of mandates as follows:—"That it shall be lawful for the League of Nations to delegate its authority, control, or administration in respect of any people or territory to some other state whom it may appoint as its agent or mandatory, but that whenever possible the agent or mandatory so appointed shall be nominated or approved by the autonomous people or territory. That the degree of authority, control, or administration exercised by the mandatory state shall in each case be laid down by the League in a special act or charter which shall reserve to it complete power of ultimate control

* Grant A. J. and others, *International Relations*, London, 1916 Ch. V by Kerr, (p. 170, 171, 179, 181).

and supervision, as well as the right of appeal to it from the territory or people affected against any gross breach of the mandate by the mandatory state. That the mandatory state shall in each case be bound to maintain the policy of the open door, or equal economic opportunity for all, and shall form no military forces beyond the standard laid down by the League for purposes of internal police." It will be seen that Article XXII of the Covenant contains these very principles—adopted from General Smuts who in his turn drew his material from the Round Table group and the writings of J. A. Hobson. The mandate system as finally adopted in the Covenant in 1919 contains the following seven specific principles :

(1) Colonial territories taken from Germany are not to be annexed by the Allies,

(2) These colonial territories are to be put under the joint sovereignty of the allied and associated powers,

(3) They are to be entrusted to the tutelage of certain individual advanced nations,

(4) This tutelage is to be exercised by the mandatories under the supervision of the League,

(5) The open door is to be maintained in colonial territories so far as the mandatory has any power over them as such,

(6) Natives shall be used in a military capacity only for local defence and police,

(7) The people of the mandated territories are to have a voice in the choice of the mandatories, subject to various limitations such as (a) the past experience and successful administration of colonies by the mandatory power, (b) grounds of propinquity and special interests.

The principle of the mandate itself is not new, having been adopted in 1906 for Morocco in the Roosevelt-Root Plan under the act of Algeciras. The modern opposition to territorial conquests and annexations, and to the use abroad of coloured colonial troops, together with the modern practice of condominium (as in Egypt), the ideal of self-determination and the policy of the open door in colonial territory, all led to the adoption of the mandate system in the Covenant of the League.

Sir Sidney Olivier (now Lord Olivier) writing in 1918 on "The League of Nations and 'Primitive' Peoples," suggested that the proposed League of Nations should frame a world charter of the liberties and rights of primitive peoples. He suggested certain safeguards against the oppression of primitive peoples under European overlordship, such as (1) the protection of native land rights and sufficient native reserves, (2) prohibition of forced labour, except for definite and approved local services, (3) restriction of contract labour, (4) complete separation of administration from exploitation, (5) maintenance of and respect for tribal authority, law and customs, wherever possible, and (6) exclusion of distilled liquor. Some of these suggestions have been actually incorporated in the conditions and obligations imposed upon the mandatory powers over the class B or C mandates by the League of Nations.

Lord Olivier also stated that Joint Sovereignties or control of the mandates by committees of different Powers did not work satisfactorily in the past, as for example the international agreement guaranteeing the good administration of the New Hebrides under the joint sovereignty of France and England, which was not enforced by the guarantors. So Lord Olivier

suggested that the League of Nations should provide the machinery for a commanding common sanction to enforce these and similar guarantees for the protection of the primitive peoples.

The writings of Hobson and the Round Table group during 1915—17, and the pamphlet of Lord Olivier on "The League of Nations and Primitive Peoples" influenced General Smuts to advocate the system of mandates. From here they were taken up by President Wilson, who in his principles for peace settlement urged the supreme council, the commission of the League of Nations and the Peace conference to adopt it.

This plan, known as the Mandates System was adopted on January 30th 1919 by the Council of Ten, was transmitted to the Peace Conference Commission on the League of Nations, and with very slight changes was incorporated as Article XXII of the Covenant of the League.

The idea, that the government of peoples not yet able to stand by themselves is a sacred trust of civilization, is not new, having previously been recognised at least verbally by the British, French, and American Governments in their treatment of dependencies. It was assumed as an International obligation in the General Act of Berlin of 1885, and revised in September, 1919. Under this compact seven great colonial Powers agreed that, so far as Africa was concerned, "they will continue to watch over the preservation of the native populations, and to supervise the improvement of the conditions of their moral and material well-being." The importance of writing such a principle into an international treaty is that it converts what is otherwise a "domestic question" into an international obligation, the violation of which gives other Powers

the right to protest. But this obligation, like the open-door provision, never amounted to very much. France and Belgium, misconstrued these provisions, interpreting them in such a manner as to allow them to establish semi-governmental monopolies of the great rubber resources of the Congo, to the exclusion of foreign merchants. Both governments declined the requests of Great Britain that the difference in interpretation of the Act of Berlin be referred either to arbitration or to an international conference. Since no impartial institution had the power to interpret and to enforce these provisions, the Act of Berlin became a dead letter. In an attempt to overcome this weakness, the revised act of 1919 provided for a compulsory arbitration of disputes relating to the application of the convention. But these obligations are scarcely more justiciable than the question of what constitutes a "fair price" or a "reasonable return," is justiciable in an ordinary court of law.

The League of Nations has established a new type of administrative tribunal, composed of colonial experts to enquire and arbitrate in these and similar questions—*i.e.*, the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations. The distinctive feature of the mandate principle is thus the accountability of each of the mandatory powers to an impartial international body for the fulfilment of the obligations assumed. This principle is not without past precedents. For example in the British Empire, the administration of certain native countries has been entrusted to the Dominions, administrators being responsible to the Colonial Office in London. An example of this kind is Papua, formerly British New Guinea, now under Australian jurisdiction and also some Negro tribes in Africa under the South African

Government. The mandate administration of the Congo Free State, by Leopold II, which offers another instance of earlier mandate rule, was theoretically made accountable in 1885 to the Powers who signed the General Act of Berlin. The mandate idea also appeared in the Act of Algeciras of 1906, which established international control over Morocco. This act placed the control of the police in the hands of French and Spanish agents, subject to the inspection of Switzerland, and with the further obligation that they submit annual reports to the signatory Powers. Article XXII of the League Covenant embodies the latest expression of the conscience of Europe and extends this idea; it makes the administration of the 18,000,000 people taken from German and Turkish rule accountable to the League of Nations.

The Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations is the chief instrument through which this accountability is to be secured and "trusteeship" guaranteed. The commission is composed of nine members, five of whom must come from countries who do not hold mandates and none of whom shall be a government representative at the time of his appointment. When Major Ormsby-Gore became the Under-Secretary for the Colonies in the first Baldwin Ministry, he was obliged to resign as the British member of the Commission. The Pan-African Congress has suggested the addition of a negro member to the Mandates Commission, and Sir Frederick Lugard, formerly a distinguished British Colonial administrator, and now a member of the Commission, has suggested that representatives from the United States would be valuable because of the experience of the United States with the negro in the Southern parts of the United States. Both these additions would greatly add to the utility

and value of the composition of the Mandates Commission. At least, a representative of the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society must be appointed to the commission. An Italian is the Chairman of the Commission. Other nationalities represented on the Commission are Belgian, British, Dutch, French, Japanese, Portuguese, Spanish and Swedish. The Mandates Commission meets annually at Geneva, but its members are constantly kept in touch with the operation of the system through the mandates section of the Secretariat, in charge of Prof. Rappard, a Swiss, who was formerly a professor in Harvard University. There have been held six sessions of the Commission at Geneva annually since 1921, except in 1924 when an extraordinary session was held.

The Mandates are of three types:—

Class A, includes the ex-Turkish colonies—Iraq, Palestine, and Syria,—whose independence can be “provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance” until they are able to stand alone. Their wishes must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory. Class B, comprises the Central African ex-German colonies. The Mandatory in this case is responsible for the administration and undertakes to maintain public order and to promote the moral and material welfare of the people. Class C includes South West Africa and the Pacific Islands. Here the Mandatory administers the territories under its own laws as an integral portion of its own territory, subject to the safeguards named for the interests of the natives. The Class C Mandates held by Japan and the Dominions “amount” as General Smuts observed “to annexation in all but the name,”—save for the obligation imposed in regard to the natives, and the annual report to the League.

The essential conditions and obligations in respect of the Classes B and C are (1) freedom of conscience and religion, subject to only the maintenance of public order and morals, (2) prohibition of abuses, such as the arms and liquor traffic and the slave trade (3) prevention of fortifications, military and naval bases or the military training of natives except for police and defence; and in Class B equal commercial opportunity for all members of the League. Some of these conditions and obligations were suggested by Lord Olivier in 1918 in a pamphlet entitled "The League of Nations and the Primitive Peoples." It is not in the power of the Council of the League or of the Principal Powers to alter these. Amendments can only be made if the covenant is revised.

The mandate system was an attempt to compose conflicting claims, pledges, and ideals. The Allies have loudly condemned the colonial methods of Germany and Turkey. Led by President Wilson, they have given currency to the catchwords "no annexations," "self determination," and "the open door" and stood committed to the principles they implied. They sought, moreover, for a method which should remedy the defects of the Berlin and Brussels Acts by providing something in the way of a supervising authority to ensure the observance of the pledges given. The alternatives assuredly give rise to friction, would paralyse all initiative and progress by the dead hand of a super-bureaucracy, which in the past was not a success. Since this was admittedly impracticable, annexation was strongly advocated by the Japanese and the three Dominion Governments. It was, however, opposed to the principles proclaimed by the Allies, if not in some cases, to definite pre-Armistice pledges. A

compromise was with difficulty reached by dividing the Mandates into the three classes described as follows :—

Mandatories and Mandated Territories.

Class A.—

Great Britain :—Mesopotamia, Palestine.

France :—Syria.

Class B.—

Great Britain :—Tanganyika, Part of Togo, Fraction of Kamarun.

Belgium :—Raunda and Urundi.

France :—Kamarun and Togo.

Class C.—

British Empire :—Nauru.

Australia :—New Guinea.

New Zealand :—Western Samoa.

South Africa :—South West Africa.

Japan :—Caroline, Ladrone and Marshall islands.

Each of the thirteen mandatories is required to submit to the League an annual report, which is carefully examined by the commission. In studying these different colonial reports, the commission is frequently obliged to interpret the obligations which the mandatory governments have assumed. It has determined for instance whether the establishment of religious spheres of influence to stop missionary quarrels is a violation of the guarantee of religious freedom, whether the establishment of a customs union between a mandated territory and an adjacent colony is a violation of the open door principle, whether the voluntary enlistment of a native of a mandate territory in the army of an adjoining colony violates the military obligations

of the mandatory powers. Thus an authoritative impartial body at last exists for the interpretation of obligations which became nugatory because of the absence of such a body in the Act of Berlin.

The Mandates Commission inquires into the entire spirit of the administration as part of its task of supervising the work of the mandatory powers. It has made excellent surveys of land-tenure, public health, education, and labour in these territories. It has called attention to the dangers arising out of the presence of Chinese indentured labour in Samoa and the phosphate monopoly in Nauru, although neither is prohibited by the mandates themselves. The Commission receives complaints from the native populations, subject to the limitation that they must first be transmitted to the Mandatory Government. Societies, such as the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society of London, may protest directly to the Commission.

The Commission calls attention to abuses in administration and to the violation of the obligations which the mandatory powers have assumed, as for example, the Bondel-Zwarts disturbance of 1922 in the mandate of South West Africa, administered by the Union of South Africa. In 1921 the South African administrator imposed an excessive dog tax of £1/- for the first dog and 10/- for five dogs which the Bondel-Zwarts tribe was unable to pay. This and other measures provoked an attitude of resistance, which the South African authorities suppressed with a force of 390 men, four machine guns, and two bombing planes. Sixteen bombs were dropped by the planes on the first day, and more than 100 men, women, and children were killed. A negro delegate from Haiti brought the incident to the attention of the Assembly of the League at its meeting in September 1922. The Assembly un-

animously passed a resolution calling on the Mandates Commission to consider the question. The South African Government also promised to investigate, but when the commission began to enquire at its meeting in 1923, it found that the South African Government had failed to present an official report, and the only data before the Commission was a report of a local commission of enquiry which the South African Government had disavowed, so that the Mandates Commission had no authoritative material upon which to base its study. After a severe examination of Major Herbst and Sir Edgar Walton the representatives of South Africa, the Mandates Commission presented a report to the Council which severely criticized the South African Government for its failure to keep the promise it had made to the Assembly. The majority of the Commission further believed that the dog tax and other measures taken by the South African authorities were unduly severe, and the report implied that no resistance would have occurred had a more intelligent policy been followed. Though the Mandate Commission did not prevent the trouble, nor secure the immediate adoption of all the remedies proposed, it more or less established the responsibility of a mandatory power to the outside world. As in the case of the Corfu affair, the machinery of the League may concentrate the burning light of world-opinion on powers which otherwise might continue their time-honoured practice of disregarding obligations with impunity. The task of the Council and of the Mandates Commission of the League is a delicate and difficult one. The observance of the pledges undertaken by mandatories must in the last resort depend on the public opinion of the mandatory state, and thus, if the Mandatory is at fault, it would naturally be inclined to defend the action of its

agents against adverse criticism, which independent states are apt to resent. A Mandatory may avoid reference in its report to a matter open to hostile comment or may burke inquiry by neglecting to send a representative to reply to questions. The commission has little or no means of verifying a report, or of ascertaining how far it is an exhaustive and impartial account. For this it must depend on outside agencies.

The League of Nations has been somewhat successful in imposing on the Mandatory powers obligations devised to protect the mandated areas and they are obliged to suppress abuses such as slavery, arms, and liquor traffics. The actual texts of the mandates, defining the obligations of each mandatory, impose four additional concrete obligations. Each mandatory state promises not only to prohibit the slave trade but eventually to emancipate slaves, thousands of whom, the League's recent investigations disclosed, continue in bondage in the backward regions of the world. This obligation has already been fulfilled in the British mandate in Tanganyika and in French Kamarun. As a guard against the abusive liquor system followed so long, if somewhat shamefully, by Portugal in Cocoa islands and by foreign corporations in the Putamayo (between Ecuador and Columbia), the League insists that the mandatory powers should protect natives against fraud in labour contracts. To prevent the regime of forced labour so long countenanced by King Leopold in the Congo Free State, the League prohibits all forced labour, except for essential public works. Similar restrictions have been designed to prevent harmful land policy and the alienation of land from natives to non-natives without governmental consent, subject of course to the supervision of the League of Nations. The question of the national status of the

inhabitants of a Mandated territory has recently been the subject of exhaustive examination by the Mandates Commission and the Council of the League. As a result, it was decided in 1923 that the native inhabitants of a mandated territory are not invested with the Nationality of the Mandatory Power by reason of the protection extended to them. Individual inhabitants of the mandated territory should voluntarily obtain naturalisation from the Mandatory Power in accordance with arrangements which it is open to such power to make, with this object under its own law. Ambiguous terms which conduce to mistaken policies—such as “liquor traffic” and “trade spirits” or “vacant lands” and “crown or state property” must be defined. The Mandates Commission has also to conciliate opposing views, as for instance, the natural protest of Japan to the application to New Guinea of the Australian Law which excludes all Asiatic immigrants and the question of economic equality and open door in the mandated areas.

The principle of economic equality for all Nations in the A and B Classes of Mandates was to be recognised under the mandates system, though in practice it was not given effect to in all cases. The United States Government sent two notes to Great Britain protesting that the latter had given advantages to the British oil interests in Mesopotamia which were not accorded to American Companies and that the San Remo agreement between England and France giving preferential treatment in petroleum production to France was inconsistent “with the principle of equality of treatment understood and accepted during the Peace Negotiations at Paris.” The United States Government considered that the San Remo agreement

would " result in a grave infringement of the mandate principle which was formulated for the purpose of removing in the future some of the principal causes of International differences." Lord Curzon, on behalf of Great Britain, in his reply to the United States Government denied the validity of the fears of the Government of the United States concerning the monopolisation of the economic resources of the mandated territory and the lack of equality of economic opportunity. Negotiations continued between the two Governments till Lord Balfour in the name of Great Britain stated in May 1922 before the Council of the League that American commercial interests in A and B class mandates would receive certain privileges, and changes were made in the draft mandates " to add greater precision to the obligation imposed on the mandatories to refrain from granting concessions having the character of a monopoly." A treaty was also concluded between the United States and Great Britain in Palestine giving equal rights to Nationals of the United States as to British subjects and the members of the League.

The British and French Governments have modified the San Remo agreement so as to give to American interests twenty per cent. of the concessions in Mesopotamia. In the case of one of the A Mandates, *i.e.*, Syria, the Mandatory, *i.e.*, France and the United States entered into a treaty in April 1924. Its provisions cover the same subjects as treaties previously made with Japan in the island of Yap and other Pacific Ocean islands, and with the B mandates in Africa held by Belgium and France, *i.e.*, Japan, France and Belgium undertake to extend to the United States the advantages both economic and political given to the members of the League both by Article XXII of the

League Covenant and by the terms of the mandate as approved by the Council of the League.

Japan, France and Belgium agreed to guarantee complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, the unrestricted right of the citizens of the U. S. to reside in the mandated areas, to hold on terms of equality property and other interests both real and personal. It may be noted here that neither the League Covenant nor the terms of the Mandate require that the open door should be maintained in the C class mandates—though in A and B class the open door is obligatory—but it seems that Japan has maintained the open door principle even in her C Class Mandates in the Pacific Ocean Islands. Thus the U. S. has at last obtained a guarantee from all the Mandatories that concession in the mandated territories (except C Class) would not be monopolised, though she is not a member of the League of Nations. India which is an original member of the League could not obtain the same rights or guarantee in the case of the Tanganyika territory even though the mandate is held by Great Britain. It seems to be a sad commentary on India's position in the British Empire and membership of the League of Nations, when non-members of the League are able to enforce their rights better than even an original member.

The Mandatory powers, however, have not limited their activities to the fulfilment of the obligations imposed by the League. The British have made witchcraft punishable in Tanganyika, where they have also established auction markets to do away with grasping middlemen. Education in the Mandated territories is free, and in at least one Mandate—Nauru—it is compulsory. In Syria, between January 1919 and May 1921, the French increased the number of schools

from 14 to 1609. Japan provides dormitories for some native school children in her Pacific mandate and grants a subsidy to Christian missions established there. The Mandatory powers have established a council of notables composed of native chiefs. In Samoa, natives are eligible for membership in the Legislative Council. The Mandate system, though probably the best solution of a question which at the moment threatened to produce very serious difficulties, is naturally open to criticisms, some of which may be briefly noted as follows :—

• Class B & C mandates have been divided up in most cases as best suited to the jealousies of the powers, sometimes with scanty regard even to tribal boundaries (as is the case for instance with the Ruanda-Urundi frontier), though the Covenant lays down as regards the A class of mandates that “the wishes of the communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.” Great Britain and France even undertook to compensate Italy by cession of territory if they increased their possessions in Africa as a consequence of the war. The Mandate to France for Togo and the Kamarun (Class B) differs in one respect from the British Mandate for those countries, in that it permits the recruitment of troops for service in emergency times outside the territory. It seems difficult to reconcile this clause with the terms of Article 22.

Though the Allies profess to proclaim the doctrine of “equal commercial opportunity,” there is no stipulation to this effect in the paragraphs of Article 22, on which the A and C Mandates are based. In the former it is true that the principle is affirmed in the Mandates themselves, but in the B class it is restricted to members of the League to the exclusion apparently of the

United States and Germany. Dr. Schnee (late Governor-General of German East Africa) would seem to be justified in asserting that this is a retrograde step, while the United States maintains that the denial of the open door in the C class mandates is contrary to the implied conditions of the Covenant, and refuses to recognise their validity with the exception of that held by Japan with whom she had made a separate treaty securing equal opportunity. Great Britain has granted a reduction in customs duties to imports like palm-oil from her mandated territories, but since she asks for no reciprocity for this "Imperial Preference," there is no violation of the Mandate obligations.

A serious draw-back of the Mandate system lies at present in the fact that it constitutes only "*un titre precaire*" as M. Ryckmans calls it. The Mandatory, therefore, may be unwilling to expend large sums in economic development, and is only able to grant a conditional title or to enter into conditional contracts with any private firm which may be anxious to invest capital in the development of the country. Business men will not risk their capital when (1) the mandate is (theoretically at least) revocable, (2) the Mandatory may at any time resign the mandate without the loss of national prestige which would be involved if it were a part of the national possessions, (3) the Mandatory may prematurely consider that the country is ripe for self-government and may transfer control to a native authority unable or unwilling to grant adequate protection. This is manifestly a serious drawback to the material progress of a mandated territory, and it is essential that some sort of guarantee by the League or the Mandatory should be given. Some of these drawbacks of the League can be rectified by annexation or the declaration of a pro-

tectorate by the present Mandatories, provided that the annexing powers accept as a condition of annexation all the conditions imposed by the present mandates (including the annual report to the League) in the form of an international convention. The Mandate system, in spite of its many defects pointed out here, is a substantial step forward in the government of tropical dependencies. The great principle of trusteeship for backward races, though limited in its operation to ex-enemy colonies, must obviously in future be regarded as no less applicable to "the possessions of the Allies."

The Mandate system itself may be extended and improved. The greatest improvement of the mandate principle would be its extension to all parts of the world. Already, international obligations have been assumed under the Berlin Treaty in most of the African possessions. Article XXIII of the Covenant requires all members "to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control"; but these obligations are still ineffective because they are not placed under the supervision of a body such as the Mandates Commission. One of the greatest possible steps towards world peace would be a treaty signed by the ten leading colonial powers, guaranteeing the open door in their colonies and just treatment of natives, as provided in the mandates themselves, subject to the supervision of the Mandates Commission. Such a treaty is doubtless beyond the scope of practical politics at present, but at least it should be practicable to carry out the suggestion made by Sir Harry Johnston a number of years ago, to establish a great International Council of Advice which would recommend colonial policies for the powers to follow. The assumption of such duties by the Mandates Commission

would be an important step in solving the colour problem of the world.

The opinion is generally held that the peoples inhabiting the tropical and sub-tropical regions are in the "adolescent" stage of development reached by the European nations centuries ago, and that with proper encouragement and assistance the time will come when these darker peoples will reach an adult stage in international society. Such is the theory embodied in the League Covenant which speaks of territories 'inhabited by "peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world."' The great problem before the League is not only the supervision of the training of backward peoples to govern themselves, but also the achievement of peaceful release from external control when that stage is reached. This problem already confronts the League in Syria and Palestine, "which have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone."

The moral obligations to the subject races include such matters as the training of the native rulers, the delegation to them of such responsibility as they are fit to exercise, the constitution of Courts of Justice free from corruption and accessible to all, the adoption of a system of education which will assist progress, the institution of free labour, and of a just system of taxation, the protection of the peasantry from oppression and the preservation of their rights in land, etc. The material obligations, on the other hand, are concerned with development of natural resources for the mutual benefit of the people and the mandatory powers.

They involve the solution of such questions as "equal opportunity," "imperial preference", and other problems of economic policy. The French in Africa adopt "a sort of economic nationalism" to use the expression of M. De Caix which aims at preserving the products and markets for the exclusive use of France by every means in her power. (See *British and French Colonial Policy* by M. Devereau: "Anglo-French Review" September 1920). France, while imposing no tribute on her colonies, maintains the policy of monopoly and conscription. The obligation to advance the political independence of these peoples has been recognised in the French mandate over Syria, where the authorities in accordance with the mandate pledge have established a Federal type of government, containing a Federal Council with five delegates from each state. Still the Syrian Nationalists are entirely dissatisfied with French rule as they hold that "good government is no substitute for self-government."

In the past a number of colonial powers promised that their control over the backward people would be relinquished as soon as the subject races reached the adult stage. England repeatedly promised to withdraw from Egypt before the War, and the United States has repeatedly promised the Philippines their independence when the requisite conditions are fulfilled. This promise of withdrawal is incorporated in the Jones Act of 1916 with respect to the government of the Philippines. England promised almost the same thing to India in the announcement of August 20th 1917. And yet, hitherto, a colonial power has been the sole judge of when that adult stage is reached; and its judgment is likely to be biased by self-interest, with the result that the promise is never kept. In the past brute force has been the chief test of a peoples'

capacity to govern themselves. If it has been strong enough to throw off outside control, it has become free. Transition from subjection to independence has been as abrupt as it has been violent. The withdrawal of England from Mesopotamia is an exception. In the British Mandate in Palestine, the situation has been complicated by the question of Zionism—nine-tenths of the population being Arab, independence would mean death to the political aspirations of the Jews. Nevertheless, the British Government proclaimed a Palestine order-in-council in August 1922, which established a Legislative Council of eleven officials, nominated members, together with twelve non-official members elected by the Jews, Moslems, Christians, and Arabs through an electoral college system followed in oriental countries. An Arab boycott, however, forced the British to suspend the operation of this body. In both Syria and Palestine the Arabs have made bitter charges against allied "imperialism." The League of Nations in order to be really effective must eventually secure self-government for these peoples when they are able to stand upon their own feet, and at the same time protect them from out-side attack.

Whether because of the fear of a racial war or because of more generous impulses, the attitude of Europeans towards the backward peoples has undergone a great change since the end of the War. This change has been marked by the revision of the Acts of Berlin and Brussels, and by signing at St. Germain in September, 1919, of new treaties suppressing the evils of the slave, liquor and arms traffics. It has been evident also in a great anti-slavery movement, initiated by the League of Nations which has probably saved the independence of the negro kingdom of Abyssinia, which

has now been admitted as a member of the League of Nations. France has done away with the old consultative conference in Tunis in favour of a more representative Grand Council. She has admitted native Algerians to French citizenship, subject to certain qualifications, and has abolished discriminatory taxes. Constitutional re-organisation has also been taking place in French Cochin-China, Senegal, and Equatorial Africa. The British Empire has promulgated new constitutions granting a greater degree of self-government in India, Ceylon, Burma, Southern Rhodesia, Malta and Nigeria. Sweeping reforms of a similar nature have taken place in the Dutch East Indies and in Italian Tripoli. The United States of America has granted a very liberal scheme of self-government to the Philippines, subject to certain nominal restrictions in the external relations of the Philippines. All these reforms have been fostered by the new spirit engendered by the War and by the substantial help given by the backward peoples to their masters in the late War. The principle of "trustee-ship" is being slowly given effect to in the government of the backward regions.

The greatest problem of the 20th century is the peaceful adjustment of relations between the European and non-European races of the World. The tropics inhabited for the most part by the non-European races have the valuable raw-materials required for the industrial progress of the temperate regions. It may be admitted, on the other hand, that the utilisation of these products is necessary for the ordered progress of mankind, and the tropical peoples, particularly of Africa, may not be able to utilise them for a long time to come, unaided by the European and Asian races. The problem then is how to exploit these valuable raw-materials for the good of all parties concerned without

actually injuring the interests of the natives as has been the case in the past. The machinery established by the League of Nations in the form of the Mandates Commission is an attempt to solve this most difficult problem and the success of that experiment will depend to a large extent upon the sincerity, honesty and mutual good-will of the parties. Unless the European people can create this good-will and trust, by their conduct in the so-called backward races, which they have hitherto failed to do, the machinery of the League and the Mandates Commission may break down, and as a result a tremendous racial war may follow which will be more disastrous to the prosperity and civilisation of the World than any other single event in history. The prevention of such a catastrophe lies in the hands of every educated person both in Asia and Europe and this can be done only by creating and strengthening the social conscience for the solution of this problem. In other words, nations like individuals should apply in their mutual dealings the same moral code that they use in their private life. It is only in this way that we can assure the peaceful and ordered progress of a higher and better civilisation—a civilisation to which every nation of the World may contribute its own quota.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

The following list of books is obviously incomplete, but it is given to show the sources from which the monograph is prepared. The omissions from the following list which will occur to anyone, largely explain the faults that may be found in the fore-going chapters. In the course of my argument I have not always acknowledged either by inverted commas or by reference to any particular author the exact nature of my debt. I need hardly say, however, that I owe the largest debt to the late Professor Paul S. Reinsch, the pioneer in the field of Comparative Colonial Government.

GENERAL.

PAUL S. REINSCH	-	-	-	Colonial Government.
Do.	-	-	-	Colonial Administration.
Do.	-	-	-	World Politics.
EDWARD FEUTER	-	-	-	World History 1815—1915.
G. P. GOOCH	-	-	-	History of our own Times.
BENJAMIN KIDD	-	-	-	Control of the Tropics.
ALLEYNE IRELAND	-	-	-	Tropical Colonisation.
MORRIS	-	-	-	History of Colonisation.
LEROY-BEAULIEU	-	-	-	Colonisation.
F. D. MOREL	-	-	-	The Black Man's Burden.
H. A. GIBBONS	-	-	-	Introduction to World Politics.
Do.	-	-	-	The New Map of Asia.
Do.	-	-	-	The New Map of Africa.
NORMAN LEYS	-	-	-	Kenya Colony.
L. STODDARD	-	-	-	The Rising Tide of Colour.
G. C. LEWIS	-	-	-	Government of Dependencies.
A. G. KELLER	-	-	-	Colonisation.

PORTUGAL, SPAIN AND HOLLAND.

- | | | | | |
|-----------------|---|---|---|--|
| WATSON, R. G. | - | - | - | Spanish and Portuguese South America during the Colonial period. |
| WHITEWAY, R. S. | - | - | - | The Rise of Portuguese Power in India. |
| ZIMMERMANN, A. | - | - | - | <i>Die Kolonial politik Portugals und Spaniens.</i> |
| MARVAND, A. | - | - | - | <i>Le Portugal et ses Colonies.</i> |
| DANVERS, F. C. | - | - | - | The Portuguese in India. |
| NEVINSON, H. W. | - | - | - | A Modern Slavery. |
| BOURNE E. G. | - | - | - | Spain in America. 1450—1580. |
| CLARKE, H. B. | - | - | - | Modern Spain. 1815—1898. |
| MOSES, B. | - | - | - | The establishment of Spanish Rule in America. |
| ROSCHER, W. | - | - | - | The Spanish Colonial System. |
| MERRIMAN | - | - | - | The Rise of the Spanish Empire. 2 Vols. |
| CHAPMAN, C. E. | - | - | - | A History of Spain. |
| ROOT, W. J. | - | - | - | Spain and its Colonies. |
| LARKINS, W. A. | - | - | - | England's Government of her dependencies compared with that of Spain and France. |
| DAY, C. | - | - | - | The Policy and Administration of the Dutch in Java. |
| PIERSON, N. G. | - | - | - | <i>Kolonial Politik.</i> |
| ZIMMERMANN, A. | - | - | - | <i>Die Kolonial politik der Niederlandsch-India. Vol. V.</i> |
| CABOTON, A. | - | - | - | Java and the Dutch East Indies. |
| MACMILLAN BROWN | - | - | - | The Dutch East. |
| VICTOR CLARK | - | - | - | U. S. Bureau of Labour. Bulletin No. 10, for 1905. |
| ALLEYNE IRELAND | - | - | - | Administration of Far Eastern Dependencies. |
| MONEY, J. W. B. | - | - | - | Java or How to manage a Colony. |
| BARKER, J. E. | - | - | - | The rise and decline of Netherlands. |
| DEKKAR, E. D. | - | - | - | <i>Max Havelaar.</i> |
| SMITH, S. | - | - | - | The Netherlands East Indies. (Commonwealth of Australia Paper No. 120). |

FRANCE.

- ZIMMERMANN, A. - - *Die Kolonial Politik Frankreichs, Vol. IV.*
- Do. - - *Weltpolitisches: Beiträge Und Studien Zur Neueren Kolonial-bewegung.* (The theories of Colonisation as practised by Germany, Great Britain and France, etc.).
- GIRAULT, A. - - *Principes de Colonisation et de Legislation Coloniale.*
- Do. - - *The Colonial Policy of France, Oxford 1917.*
- MEGGLE, A. - - *Le Domaine Colonial de la France. Ses ressources et ses besoins, Paris 1922.*
- ZAY, F. - - *Histoire Monétaire des Colonies Françaises.*
- CHAILLEY-BERT, J. - - *Dix Annees de politique Coloniale.* (An examination of French Colonial Policy).
- CONGRES COLONIAUX QUIN- *Congres des Anciennes Colo-*
QUENNAUX - - *nies tenu à Paris de 2 au 16*
Octobre 1909. (Contains papers on the Administration, Finance, Agriculture, Commerce and Hygiene of the French Colonies).
- MANGIN - - *La Force Noire, 1910.*
- REGISMANSET, C. - - *Questions Coloniales.*
- MALLESON, G. B. - - *L'Indo-Chine Française.*
- DOUMER, P. - - *History of the French in India.*

THE BRITISH EMPIRE.

- EGERTON, H. - - *A short History of British Colonial Policy.*
- Do. - - *British Colonial Policy in the 20th Century.*
- WOODWARD - - *Expansion of the British Empire.*
- LUCAS, C. P. - - *Historical Geography of the British Colonies.*

KEITH, A. B.	-	-	-	Constitution, Administration and Laws of the British Empire.
Do.	-	-	-	Dominion Home Rule in Practice.
Do.	-	-	-	Responsible Government in the Dominions.
IRELAND, A.	-	-	-	The Far Eastern Tropics.
MONTAGU-CHELMSFORD	-	-	-	Report on Constitutional Reforms.
HORNE, E. A.	-	-	-	Political System of British India.
J. H. ROSE	-	-	-	The Development of the European Nations, 1820-1924.
WOOLF, L.	-	-	-	Empire and Commerce in Africa.
EGERTON	-	-	-	Federations and Unions in the British Empire.
Do.	-	-	-	Origin and Growth of English Colonies.
KEITH, A. B.	-	-	-	Select Speeches and Documents on British Colonial Policy, 2 vols.
KEITH	-	-	-	War Government of the British Dominions.
JENKS	-	-	-	The Australian Colonies.
WILLIAMSON	-	-	-	Short History of British Expansion.
SEELEY	-	-	-	Expansion of England.
MAHAN	-	-	-	The influence of Sea-Power upon History.
TREVELYAN	-	-	-	History of the American Revolution.
RAMSAY MUIR	-	-	-	Expansion of Europe.
BOURINOT	-	-	-	Canada.
BEER	-	-	-	Origins of the British Colonial System. 1573-1660.
Do.	-	-	-	The Old Colonial System, 1660-1754.
Do.	-	-	-	British Colonial Policy, 1754-1765.

BRAND	-	-	-	-	•	Union of South Africa.
BRYCE	-	-	-	-	-	South Africa.
LORD CROMER	-	-	-	-	-	Modern Egypt.
MILNER	-	-	-	-	-	England in Egypt.
RICHARD JEBB	-	-	-	-	-	The Imperial Conference, 2 vols.
LYALL	-	-	-	-	-	The rise and expansion of the British Dominion in India.
BASIL WILLIAMS	-	-	-	-	-	Chatham, 2 vols.
DUNCAN HALL	-	-	-	-	-	The British Commonwealth of Nations, 1920.
EGERTON AND GRANT	-	-	-	-	-	Selected Speeches and Docu- ments relating to Canadian Constitutional History, (1907).
LUCAS	-	-	-	-	-	Durham's Report, 2 vols.
EYBERS	-	-	-	-	-	Selected Constitutional Docu- ments illustrating South African History, 1795-1910.
WISE	-	-	-	-	-	The making of the Australian Commonwealth, 1819-1902.
CURTIS	-	-	-	-	-	The Commonwealth of Nations.
Do.	-	-	-	-	-	Dyarchy.
CURREY, C. H.	-	-	-	-	-	British Colonial Policy, 1783- 1915.
COHEN, M.	-	-	-	-	-	An Empire Symposium on important Imperial issues, (1916).
ROBINSON	-	-	-	-	-	The Development of the British Empire.
NEWTON, A. P.	-	-	-	-	-	The Old Empire and the New.
POWELL, E. A.	-	-	-	-	-	Asia at the Cross Roads.
POWELL, N. W.	-	-	-	-	-	The British Empire and World Peace.
WORSFOLD	-	-	-	-	-	The Empire on the Anvil.
YOUNG, D. H.	-	-	-	-	-	A White Australia.
SAUNDERS	-	-	-	-	-	A Self-supporting Empire.
MOWAT, R. B.	-	-	-	-	-	A History of European Diplo- macy, 1815-1914.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

COOLIDGE, A. C.	-	-	-	The United States as a World Power.
ROOT, E.	-	-	-	The Military and Colonial policy of the United States.
FISH, C. R.	-	-	-	American Diplomacy.
VIALATE, A.	-	-	-	Economic Imperialism and international relations during the last 50 years.
WOOLF, L.	-	-	-	Economic Imperialism.
JOHNSON, W. F.	-	-	-	America's Foreign Relations. 2 vols.
MILLS, J. T.	-	-	-	Great Britain and the United States.
TURNER, F. J.	-	-	-	The Frontier in American History.
FARRAND, M.	-	-	-	The Development of the United States.
BOLTON, A. E. AND MARSHALS, T. M.	-	-	-	The Colonisation of North America.
BROWN, J. S.	-	-	-	The United States of America.
BARROWS, D. P.	-	-	-	History of the Philippines.
ELLIOT, C. B.	-	-	-	The Philippines to the end of the Commission Government.
DIAMONON, V. D.	-	-	-	The Development of Self-Government.
DUTCHER, G. M.	-	-	-	The Political Awakening of the East.
HARRISON, F. B.	-	-	-	The Corner-Stone of the Philippines.
JOHNSON, J. E.	-	-	-	The Independence of the Philippines.
KALAW, M. M.	-	-	-	The Present Government of the Philippines.
Do.	-	-	-	Self-Government in the Philippines.
MAYO, K.	-	-	-	The Isles of Fear.
OSMENIA, S.	-	-	-	The Constitutional Development of the Philippines.
PETTIGREW, R. F.	-	-	-	The Course of Empire.
U. S. BUREAU OF INSULAR AFFAIRS	-	-	-	The Philippine Islands, 1913.
U. S. SPECIAL MISSION	-	-	-	Conditions in the Philippine Islands, 1922.

MALCOLM GEORGE	-	-	•	The Government of the Philippines, 1923.
MILLER, H. H.	-	-	-	Economic Conditions in the Philippines, 1923.
WORCESTER, D. C.	-	-	-	The Philippines, Past and Present, 1921.
WALTER LIPPMANN	-	-	-	The Stakes of Diplomacy, 1915.
CHARLES SEIGNOBOS	-	-	-	A Political History of Europe since 1814.
BRYCE	-	-	-	International Relations.
J. HIRAM BINGHAM	-	-	-	The Monroe Doctrine: an obsolete Shibboleth, 1913.
STEPHEN BONSAI	-	-	•	The American Mediterranean.
JOHNSTON AND WOODBURN	-	-	-	American Political History.
PECK	-	-	-	Last Twenty years of the Republic, 1885-1905.
STANWOOD	-	-	-	History of the Presidency, 2 Vols.
J. D. RICHARDSON	-	-	-	Messages and Papers of the Presidents.
MACDONALD	-	-	-	Documentary Source Book.
ROOSEVELT	-	-	-	American ideals and the new Nationalism.
J. R. H. MOORE	-	-	-	An Industrial History of the American People.
D. R. DEWEY	-	-	-	Financial History of the United States.
J. W. FOSTER	-	-	-	A Century of American Diplomacy.
W. H. TAFT	-	-	-	Political issues and outlook.
W. WILSON	-	-	-	The New Freedom.
J. W. FOSTER	-	-	-	American Diplomacy in the Orient.
A. B. HART	-	-	•	The Obvious Orient.
Do.	-	-	-	The Monroe Doctrine.
PAUL S. REINSCH	-	-	-	World Politics.
EDWARD BICKNELL	-	-	-	The Territorial Acquisition of the U. S. 1787-1904.
HINSDALE	-	-	-	The Old Northwest, the beginnings of our Colonial System.
A. D. NOYES	-	-	-	Forty years of American Finance.

MANDATES.

- International Conciliation Document No. 166, September, 1921,
(giving the Constitution of the Permanent Mandates
Commission; Terms of the C. Mandate; Franco-British
Convention of December 23 1920, etc.).
- International Conciliation Document No. 213. October, 1925, by
W. R. Batsell, M.A., on the United States and the System
of Mandates (and also giving information regarding the
Mandate System).
- GIBBONS, H. A. - - - The Defects of the System of
Mandates (The Annals of
the American Academy of
Political and Social Science,
July, 1921).
- HARRIS, J. H. - - - The Mandatory System after
five years working. (The Con-
temporary Review February,
1925.)
- LUGARD, F. - - - The Dual Mandate in Africa.
League of Nations publications on the Mandates Information
Section, League of Nations Secretariat, Geneva (parti-
cularly that of July, 1924).
- LUCAS, C. - - - Partition and Colonisation
of Africa, New York, 1922.
- LUGARD, F. - - - The Mandate System.
(Edinburgh Review, Octo-
ber, 1923).
- PORTER, P. B. - - - Origin of the System of Man-
dates under the League of
Nations (The American Poli-
tical Science Review,
November, 1922).
- SOUTH WEST AFRICA MANDATE The Round Table, June, 1925.
- STOYANOVSKY, J. - - - *La Theorie Generale des
Mandates Internationaux, les
Presses, Universitaires de
France.*
- WORSFOLD, W. B. - - - Palestine and the Mandates
1925. Fisher Unwin, London.

INDEX

A

- ACADIA, 56.
 Aden, 21, 93.
 Afghanistan, 122-123.
 Africa, 33, 58, 61; South, 131.
 — Partition of : Anglo-French Treaties, 146; Anglo-German Treaties, 146; Franco-German Treaties, 146.
 — Tropical, Colonisation of 135.
 Alexander, Sir William, 78.
 Alexandria, 125.
 Algeria, 58, 60, 68, 72.
 American Revolution, 85, 89, 130.
 Anam, 62.
 Anne, Queen, 81.
 Anti-Slavery Society, 87.
 Arabi Pasha, 125, 127.
 Australia, 86, 131, 134, 135.
 Azores, 39.

B

- BACON, FRANCIS, 79.
 Baker, 99.
 Balboa, 29.
 Balfour, Lord, 269.
 Baltimore, Lord, 79.
 Baluchistan, 94.
 Bathurst, 98.
 Belgium, 22.
 Berbice, 45.
 Bismarck, 119, 144.
 Blackford, Lord, 106.
 Board of Trade and Plantations, 82, 85.
 Bodelsen, 115, 116.
 Boer War, 34, 131.
 Borneo, 95.
 Boxer rising, 125.

B.—(Contd.)

- Brazil, 32.
 Brazza, Count of, 11.
 Bright, 103.
British Empire, Colonial Policy of:
 Afghan War, Second, 122-123.
 Africa, opening of and expansion of Empire in, 98-99.
 American Revolution, 85.
 Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Question of removal of, 135.
 Area and population of, 74-75.
 Asia, expansion of Empire in Tibet, Burma, China, Arabia, 94-96.
 British Colonial Policy, causes for success of, 90-91.
 British Imperial problems, 130-140.
 Canada, federation of, 110.
 Canadian rebellion, causes and results of, 108-109.
 Capital, British and Imperialism, 117-118.
 Colonies, Policy of Abandonment of, 104-106.
 — Self-governing, Britain and, 130-133.
 Colonial Policy, 74-140.
 Colonial System, Old, 84-85.
 Convict System in Australia, 99-100.
 Cyprus Convention, 122.
 Disraeli, Contribution to Imperial Sentiments, 116.
 Dominions, Post-war Status of, 132-133.
 — Self-governing, value of, to the British Empire, 136.

B.—(Contd.)

- Durham's report on Canada, 108-109.
 Egypt, anti-foreign movement in, 125.
 — British and French intervention in, 125-126.
 — British Reforms in, 127-128.
 — Modern History of, 124-125.
 — Nationalist Agitation in, 126, 128-129.
 Elgin's Policy in Canada, 109.
 Emigration, 101-102.
 Empire, Classification of the Component parts of, 76.
 — Expansion of, in the XIX century.
 — in the Pacific and Oceania, 97-99.
 Expansion by Chartered Companies, 78-80.
 — by conquest, 81-82.
 — by plantations, 78.
 — by settlement, 80.
 French Revolution and Napoleonic wars effect on the Colonial Policy of Great Britain, 87-90.
 Gladstone's Contribution to Imperialism, 123-124.
 Grey's Policy as Colonial Secretary, 110-111.
 Immigration laws, exclusive, application of to Africa and Australia, 135-136.
 Imperial citizenship, question of, 139.
 Imperial Conference, 132-133.
 Imperial sentiment, causes for the revival of, 117-120.
 — revival of, in England, 115-117.
 Imperialism British, effect of, on democracy, 139-140, 159, 166-167.

B.—(Contd.)

- psychological basis of, 119-120.
 India and the dominions, 133-134.
 — British policy in, 112-114.
 — Lancashire in, 137-138.
 — Nationalist demands of, 138-139.
 — position of, in the Empire.
 — value of, to the Empire, 76, 136-138.
 — views of *Morning Post* on, 137-138.
 — views of Sir John Strachey on, 137-138.
Laissez Faire and Free Trade, School of, 102-104.
 Morrison's Scheme for Colonising Indians in Africa, 135-136.
 Munro's declaration of policy, 112.
 Nationalist Sentiments in Australia, Canada and South Africa, 131-132.
 — in India, 138-139.
 Near East, Consolidation of British power in, 120-124.
 Quebec Act of 1774 and 1791, 86.
 Regulating Act of 1773, 87.
 Revolution, English, and its effects on Colonial policy, 82-83.
 Royal Colonial Institute, foundation of, 115.
 Secretary of State for Colonies, establishment of the office of, 111-112.
 Slavery, abolition of, 100-101.
 Suez Canal, purchase of, 121.
 White Australian Policy, 134-135.
 Buller, Charles, 108.

C

Cabral, 28.
 Cairo, 95.
 Cambodia, 62.
 Camerouns, 71.
 Canada, 131.
 Canadian Rebellion of 1837, 107.
 Cape of Good Hope, 21, 45, 79, 92.
 Capitalistic Colonisation, evils of, 21-27.
 Carlisle, Earl of, 78.
 Carolina, 79.
 Carribean Islands, 78.
Casa de Contratacion, 36.
 Ceylon, 21, 92, 125, 129.

Chartered Companies:

British East Africa Co., 146.
 British North Borneo Co., 146.
 British South Africa Co., 146.
 Dutch East India Co., 42-44.
 French East India Co., 55-56.
 German East Africa Co., 147.
 Hudson Bay Co., 79.
 Labuan Trading Co., 95.
 London East India Co., 79, 93, 112.
 Massachussetts Bay Co., 78.
 Muscovy Co., 79.
 New Zealand Co., 102.
 Portuguese Mozambique Co., 147.
 Royal African Co., 79.
 Royal Niger Co., 146.
 Suez Canal Co., 93.
 Turkey or Levant Co., 79.
 United Africa Co., 99.
 Child, Sir, Josiah and his "Discourse on Trade," 80.
 China, 96.
 Clarke, Sir Andrew, 11.
 Cobden, Richard, 103.
 Cochin-China, 57, 62, 69.
 Colbert, 55.

C.—(Contd.)

Colonisation, Motives of: 1-27.

Church Missionary Society pays subsidy to British Africa Company, 9.
 Closed door, 17-30; in Nauru 19; in W. Africa, 20.
 Colonial trade, volume of and its relation to world trade, 15-16.
 Colonies, classification of, 1-3.
 Colony, definition of, 1.
 Commercial Motive, 12-15. •
 Communication, means of and Colonial expansion, 21-23.
 — as an impetus to imperialism, 21-23.
 Economic imperialism, new, and revival of Colonial expansion, 24-27. (See also 141-147).
 Free trade, policy of, and decline of Colonial expansion, 15-18.
 Islam and Christianity, in Central Africa, Conflict between, 9.
 Land alienation of the natives, 26-27.
 League of Nations and the open door, 18-20.
 Mandates Commission on land tenures, 27.
 Missionary Motive, 6-10.
 Movement of population as the earliest motive, 3-4.
 Spirit of adventure and the desire for geographical discovery, 10-12.
 Surplus population of the world, 4-6, 141.
 Colonisation Society, 102.
 Columbus, 6, 10, 28.
 Condominium, 126, 127.
 Congo Free State, 145.
 Congress of Berlin, 59, 120, 142.
 Congress of Vienna, 120.

C.—(Contd.)

- Convention of London, 45, 97.
Conseil Supérieur des Colonies, 64.
 Cook, Captain, 85-86, 97.
 Coolidge, President, 246, 247.
 Cortez, 10, 11, 35.
 Crimean war, 111.
 Cromer, Lord, 10, 127.
 Cuba, 88.
 Culture system, 49-52.
 Cyprus, 21, 93.
 Cyprus Convention, 122.

D

- De Gama, 28, 31.
 Demerara, 45.
 De Soto, 11, 35.
 Diaz, 28.
 Differential duties, 84.
 Dilke, Sir Charles, 105, 117.
 Disraeli, 93, 116, 117, 123.
 Dollar diplomacy, 148, 157, 159.
 Drake, 10.
 Durham, Lord, 108, 109.
 Dutch East Indies, 46.

E

- Economic Imperialism, 141-169, 157, 159, 161.
 Egypt, 57, 59, 118, 124-129.
 Elgin, Lord, 109, 114.
 Elizabeth, Queen, 79.
 Empire citizenship, 132, 135, 139.

F

- Faideherbe, 11.
 Fellaheen, 127.
 Ferry, 143.
 Fiji, 97, 98.
 France, 54-73, 143.

F.—(Contd.)**France, Colonial Policy of:**

- Africa, French policy in Western and Central, 61-62.
 African empire, north, economic advantages to French of a, 60-61.
 Algeria and Tunisia, Colonisation of, by the Italians, Spanish and the Jews, and not the French, 68-69.
 Asia, South-eastern, French policy in, 62-64.
 Colonial expansion, revival of French, 57-60.
 Colonial activity, first phase of, 55-56.
 Colonies, Administration of, 64-66.
 — closed door in, 72-73.
 — education in, 67.
 — post-war reforms in, 69-70.
 — as military reservoirs 71-72.
 — representation of, in the French parliament, 64.
 Colonisation, aptitudes of the French for, 54.
 Colour prejudice in French Colonies, absence of, 70.
 Lanessan on French Colonial Policy, 67-68.
 Siam, France and, 62-63.
 Struggle between Britain and France and the defeat of France, 56-57.
 Tropical Colonies, Government of, 63-65.
 Washington Conference, France and, 61.
 Free Trade, 23-24, 103, 114, 144.
 French Revolution, 141, 142.
 Frere, Sir Bartle, 10.
 Froude, Anthony, 117.

G

GAMBIA, 98.
 Gandhi, Mahatma, 75.
 German Colonial Movement, 144.
 German Colonies, 134.
 Gibraltar, 21, 81.
 Gilbert, Sir Humphrey, 78.
 Gladstone, William Ewart, 103, 115, 117, 123, 125.
 Gold Coast, 98.
 Goldia, Sir George, 10, 12.
 Gordon, 99.
 Great Britain, 21, 22, 74-140.
 Greece, 93.
 Grey, Lord, 110, 114.
 Grey, Sir George, 111, 115.
 Guadaloupe, 63, 66, 89.
 Guiana, British, 89, 99.

H

HALIFAX, 81.
 Harding, President, 242, 243, 246.
 Harrison, Governor-General, 183.
 Hastings, Warren, 87, 89.
 Hawaii, 23, 97, 154-156.
 Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, 17, 161.
 Haiti, 30.
 Hedjaz, 69.
 Henry the Navigator, 28.
 Hinterland doctrine, 145, 146.
 Hobhouse, Prof : 120.
 Holland, 40-53, 153.

Holland, Colonial Policy of :

Colonial policy of 40-53.
 Culture System in Java, 49-51.
 Dutch Colonial Policy, causes for the success of, 52-53.
 Dutch East India Company, 42-43.

H.—(Contd.)

Dutch East Indies, area and population of, 46.
 — administration of, in the XVII century, 41-46.
 Governor-General, his power and functions, 47.
 Java, administration of 47-49.
 — recent reforms in, 53.
 Napoleonic wars in Holland and Dutch Colonial Policy, 45-46.
 Provincial and Local Governments, 48.
 Spice trade of the Dutch in the East, 41, 44.
 Temperate regions, failure the Dutch to colonise, 44-45.
 Holy Alliance of Russia, Prussia and Austria, 91.
 Honduras, British, 99.
 Hong Kong, 23, 95, 97.
 Humboldt, 11.
 Huskisson, 102, 103.

I

Imperial Foreign policy, 133.
 Imperial Preference, 18, 132; in Samoa, 19.
 Imperial War Cabinet, 132.
 India, 76, 106, 134, 135, 136-139.
 Indo-China, 63.
 Industrial Revolution, 141.
 Ionian Islands, 92.
 Ireland, 136.
 Irish Free State, 131.

J

JAPAN, 133, 135
 Java, 41, 44, 45, 46-52,
 John I, 28.

K

- KALAT, 94.
 Kamarun, 54.
 Karachi, 94.
 Kenya, 100.
 Kitchener, Sir Herbert (later Lord), 127.
Kolonialverein, 144.
 Kuria Muria Islands, 21, 93.

L

- LABUAN, 95.
 Lagos, 99.
Laisssez Faire (see under Free-trade).
 Lanessan, 67.
 Lapsalle, 11.
 Laurier, Sir Wilfred, 131.
 League of Nations, 18, 61, 71.
 132-133, 253-278.

League of Nations and the Mandates System.

- Anti-slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, 262, 265.
 'C,' Class Mandates, no open door in, 270.
 Classification of Mandates, 262-265; conditions and obligations of 'A' class Mandates, 262; of 'B' and 'C' class Mandates, 262-263.
 Conflict of Colour and the future of world peace, 276, 277-278.
 Constitution of the Permanent Mandates Commission, 261; its powers and functions, 265-268; Names of Mandatories and the Mandates territories, 264.
 Contribution to the Mandate Principle of: Hobson, 256-257; Olivier, 258, 263.
Round Table, 255, 257; Smuts, 256-257.

L.—(Contd.)

- Controversy between U. S. and England about oil interests in Mesopotamia, 268-269 (See also Mesopotamia Oil Co., 19).
 — U. S. and Japan over the island of Yap, 269.
 Corfu Affair, 266.
 Education in Mandates, 270-271.
 Forced labour, slavery, arms and liquor traffic, prohibition of, 267-268.
 Freedom of Conscience, 270.
 International Council of Advice, Sir Harry Johnston's Scheme on, 273-274.
 League and the backward peoples, 274-276.
 — success of, in imposing obligations on the Mandatory powers, 267.
 Lugard, Sir Frederick, 261.
 Mandate System, origin of, 255-259; precedents of, 259-260; principles of, 257-258; criticisms of, 271-273; suggested improvements, 273-274.
 Pan-African Congress, 261.
 Post-war reforms in the Colonies, 277, principle of economic equality in the mandated areas, application of, 268-270.
 Sau-Remo Agreement, 268-269.
 Slave and liquor traffic in the mandated areas, prohibition of, 267-268.
 Tropical products, importance of, 147, 253-254.
 — and the Industrial revolution, 254.
 Tropics, Control of, 253.
 Leopold II, 144.
 Leroy-Beaulieu, 66.

L.—(Contd.)

Lesseps, Ferdinand de, 121.
 Liberia, 152.
 Livingstone, David, 6, 10, 98,
 99.
 Lloyd George, 139.
 Locke, John, 80.
 Louis XIV, 55, 56.
 Louisburg, 82.
 Lugard, Sir Frederick, 261.

M

MACKENZIE, WILLIAM, REVOLT
 OF, 108.
 Madagascar, 56, 58, 62, 66.
 Madeira, 39.
 Mahdi, the, 127.
 Mahomet Ali, 124.
 Malta, 21, 92, 128.
 Malthus, 102.
 Manchester School, 106, 107,
 114.
 Mandates Commission, 22, 261-
 268.
 Mangen, General, 70.
 Manila, 23, 160, 179.
 Marlborough, Duke of, 78.
 Martinique, 63, 66, 89.
 Maryland, 78.
 Mauritius, 45, 89.
 McKinley, President, 161, 173,
 175, 245.
 Magellan, 29.
 Mercantile System, 80, 83, 84,
 103.
 Mexico, 35.
 Midway Island, 23.
 Milner, Lord, 128, 129.
 Montagu, E.S., 137.
 Montford Reforms, 113.
 Morocco, 39-40, 54, 58-59, 60,
 64, 68, 118, 126.
 Morrison, Sir Theodore, 135.
 Munro, Sir Thomas, 112.
 Muscat, 94.

N

NACHTIGAL, 10.
 Napoleon III, 57, 94.
 Navigation Acts, 14, 79, 84.
 New Caledonia, 97.
 Newfoundland, 102.
 New Zealand, 86, 102, 131.
 Northcliffe, Lord, 134.
 Nova Scotia, 81, 102.

O

OPEN-DOOR POLICY, 18, 145,
 160, 268.
 Opium War, First, 95.
 Orellana, 35.

P

PARIS, TREATY OF, 81, 90.
 Paton, John, 98.
 Peace Conference, 132, 133.
 Penn, William, 79, 80.
 Pennsylvania, 80.
 Peru, 35.
 Peter D. R., 10.
 Philip II, 38.
 Philippines, 88, 97, 170, 252.

Philippines:—

Act of 1902, 180-182.
 Agriculture and farm schools,
 226-227.
 Agriculture and industries,
 development of, 234-242.
 Agricultural production,
 statistics of, 236.
 American policy from 1899-
 1916, summary of, 184-185.
 American rule in, four
 periods of, 173-175.
 — economic aspects of, 241-
 242.
 Annual enrolment in public
 schools, statistics of, 219,
 222.
 Area and population of, 170.

P.—(Contd.)

- Assembly, inauguration of, 181.
- Assembly and Commission, Conflict between, 182.
- broken by the policy of Governor-General Harrison, 182-183.
- Bureau of Agriculture, activities of,—farm advisers and demonstrative farms, 237-238.
- functions of, 234-235.
- Bureau of Insular Affairs, powers and functions, 189-190.
- Bureau of Science, Forestry and Weather, 240-241.
- Contrast between the Viceroy of India and the Philippine Governor-General, 244.
- Council of State, 207-208.
- Death-rate and sanitation, comparative statistics of, 233.
- Defence, Military and Naval, Cost of, Borne by U. S. 215.
- Departments and Bureaus, 199-200.
- Education, Health and Sanitation, 219-233.
- Education, Expenditure on, 213-214.
- per capita expenditure on, 230.
- Fairfield Bill, 251.
- Financial Condition of, 212-218.
- General Wood's Administration, 244-247.
- Governor-General 195-203; his powers and functions, 196-198.
- Harrison's Policy, 180.
- testimony, 248-249.
- Health Service, Philippine, 231-233.

P.—(Contd.)

- History of, 170-175.
- Home Government of, 186-190.
- House of Representatives, Speaker of, 208-209.
- Iwahig Penal Colony, 212.
- Jones Acts of 1916-193-195.
- Justice, administration of 209-212.
- Languages of, 172.
- Legislature of, 203-209; Constitution, powers and functions, 181, 203-206.
- Library Movement in, 228-229.
- Literacy in, 220.
- Local Self-government in, 175-179.
- Manila, Government of, 179-180.
- McKinley's policy in, 173.
- Moral and Material Progress, Summary of, 243.
- Filippinisation, policy of, 183.
- Political developments in, recent, 242-252; Independence movement, 248-252; first independence mission to Washington, 248-249; second and third independence missions, 250-252.
- Political progress, survey of, 242-244.
- Presidential Control over, 187-188.
- President Coolidge's policy, 247-248.
- Harding's policy, 243, 246, 247.
- President Wilson's farewell message to Congress and Philippines, 249-250.
- Provincial Government of, 184.
- Public debt in, 217-218.

P.—(Contd.)

- Public utilities, nationalisation of—railroads, banks, industries, development Companies, etc., 215-217.
 Revenue and expenditure of, 213-215.
 Resident Commissioners to U. S. their powers and functions, 190-192.
 Rural Credit Societies, 238-239.
 Schools, classification of, 223-225.
 — Agricultural and farm, 226-227.
 — physical education in, 227-228.
 — statistics of annual enrolment in, 219, 222.
 — vocational education in, 225-226.
 School Board, constitution and functions of, 221.
 Spanish rule in, 172-173.
 Supreme Court, Constitution, jurisdiction and functions of, 209-211.
 University of, 229-230.
 Vice-Governor, 198-199.
 Voters, number of, in, 179.
 — qualifications of, 178, 181.
 Wood-Forbes Commission, 249-251.
 Wood, Governor-General, policy in, 244, 245.
 Picton, Colonel, 87.
 Pitcairn Island, 97.
 Pitt, William (Chatham), 81.
 Pitt's India Act, 87.
 Pizarro, 11, 35.
 Pondicherry, 66.
 Porto Rico, 88.
 Portugal, 28-34, 143.

P.—(Contd.)**Portugal, Colonial Policy of:**

- Administration of Portuguese West Indies, System of, 31-32.
 Colonial Policy of, 28-34.
 Decline of Portuguese power, causes for, 32-33.
 Explorations of the XV Century, 28.
 Portuguese Empire at the present day, extent of, 32-34.
 Slave Trade, volume of, 29.
 Trade in Portugal, State Monopoly of, 30-31.
 Protective tariffs, 84, 147, 161.

Q

- Quebec Act, 82, 86, 108, 130.

R

- Raffles, Sir Stamford, 11, 45.
 Rajah Brooke, 10, 11.
 Raleigh, 10.
 Regulating Act of Lord North, 82, 87.
 Reunion, 63.
 Rhodes, Cecil, 10, 11, 22.
 Rhodesia, South, 100.
 Ricardo, 102.
 Richelieu, 4.
 Ritter, 11.
 Roe, Sir Thomas, 79.
 Rohlf, D. R. Gerhand, 11.
 Royal Colonial Institute, 115, 117.
 Ruanda-Uranda, 121.
 Russell, Lord John, 114.
 Russo-Turkish War, 94.

S

- Said Pasha, 121.
 Samoa, 22.
 Sandeman, Sir William, 11.

S.—(Contd.)

Seeley, 117.
 Suez Canal, 21, 121, 125, 126.
 Seven Years War, 82, 87.
 Seychelles, 92.
 Siam, 63.
 Sierra-Leone, 87, 98.
 Singapore, 23, 97.
 Six power loan to China, 148.
 Slavery, abolition of, 29-30, 100, 101.
 Smith, Adam, 102.
 — Goldwin, 105.
 — Sydney, 100.
 Socotra, 21, 93.
 Somali Coast, 21.
 South Sea Island, 98.
 Spain, 34-40, 143.

Spain, Colonial Policy of:

America, Spanish Congress in, 35.
 — Spanish trade with, in gold and other precious metals, 35-36.
 Church, State of, in the Colonies, 37.
 Colonial Policy of, 34-40.
 Colonies, administration of, 32-38.
 — trade, Monopoly of, 36.
 Failure of Spanish Colonial empire, causes of, 37-38.
 Gold trade, 12, 36.
 Monroe doctrine, application of, to Spanish Guiana, 39.
 Morocco, Spanish Policy in, 39-40.
 Spanish American Colonies, revolt of, 39.
 Spheres of influence, 146.
 Spooner Amendment, 175.
 Stanley, 10.
 Stephen, Sir James, 106.
 Sudan, 99, 126.
 Syria, 54.

T

Taft, William, 148, 175.
 Tangier, 40.
 Tasmania, 100.
 Temperate or Settlement Colonies, 99.
 Tibet, 96.
 Togo, French, 71.
 Togoland, 54.
 Tongking, 62.
 Tourane, 62.
 Trinidad, 89.
 Tunisia, 59, 64, 68, 72.

U

United States, 22, 24, 105, 148-149.

United States, Economic Imperialism of:

Africa, Partition of: Anglo-French Treaties, 146; Anglo-German Treaties, 146; Franco-German Treaties, 146.
 American Colonisation Society, 151.
 American Policy in the Carribean Sea, 156-157.
 — in the Hawaii and Pacific, 154-156.
 — in the Philippines, 170-192.
 Capital, increase of, 148, 150, 162.
 Carribean Sea, proposal for the annexation by U. S. of European Colonies in the, 158-159.
 Contract Debts, recovery of, 163-164.
 Dollar diplomacy of U. S. 157-159.
 Economic Imperialism of U. S., 141-169;—Motives, 141-142.

U.—(Contd.)

- Expansion, Constitutional basis of, 168-169.
 — Continental, of the territory of U. S., 148-150.
 — extra-Continental, 151-153; motives for, 153-154.
 Financial protectorate, U. S. and, 163.
 Financial relation between U. S. and Philippine Islands, 168-169.
 — and other countries, 168.
 Hague Conference of, 1907, 164.
 Insular Cases, 168.
 Inter-oceanic Canal, 161.
 Latin America, attitude of, to U. S., 164-165.
 Liberia, 152.
 Monroe Doctrine, application of, to Carribean, 157-158; to Hawaii, 155.
 Panama Canal, 161.
 — exemption of tolls, 17.
 Population of U. S., increase of, 150.
 — of the World, 4, 141-150.
 Porter Resolution, 164.
 Preferential trade of U. S. with its Colonies, 168-169.

U.—(Contd.)

- War Debt, Cancellation of in exchange for European Colonies, 157.
 Utrecht, Treaty of, 81.

V

- VANE, SIR HARRY, 79.
 Venables, 79.
 Venezuela, 99.
 Vespricco, 29.

W

- Wakefield, Gibbon, 4, 101, 103, 114.
 Washington Conference, 60-61.
 Wellesley, 89.
 Whatley, Archbishop, 100.
 Wilberforce, 87.
 William III, 81.
 Wilson, President, 148, 182, 249, 250, 259.
 Wissman, 11.

Z

- Zaghlul Pasha, 129.
 Zanzibar, 62, 94.

